Taste : a commentary on its genesis, nature and claims by Kokkoris, Panos
TASTE: A COMMENTARY ON ITS GENESIS, NATURE AND CLAIMS
by
PANOS KOKKORIS
Dip]. Arch. National Technical University of Athens
1977
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the requirements for the
Degree of
Master of Architecture in Advanced Studies
at the
,1 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
September 1980
@ Panos Kokkoris, 1980.
The Author hereby grants M.I.T. permission to reproduce and to distri-
bute publicly copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Signature of Author
Department of Architecture
July 8, 1980
C- -'. ,
Certified b
Accepted by
5tforp Anderson, Professor
offHistory and Architecture
Thesis Supervisor
Pr es or Julian Bfina i, Chairman
MASSA Departmental Co mittee for Graduate StudentsMASSACHUSEj-J-S INSTITU TEOF TECHNOLOGY
SEP 2 5 1980
LBRARIES
i
ii
To 'Sylve', with love and gratitude
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My thanks go to professor Stanford Anderson who has been a source
of ideas and a creative stimulus to me; to professor Julian Beinart
for reading the draft; to Olga Michelis; to Suzanne Ehly. This
work has been made possible, in part, with the help of an
'Alexander Onassis Foundation' scholarship.
iv
Taste: A Commentary on its Genesis, Nature and Claims
by
Panos Kokkoris
Submitted to the Department of Architecture on July 8, 1980, in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of
Architecture in Advanced Studies.
ABSTRACT
In the first section, taste, along with parallel phenomena linked
to form and symbolism in general, is discussed in relation to the
fundamental device of the reason-feeling dichotomy. The dichotomy's
internal possibilities of significance and basic ways in which these
have at times affected esthetics are traced. Examples are used which
range from ancient Greek philospohy, via the 18th century, to
Wittgenstein.
The latter's gradual evolution from a position of unyielding separa-
tion of rational, valid knowledge from fantasy and the 'unspeakable',
towards an increasingly unified view of language and conceptualiza-
tion as phenomena rooted in wide social contexts, serves as the
point leading into, as well as the basic idea underlying, the second
section. Accordingly, issues relevant to a 'game' notion of taste
are brought forth, such as the continuity (as opposed to any clearcut
and schematical division) of experience and of the processes of
perception and conception; the idea of utility, convention as an
indispensable means of obtaining knowability, communicability, and
persistence of our mental constructions, either scientific, or
esthetic, or religious, etc.; prejudice, appearing as an ineluctable
factor underlying our arguments; or, the phenomenon of esthetic
polarities, being the result of fundamental traits (or 'rules') of
the 'game'. Juxtaposed to these issues is the theme of the autonomy
of art and taste, chiefly as it was propounded by Kant.
Genuine autonomy is disputed in the ends of the second and in thev
beginnings of the third section, and it is by way of this dispu-
tation that the game notion is resumed. This time, in a more ex-
tended sense, i.e. as centering upon the search for order in the
conceptions of nature. The implication of this for a commentary on
the phenomenon of taste is that, whatever the techniques appropri-
ated and the results sought, whatever the specific biases of art,
form-giving, and form-appreciating at different times, a possibil-
ity of unification may be presented. That possibility results
from considering the general ground of perception and conceptualiza-
tion, i.e. the tendency to effect an ordering of experience what-
soever. However, by unification, nothing of the sort of a smoothly
functioning though artificial and forced generalization is meant.
On the contrary, what is implied is an attempt to visualize, in the
sphere of formal systems, what Michel Foucault calls a 'discursive
unity'. That is, a discourse unified not by virtue of any consis-
tency or continuity reigning over it, but rather by virtue of
clashes, contradictions, discontinuities, which may nevertheless
have a common locus. In terms of form, conceptions of orderable
nature are taken to formulate such a common locus of diverse formal
systems, and the hypothesis is brought forth of a possibility of
'discursive' unification of formal and esthetic incompatibilities,
on the grounds of subtle threads that link them with intergral
epistemologies or world-views.
Thesis Supervisor: Stanford Anderson
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section i
THE REASON-FEELING DICHOTOMY
In a sense, the progress of mankind might be estimated in terms of
the progress of analysis. I try to imply this, that the unfolding
of history has been marked, among other things, by a gradually in-
creasing tendency towards efficient separation. Separation of men,
according to distinctions of courage, venerability, power, skill;
of classes, according to birth, freedom, granted or acquired privi-
lege; of objects according to the respective place they supposedly
held in the surroundings of men, with regard to usefulness, value,
therapeutic properties, desirability entailed by scarcity, or curio-
sity aroused by lack of knowledge and familiarity; so that if one
turns to any stage of human history and looks at any of its levels -
power relationships, administration, production networks, scientific
achievements, the formation of relationships based on notions such
as morality, justice, respect, etc. - one is likely to encounter the
same formal arrangement: a deployment of separate entities, either
horizontally or vertically, in a hierarchized system - the criteria
applied for the separation as well as the subtlety and the detail
attained by the mechanism of separation notwithstanding.
It is not only with respect to the manipulation of a community, a
society, a state, or man's needs for self-preservation (food, defense,
shelter, etc.) or of the objects that surround him, to the existence 2
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of which he has to adjust his own existence, that the force of
separation has been exerted. It has equally powerfully permeated
man himself as an individuality, and has turned that in him which
lies over and beyond his visible body and functions, namely his
sensitivity, his perceptive abilities, his pains, joys, decisions,
thoughts, dreams, fears, visualizations and remembrances, into one
of its proper domains. It is as though mankind would not rest con-
tent with exerting its dissecting formations upon society or the
world of objects only. Analysis had to interfere with the mind too.
Thus a model was created to which, or to variations and modifications
of which man has so ardently adhered throughout history that it has
ended up as one of the most basic, elementary and supposedly infall-
ible notions: the reason-feeling dichotomy. This formidable model
has been used exhaustively by the great majority of thinkers and
philosophical schools, and has appeared as a major normative or
explanatory element in virtually every epistemology, religion,,
"weltanschauung" in general; but, probably its most pre-eminent
abode has been the realm of art and, consequently, that of esthetics.
I find it extremely difficult to conceive of a single argument about
art or any other situation in which there is room for questions of
beauty, taste, esthetic considerations and the like, which won't
proceed or eventually end by resorting steadily to feeling, on the
grounds that feeling, as opposed to reason, supposedly provides
such issues apparently not liable to precise description and 4
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explanation with a legitimate sphere in which to exist. In addition,
it is concerning not only the esthetic appreciation and evaluation
of artistic products and other objects, but also, and principally,
art as creation that feeling has been persistently adduced as a
general concept shedding more or less light on it.
It appears thus, that analysis as a tendency peculiar to human
evolution not only brought about the reason-feeling dichotomy as a
result of its application to man - the result of the 'anatomical'
dissection of his 'soul', so to speak - but was in turn supported and
furthered by it, in the sense that the dichotomy was used as a
criterion for separation of and demarcation between domains. In
other words, the dichotomy certainly resides in man's 'inside', but
nonetheless, at the same time is made to turn towards the 'outside',
to ponder on it and to collect information about it.
The above general remarks suffice, I think, as the ground for the
formulation of two basic questions, the discussion of which will
be the task of this section. These concern:
1. An examination of the theoretical possibilities of the reason-
feeling dichotomy as a concept. More specifically, what has been
the meaning sought for by means of it? What are the implications
underlying it? What has been aspired at which made it necessary for
the dichotomy to appear? What have been the relative values attri-
buted to each part of it? Have these been stable or did they 6
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alternate? To what extent has the dichotomy been made into a
polarity - its constituents being viewed as incompatible - and,
alternatively, in which cases has it assumed the status of a unity -
a reconciliation of the constituents being thought of as possible?
2. A general retracing of the role played by the dichotomy in
the realm of esthetics by discussions of representative examples.
More concisely, the above two questions refer to 1) the dichotomy
as a tool, rooted in man for the demarcation between and individu-
alization/characterization of objective realms, and 2) the appliance
of the dichotomy in one such realm, that of esthetics.
THEORETICAL POSSIBILITIES OF THE DICHOTOMY
One might start by asking what is meant by reason and feeling
respectively. It is obvious that there is no fixedness and unequivo-
cality here. At a first glance, reason may connote a mundane level
of common sense; that is, it may serve as a selective label for and
characteristic property of all those actions, decisions, thoughts,
explanations and beliefs upon which the greater part of a regular
practical life depends. On the other hand, it may signify a more
highly valued though more or less ellusive authority, conceived of
as belonging either in man or impersonally in nature, an authority
which bears legislative power, i.e., which imposes necessity upon
things. In the third place reason may be viewed as a combinative
force partaking of both man and nature, by means of which as a 8
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sine qua non condition, these entities can, ideally, deontologically
co-exist. As regards feeling, it may just'mean sensing states of
equilibrium or disequilibrium in our organism, which depend upon the
interaction of this organism with its environment, for instance,
feeling of pleasure, pain, fatigue, respiratory difficulty, etc.
However, by feeling one may also understand an office, granted a
unique position in our mental make-up, by which things which appear
mysterious and irreducible to 'reasonable' explanations are custom-
arily administered. To develop a third possible meaning for feeling,
one has only to extend the previous notion so as to make it charac-
teristic of parts of the objective reality outside us. In this sense,
our 'subjective' feeling of obscure experiences made to harmonize
with the 'objective' realm of 'feeling', or to put it differently,
that of 'spirit', may be viewed as a deep source of knowledge.
It follows that the fields of experience which are to be subsumed
under either feeling or reason, and thence the objective territories
proper to be administered by their respective authorities, vary
accordingly with the differentiations of their meanings. Therefore
we may think of a distribution-separation in which reason is supposed
to deal with those things that are unanimously seen, touched,
sensed in the immediate vicinity of man and about the existence and
nature of which no dispute is likely to be raised; whereas those
other problematical, awesome, unknowable things occuring both at a
level of uncontrollable privacy but also, probably, at one situated 10
It has sometimes been said that what we feel is always some-
thing existing here and now.. .whereas what we think is always
something eternal,...existing everywhere and always... If we
compare the flux of feeling to the flow of a river, thought has
at least the relative solidity and permanence of the soil and
rocks that make its channel," Coll.ingwood, R.G., "The Principles
of Art", Oxford University Press, 1979, pp. 158-159.
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outside the authoritative limits of public perception and agreement
are declared the denizens proper of feeling. Such a scene would be
organized upon this variation of the model. Reason and the immedi-
ate, the comprehensible, the explicable. Feeling and the ungrasp-
able, the mysterious, the elusive. Or, there might be a separation
according to which feeling would be declared pertinent to the realm
of the immediate, the transient, the realm addressed chiefly to our
senses, whereas reason would be thought of as rising higher than
this, capable of establishing or discovering immutable realities by
which, then, we would have to abide. Such a variation of the model
might be 'coded' as follows: Reason and the permanent, the neces-
sary, the universal. Feeling and the fluid, the contingent, the
particular. Incidentally, it seems that this specific interpretation
of the reason-feeling dichotomy is one that has achieved great cred-
ibility and relatively greater persistence than other alternatives.1
In addition, to sketch a third possibility, we may conceive of both
reason and feeling addressing 'elevated' realms, apparently trans-
cending the territories of either common sense or immediate sensation,
claiming jointly higher knowledge and order though of a different
kind each. In this case the level of the 'beyond' does not yield to
either of the two exclusively, but is shared by both, nonetheless
made into a double-faceted whole. I will presently have several
opportunities to explain why I tend to believe that such a posited
co-existence-yet-dichotomy of reason-feeling in one and the same
territory, however diversified this may be (the diversification 12
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providing the apparent ground for such a parting within a single
whole); why such an amiitious balance is precarious, unstable and
tending to dissolve in to either the first or the second alternatives
given above, i.e. into a constellation wherein the beyond is com-
mended either to feeling or to reason.
What, as a corrollary of the above going discussion of the various
meanings and territories of experience possibly attributable to
reason-feeling respectively, seems to me worth bearing in mind is
the following supposition, namely: that in general, reason and
feeling appear in a state of antagonism. Such a state involves either
a mood of mutual exclusion - the one side claimed, as it were, legi-
timate, the other illegitimate - or a mood of adoption, taming/
'domestication' of the one by the other, through achieving a sort of
allegiance. Exceptionally, a conciliation, harmonization may be
effected, its possible rootedness and stability notwithstanding.
THE DICHOTOMY IN ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY
In their various views about art and related ideas - the aristic
process, the effect of art upon people, its purpose, 'criticism' of
art etc. - the Greek philosophers made ample use of the reason-
feeling dichotomy. Throughout their discussions virtually every
possible meaning for the parts of the dichotomy, as well as virtually
every possible realm of experience correspondent to them, may be 14
2Tatarkiewicz, W. "History of Aesthetics", Paris,
p. 15.
1974, V.I.,
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encountered. For instance, here is an account given of the position
occupied by the dichotomy in archaic Greece:
Two streams appeared in Greek religion; one of them
embodying a spirit of order, clarity, and naturalness,
the other a spirit of mystery... The Olympian religion,
humanist and adaptable, conquered Greek poetry and
sculpture... This religion permeated the art of the
Greeks... Mystical religion is less noticeable..., at
least as far as poetry and sculpture are concerned.
Music, however, served that religion and was therefore
interpreted in accordance with its spirit. But Greek
mystical religion was chiefly revealedin philosophy and
through philosophy it influenced esthetics. While one
stream of early esthetics was an expression of philoso-
phical enlightenment, the other was an expression of
mystico-religious philosophy.2
This being a very general distinction it may nevertheless serve us
as a framework wherein adjustments, modifications and variations
of the dichotomy might find their proper place. From the first
'stream', for example, we may extract or anticipate such possible
implications as the following:
The 'order, clarity and naturalness' refer to a version of ration-
ality, tamed, so to speak, and made subservient to the requirements
of well-organized secular life. It could be viewed as what has
been referred to above as common sense.
However, these properties, if extended and granted a certain autonomy 16
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of existence, if made to reflect universal necessities, readily
connote transcendent spheres, and assume an austerity of the mind
felt when we encounter deep and perennial questions as those of
the existence and nature of the universe and of man.
To take the diametrically opposite interpretation, this 'enlighten-
ment' might also imply a more or less exclusive confidence in the
immediacy and indisputability of the thing.sensed, as opposed to
the endless regress involved in the thing thought. Contrasting to
the above possible interpretations of the 'enlightened' branch of
archaic Greek religion (the immediate, either 'reasoned' or 'felt'
and the beyond, given in a status of confident, 'ordered', 'clear',
and 'natural' intelligibility), the mystical counterpart brings
forward that meaning of feeling which has been presented above as
properly transcendent: the beyond, awesome and incomprehensible
by reason; a realm whose manifestations can be vaguely conceived
only by our irrational faculty of feeling.
It is in this context of potential richness of the reason-feeling
dichotomy as a concept indispensable to the manipulation of nature
and man that, among the Greeks, art was given explanations as to
its nature as an activity, as to its purposes; as to its perfection;
as to the aspects of man it properly affects. In addition, it is
by virtue of the general instability ofa reason-feeling equilibrium
that gradual transformations, reformulations and redistributions
of the exegesis of art occurred, thus often rendering its alternative 18
3Ibid., p. 28
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versions utterly incompatible. But, to be sure, beneath the most
part of this expanse of diverse explanations of the problem of art
there can be witnessed a stable common ground, besides that of a
certain historical continuity and successive influence, i.e. the
practice of separation. So, "poetry", it was thought, "thanks to
divine inspiration, gives knowledge of the highest order; it leads
the soul, it educates men, it is capable of making them better.
Art, on the other hand, does something quite different: it pro-
duces useful and sometimes perfect objects. " Presumably this
account of poetry, as opposed to 'art', or the rest of that which
more or less we nowadays understand by the 'arts', is not exactly
the same as the one given before whereby 'poetry and sculpture'
have been associated with 'enlightened' religion. Poetry here comes
closer to incomprehensible mysticism, seems to resist 'order',
'clarity', and 'naturalness', (at least to some extent) and recalls
of music, since it is actuated by 'divine inspiration', although
not completely, since it 'gives Knowledge of the highest order'.
It is as though that part of the 'beyond' claimed by reason (know-
ledge) has been brought very close to that claimed by feeling
(inspiration).
THE PYTHAGOREANS: FEELING 'DOMESTICATED' BY REASON
Indeed, such a rapprochement appears to underly the philosophy of
the Pythagoreans, whose foundations betray an equivocal character, 20
4Popper, K.R., "Conjectures and Refutations", London, 1965,
Ch. 2.
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being scientific on the one hand, and religious-moral on the other.
For the Pythagoreans the whole world could be reduced to a sort of
elaborate mathematical construction. This conviction was given
rise to by
two discoveries. The first was that a prima facie
qua)itative phenomenon such as musical harmony, was, in
essense, based upon the purely numerical ratios
1:2;2:3;3:4. The second was that the 'right' angle...
was connected with the purely numerical ratios 3:4:5 or
5:12:13 (the sides of rectangular triangles). These two
discoveries, it appears, led Pythagoras to the somewhat
fantastic generalisation that all things are, in essence,
numbers or ratios of numbers; or that number is the
ratio (logos = reason), the rational essence, of things,
or their real nature. 4
It is interesting to trace the grounds on which this 'fantastic gener-
alisation' proceeded so as to take hold not only of objects at large
but also animate beings, and eventually abstract properties and
states of mind.
The main application (of the theory) was to plane figures,
or shapes, or 'Forms'. These were believed to be char-
acterized by the appropriate sequence of numbers, and
thus by the numerical ratios of the consecutive numbers
of the sequence. In other words, 'Forms' are numbers or
ratios of numbers. On the other hand, not only shapes of
things, but also abstract properties, such as harmony
and 'straightness' are numbers. In this way the general 22
5Tatarkievicz, op. cit., pp. 86-87
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theory that numbers are the rational essences of all
things is arrived at.
To facilitate the comprehension of the abrupt leap from 'shapes'
to 'abstract properties', we should bear in mind that the reduction
of forms to numbers could be effected only by means of substituting
a diagram constituted of dots for the contours of the shape, or for
the entire expanse of the form. In such a way the form or shape
could be represented by a certain distribution of computable dots,
the distribution nevertheless resembling the figure it was derived
from. Therefore, "it seems probable that the development of this
view", i.e., that even abstract properties are numbers "was influ-
enced by the similarity of the dot-diagrams with the diagrams of a
constellation such as the Lion, or the Scorpion, or the Virgo. If
a Lion is an arrangement of dots it must have a number. In this way
Pythagoreanism seems to be connected with the belief that the numbers,
or 'Forms', are heavenly shapes of things". Now in such a conception
of the universe brought under the sweeping power of reason, number
is the fundamental principle, the common nature of all things.
However, besides number, viewed as a fundamental, yet crude form
of affinity, things in this rationalized universe are brought to-
gether, made to co-exist consistently by virtue of another force,
i.e. harmony. Harmony is itself, according to the above argument,"
a mathematical, numerical disposition, depending on number, measure,
and proportion".5 It is the number par excellence, one might assume,
and it parallels, complements number in being "a property of the 24
6Ibid., pp. 86-87. The original meaning of the word cosmos, i.e.
universe, was 'order'.
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cosmos".6 Thus harmony effects an extension of the meaning of the
concept of number (as a raison d'etre for the widest range of things
in the universe, considered individually), by introducing a sense
of the raison d'etre of all things placed in a consistent scene/
setting, characterized by compact togetherness and mutual collabor-
ation. It is due to the workings of harmony, therefore, that dif-
ferent, dissimilar elements are brought into a ruling condition of
unity.
As far as human activities are concerned, the above had the following
consequence: Human creations, not only artistic ones but human
behavior generally, can secure their endurance within the universe
only insofar as they possess harmony, i.e. unity of parts on the
one hand, and number, measure and proportion on the other. For since
the whole range of existence is confined within that realm exclu-
sively and absolutely dominated by harmony and number, i.e., reason,
how could it be possible for anything to exist in defiance of these
sovereign properties without condemning itself to topple down into
chaos? This is the image of a perfectly functioning and strictly
regimented system perpetually going on, to which admission is granted
solely upon satisfaction of the most demanding stipulations of
conformity, whereas what fails to meet them is a leftover, evil,
false, 'ugly and useless'. Now it is important that the following
fact be stressed, namely that all this does not constitute an
esthetic theory at all. On the contrary, it is pure epistemology, 26
7See below, section iii.
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and at most, moral theory. Harmony, number, proportion, measure,
regularity, symmetry were not originally aesthetic prescriptions
(in the sense we tend to understand the term today); they had no
such meaning. They were thought of as mere instruments contributing
to cognition, i.e., the search for truth, as well as to the search
for the morally good. Viewed from this angle, then, qualities such
as the above which for centuries have been supposed to be the some-
what magical keys to an arcane world of warranted beauty, assume a
simple and comprehensible function, being consistent elements of an
integrated epistemology or world-view. Nevertheless, this epis-
temology provides for the possibility of the canon to which Greek
morphology was subjected, especially in architecture. Yet, these
forms, "the permanent, canonical forms of Greek architecture...
objective, impersonal, and inevitable", may perfectly be considered
but as a declaration of obedience, an act of compliance with the
'masters' of the universe, as a prudent option securing existence,
survival, and endurance, in brief, participation in the impeccable
and ruthless vehicle of the perfectly functioning system, the
vehicle of the good. By adopting all the above mentioned properties,
the Greeks could feel "as if (their) architectural works followed
eternal laws independent of the individual and of time". "Symmetria
signified proportions which are not invented by artists but are a
property of Nature. Seen in this light, art was a species of
knowledge".
28
8Tatarkiewicz, op. cit., pp. 81-82.
29
This, so far, is the scientific 'half' of Pythagorean philosophy.
Its starting point being the reducibility of shapes to numbers, it
extends to essentially all things liable to experience, art, among
them, occupying a conspicuous position. This, therefore, seems to
be underlying what has been quoted above, i.e., 'art...produces useful'
(not only in the utilitarian sense, but also in the sense of being
compatible with the universe/number, as opposed to the 'useless'
which is destined to vanish in chaos) 'and sometimes perfect objects'.
In all events, art, according to this viewpoint, appears not to be
expected to produce properly 'esthetic' objects (in the sense the
word might have for us), i.e., begetting deep but, as to their
knowability, elusive impressions and effects in man. Art as object,
man as creator/producer, everything in the universe, have hereby
been brought together under the implaccable power of reason.
It is strange that this absolutist system, so inflexible and harsh,
excluding and utterly indifferent to any exception, digression and
protestation, glorifying the precision of the natural number, was
able and willing to accommodate and harmonize with what would appear
to be its extreme opposite: mystical religion, chiefly expressed
in music. Yet, even here, harmony supplied the necessary link. For
music, due to its standing as a chief source of 'number', could be
considered the harmony of the universe.8 It is as thought a modifi-
cation of harmony in general is presented here; a harmony not
impersonal anymore, embedded in and being an "objective property of 30
9Ibid.,
10Ibid.,
11Ibid.,
p.
pp.
pp.
81.
81-82.
81-82.
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things".9 This appears to be a harmony 'personified' so to
speak, enlivened, capable of being communicated sensibly, as
opposed to harmony as an abstract property, which is liable to
being discovered intellectually. In brief, this is a compellingly
manifest harmony. Music is thus brought under the rational system
of number and harmony. But so are its effects upon the soul; for
since music as well as the soul belong in the same harmonious uni-
verse, they can be made to correspond:" Sounds find an echo in the
soul, which responds in harmony with them. It is as with a pair of
lyres: when we strike one, the other standing nearby will respond." 10
It follows that music may be thought of as a 'likeness' (omoioma)
of the psyche, "the 'sighs' or expressions of character".1 By way
of this assumption, it was possible to reconcile two domains which
apparently were utterly incompatible, namely, the domain of a ra-
tional universe on the one hand and that of spiritual mysticism,
obscurity and awe as reflected in the tradition of Orphic mysteries,
on the other. According to that tradition, music and gesture were
believed to be endowed with 'cathartic', or purificatory, properties,
i.e. with potentialities of elevating the soul, of assisting it
in achieving a state of exaltation, occasionally releasing it from
the painful constraints of the body in which it had been imprisoned
due to sin. Such occasional excursions into bliss could not anymore,
under the spell of the Pythagorean rapprochement between the
comprehensible and the uncomprehensible, or rather the domestica-
tion/subjugation of the latter to the former, afford allusions to
traditional mysticism, or involve explicit acknowledgements of the 32
12 Ibid. , pp. 81-82.
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unknowability of catharsis. Music would thenceforth have ethos. 12
Under this label, both its purificatory effects upon the soul and
the resulting revelation/knowledge could be selected. After all the
Greek term properly denoting the effects of music upon the soul,
i.e. 'psychagogia', meaning, freely, the treatment or the guidance
of the soul, implies precisely the domestication, rationalization,
of the realm of transcedental feeling. One may here recall the
similar account of poetry, quoted above, in terms of 'divine inspir-
ation' and 'knowledge of the highest order'.
Therefore, in relation to the present discussion of the reason-
feeling dichotomy, we may consider Pythagorean philosophy as an in-
stance of a demarcation of the objective world as well as of human
nature in which reason is ruling, an appropriate due having been
given to feeling nonetheless, but only after its peculiar properties
have been translated into, filtered through, those of reason. Art,
both as to its 'cognitive' and 'spiritual' aspect is in this manner
made comprehensible and given the character of an instrument. It con-
cerns, both as creation and effect, the secular life of men: it
relates to their practical activities and problems, but at the
same time it constitutes a middle term between this earthly level
and that of the eternal and the necessary, a step leading from the
former to the latter, thus partaking, in a sense, of both. In this
manner, lastly, the beautiful is made identical to, interchangeable
with, the good. Granted the general traditional Greek tendency not
to speak of beauty in any exclusive 'esthetic' sense and the 34
35
concomitant constraints imposed upon any possibility of a freely
existing beauty, I think that we may discern in Pythagoreanism an
attempt at harmonizing reason and feeling, whatever the conditions
under which feeling enters this alliance; that is, an attempt at
effecting a genuine balance between two mental forces sharing a
common territory.
THE PRECARIOUSNESS OF A REASON-FEELING HARMONY. DEMOCRITUS
AND THE SOPHISTS
That such a sought after balance of the reason-feeling dichotomy,
at least as far as its relevance for artistic issues is concerned,
was precarious, may be indicated by the subsequent course of phil-
osophizing on art (i.e., 5th and 4th centuries B.C.). Utility, as
a fundamental criterion of evaluation appears to be gaining irre-
sistible impetus during this period. But it is not the same
'purified', rationalized, founded-in-number, abstracted utility we
have encountered above. Its meaning is definitely coming close to
the common-sense one, implying immediate practical solutions to
urgent problems. A mundane content is assumed by the term. It
might be said to have a 'biological' sense. This idea comes as a
reflection of that branch of the Ionian school which was character-
ized by "materialism", "determinism", and "empiricism" and of which
Democritus was the chief exponent. For him, art was dependent upon,
its operation/enactment being in principle confined within the 36
13 p.
14 Ibid., p.
15 Ibid., p.
16Ibid., pp.
89.
90.
90.
90-91.
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limits of imitating, nature: "We have been the pupils (of the
animals) in matters of fundamental importance". However, imi-
tation here is used "not in the sense which this word has in
'choreia', not in the sense of the actor's imitation of feelings,
but as following nature in its methods of action." 14 Thus, it is
not only building, or weaving, which might be thought of as having
been derived from imitating beavers and spiders respectively, but
even culinary art, "by which food is prepared,... (imitates) ...
the digestion of nourishment by organisms." 15 Art in this context,
especially the useful arts, though still definitely attached to
reason, is likely to be drawn towards a merely functional, as
opposea to teleological,, conception. As to the arts that provoke
pleasure, i.e., poetry or music, they were likely to be dealt with
by way of a hedonistic approach. Inspiration in them would be still
acknowledged, but not 'divine' or at any rate due to a supernatural
cause. Inspiration was made to refer to a state of "inflamed
spirit", this inflammation being in turn explained as a "mechanistic
stirring of the senses" due to "mechanical action".
Such innovatory arguments parallel those of the Sophists who suc-
cumbed to a bias for the particular, the empirical, the relative
as opposed to the construction of omnipotent frameworks of the
general and the universal. They introduced a definite distinction
between useful and pleasurable arts, giving a sensualistic definition
of beauty, as being merely that "which gives pleasure through 38
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hearing and the sight". Even this, moreover, could not be irrever-
sibly identified since such a possibility would be in contradiction
with the fact that "In Thrace tatooing is regarded as an 'ornament',
but in other countries it is a punishment for convicts". For
beauty, along with "laws, political systems and religion", is
"relative and conventional"; and this relativity, a fact manifested
by the diversely paid tributes to beauty in different milieus, was
considered grounded in the need that each thing ought to be imbued
by the particular 'beauty' suiting its intrinsic nature. As
opposed to the notion that beauty "depended on an accord with eternal
laws", the Sophists opted for a concept of beauty whereby it was
made to depend "on adjustment to individual conditions". Thus the
previous beautiful-good, applicable to, and attestable in virtually
everything, was fractured plurally, the result being the dissocia-
tion of the beautiful from the good, of the useful from the pleas-
urable, and of the many particular beauties suitable for their own
individual purposes from each other. Indifferent to what might
possibly underlie the surfaces of things and any form of the immedi-
ate to which they adhered, the Sophists urged to vindicate, with
regard to the effects of art upon man and society, not any variations
of the reason-knowledge-good motif, but illusionism, i.e. admission
of any falsity, imprecision, incorrectness, 'lie', so to speak,
either in form or content for the sake of the overall immediate
impression provoked. "Gorgias...said of tragedy: '(it is) a decep-
tion in which the deceiver is more honest than the non-deceiver, 40
17If, in passing, we adopt provisionally a division of artis-
tic activities, as far as their purpose is concerned, into "repre-
sentational art" and "magical symbolism", the one viewed as making
allusions to the workings of the intellect, i.e. cognition generally,
the other as invoking action on the part of the beholder, whereby
these two different states in the subject may be described as
characterized by "overdistance" (i.e. a psychological factor causing
the reaction of the subject to the situation presented to the
suspended and hence to result in a mental experience), and "under-
distance", (i.e. a psychological factor causing the spectator to
react actively), respectively, then a possible interpretation of the
phenomenon of the "esthetic illusion" appears, in relation to the
tacitly invoked pair of reason and feeling/action (or better, in
this connection, instinct), as a point of equilibrium between
overdistance and underdistance. Kris, E., "Psychoanalytic Explora-
tions in Art", N.Y., 1967, pp. 48 ff. In this context then,
Gorgias' illusionism might be 'read' as referring to a representa-
tive art whose aim, however, has been stripped, by and large, by
any sort of intellectual content, and charqed, instead, with an
exclusively sensual one.
18See above p. 18.
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and the deceived is wiser than the non-deceived'. By way of this
sketchy exposition of the 'esthetics' of Democritus and the Sophists,
we may retrieve that distinction which we made our starting point
as to the discussion of the reason-feeling dichotomy in ancient
Greek philospohy. It is obvious that their arguments fall readily
under the category of 'enlightenment', and offer grounds for that
particular interpretation we made of reason, and feeling as both
addressing the realm of the 'immediate', i.e. the "immediate, either
'reasoned' or 'felt'".18 Before proceeding to the next step of our
argument, however, we should try to state definitely why that phase
in Greek philospohy - the late Ionian philospohers and the Sophists -
makes it clear that the Pythagorean sort of union between reason
and feeling is a very 'volatile' one. Indeed, reason (in its com-
monsensical guise) and feeling (on a sensualistic level) co-exist,
as we have seen, both in Democritus and the Sophists. But theirs
is a coexistence which claims no unifiability. It is a neutral
co-existence occuring as an inevitable state between dissociated,
different things. Reason claims its own realm of experience, feel-
ing its own, no conflict threatening this neat demarcation of possi-
bilities of mental states as well as of objective domains. The
only internal commotion one might possibly discern in such a con-
ception/constellation of the reason-feeling dichotomy, would be one
caused by a sort of repulsion felt towards any attempt at bringing
forth inklings of a higher, more abstract reality than that
acknowledged by the 'enlightened' system. In a sense, it is 42
19Popper, op. cit., introduction and Chapter 2.
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probably because things are left unquestioned as to any possible
ultimate essences or causes they might hide, that any possibility
of omnipotent unification is out of the question. Yet, this disso-
ciation, separation, this 'spreadingLout' of diversified territories,
and this prompt acknowledgement of their diversity does not pre-
suppose/imply a state in which reason and feeling are conceived as
inimical to one another. Certainly, the 'immediate' may be thought
of as incompatible with the 'beyond, but at least, one may forget the
'beyond' and rest content with the 'immediate' in which room for
both reason and feeling is amply provided. One can in this system
dispense with the need to feel fortified against a threatening
adversary. Just ignoring him may equally do. Thus, we will have to
hold recourse to Plato in order to select one more theoretical
possibility of the dichotomy, i.e., one whereby reason and feeling
are declared irreconcilable, and trace its effects upon the conception
of art.
THE DICHOTOMY AS CONTRADICTION: PLATO
To consider the ways in which the dichotomy enters his specific
views on art, one should preferrably bear in mind as a background
"anan~si" ad of"Ides".19Plato's related theories of "anamndsis" and of "Ideas". According
to the first, the human soul is considered omniscient prior to
birth. Only then is absolute knowledge conceivable: knowledge,
that is, of "the essence or nature of a thing rather than of a 44
20 Ibid., p. 10.
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particular historical fact". This theory "in some measure grants to
each man the possession of divine sources of knowledge" for "In
being born we forget; but we may recover our memory and our know-
ledge, though only partially: only if we see the truth again shall
we recognize it. All knowledge is therefore re-cognition, recalling
20
or remembering the essence of true nature that we once know".
Now the realm which monopolizes that absolute knowledge, the realm
of 'essences' and 'true' nature, made knowable to man prior to his
birth, is the realm of 'forms' or 'ideas'. This is a sphere of
reality which stands in apparent contrast to the reality of life on
earth, and of which the latter can at most yield weak reflections.
Such a twofold conception of the universe bears significant simil-
arities to the Pythagorean one, however more intransigent it appears.
In fact it derives a lot from the latter, a basic borrowing being
"the so-called Table of Opposites', based upon the fundamental dis-
tinction between odd and even numbers". This contains "such things
as ONE/MANY, ODD/EVEN, REST(BEING)/CHANGE(BECOMING), DETERMINATE/
INDETERMINATE, SQUARE/OBLONG, STRAIGHT/CROOKED, RIGHT/LEFT, LIGHT/
DARKNESS, GOOD/BAD". When transferred to the Platonic theory of
'ideas', th.e 'table' could have the following meaning:
the 'good' side of the table of opposites constitutes an
(invisible) Universe, a Universe of Higher Reality of
the Unchanging and Determinate 'Forms' of all things...
while the visible world of change and flux in which we
live and die, the world of generation and destruction, 46
21Ibid., p. 78.
22Venturi, L., "History of Art Criticism", N.Y., Dutton, 1964,
pp. 39-40.
23Tatarkiewicz, op. cit., p. 131.
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the world of experience, is only a kind of reflection or
copy of that Real World. 2 1
For Plato, then, there was in accordance with the above, a clear
distinction between art and beauty, art being identified as
"imitation and representation of Naure", and beauty as having "a
moral character identified with the good, or a mathematical char-
acter identified with geometrical proportions".22 Presumably art
occupies a place within the confines of the empirical, the earthly
world, whereas beauty belongs intrinsically in the realm of 'ideas'.
So far, with regard to Plato, there are certain elements which we
may single out: A resuscitation of a higher, transcendent sense
of reality; a return to the notion of unity between beauty and
goodness; a conviction that man's furthest aim is cognition or
re-cognition of 'ideas'; a definite deprivation of art from any
claims to beauty, itself an 'idea'. The last two points may serve
us as the springboard from which to touch upon a further distinc-
tion, this time between the arts. Plato allots a distinct status
to the poet, his function viewed as involved in soothsaying,
inspiration, cathartic effects, irrationality in general, as
opposed to the artists-craftsmen who proceed according to definite
practical rules. In 'Io' he admits that "The God seems purposely
to have deprived all poets, prophets and soothsayers of every
particle of reason and understanding, the better to adapt them to
their employment as ministers and interpreters."23 However, 48
24Popper, op. cit., p. 10.
"Laws", 889A, quoted in Tatarkiewicz, op.cit., p. 137,
n. 40.
26Tatarkiewicz, op. cit., p. 122.
27Ibid., p. 122, p. 133, n. 28.
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even this acquiescence in irrationality, does not amount to an
acknowledgement of poetry's accessibility to the realm of ideas.
It rather insinuates "a sharp distinction...between divine
inspiration - the divine frenzy of the poet - and the divine
sources or origins of true knowledge... Plato grants the inspira-
tion to poets but denies to them any divine authority for their
alleged knowledge of the facts". 24  So that poetry, however dif-
ferent from the other arts, is still attached to the domain of
transient reality, unable to transcend the limitations of being a
species of imitation. And, it is not only that the arts, including
poetry, are thought of as taking "over the grand primary works from
the hands of nature, already formed, and then... (modelling and fa-
shioning)...the more insignificant... 'artificial'...simulacra",25
i.e., as being, characterized by "their imitativeness (and)...
the unreality of their products";26 but imitation, furthermore,
which, when departing from reality is a lie, whereas when remaining
truthful to it is, at most, a superfluous replica, may generally
stir the passions and "jeopardize our betterment."27  It is on the
grounds of such assumptions that "we have then, a fair case against
the poet and we may set him down as the counterpart of the painter,
whom he 'resembles in two ways: his creations are poor things by
the standards of truth and reality, and his appeal is not to the
highest part of the soul, but to one which is equally inferior.
So we shall be justified in not admitting him into a well-ordered
commonwealth, because he stimulates and strengthens an element 50
28
"Republic", 605A, quoted in Tatarkiewicz, op. cit., p. 136,
n. 39.
29
"Laws", 889A, quoted in Tatarkiewicz, op. cit., p. 137,
n. 40
30Tatarkiewicz, op. cit., p. 125.
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which threatens to undermine reason". 28
So, we may come to the following interpretation of the reason-
feeling dichotomy as it underlies the above views: Reason is
the sovereign ruling over the venerated realm of 'ideas', the
realm exclusively possessing goodness, beauty, truth, knowledge.
Apart from that lies the realm of empirical reality, in which man
is cast adrift. Two alternatives ultimately present themselves
to man in that inferior domain: The first is to cultivate reason
and in this way to ascend gradually to higher spheres, thus claiming
back his original omniscience. This can be effected in a plural-
ity of ways, as the 'well-ordered commonwealth' implies: The way
of philospohy, the way of morality and goodness, the way of love,
or even the way of those "arts which really produce anything of
genuine worth...(i.e.)...those which lend their aid to nature like
medicine, husbandry, gymnastic".29 The second alternative is
yielding to "imitation (which) is only a game, though no doubt a
charming one...a frivolous occupation dragging men away from their
sublime duties";30 indulging in the immediate which is the imita-
tive arts' effect upon feeling. This second alternative and the
related submission to feeling, either in a low, sensualistic sense,
or in a high, spiritualistic sense of 'divine frenzy' represents
in the last analysis an obstacle blocking the way to the 'ideas'.
The arts, particularly liable to either the base 'frivolity' or
the elevated 'madness' of feeling, are one of the chief substantia- 52
31Ibid., p. 123.
32Ibid., p. 125.
33Collingwood, op. cit., p. 49. To trace that alternation in
the evolution of Plato's views by way of which poetry, from a state
of admitted 'divine irrationality' was drawn into a state of depre-
cation, is an issue relevant to a discussion of taste to which I
intend to return in section iii.
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tions of the second alternative and the only way to restore them to
the worthy order of reason, is to imbue them with "moral utility",
i.e. "a means of molding the character and of forming an ideal
state", and "righteousness", i.e. make them "suitable, accurate and
just, without deviations". 31 Thus it was that Plato, diversely
modifying his views reached a conception of art (in relation to both
its effects upon the emotions, and its intrinsic affinity to reason)
which became capable of eliciting interpretations such as the fol-
lowing:
Dissatisfied with the art of his day, he wanted art
to abide by tradition. He has been called the first
'classicist' because he was the first known thinker to
advocate return to the art of the past.32
Or,
What Plato wanted to do,...was to put the clock back
and revert from the amusement art of the Greek decadence
to the magical art of the archaic period of the 5th
century.
33
I think that by way of this reference to several basic ancient
Greek notions on the theory of knowledge and art, we are able to
gain some insight concerning the relative values and corresponding
realms of experience that it has been possible at different times
to ascribe to reason and feeling. We have obtained some under- 54
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standing as to how flexible the dichotomy is as a theoretical
instrument for analysis.
Reason as the faculty proper in man which ought to be guiding his
activities so as to attune them to the objective realm of reason,
hidden in and beyond sensible reality; feeling as a peculiar
'modification' of reason, made subservient to it and to the single
aim of getting to know that higher reality; art as a rational
instrument of cognition; or, reason considered as a mere practical
common sense, not partaking of and indifferent to anything trans-
cendent, simlar to, though more sophisticated than that of the
animals; feeling, thought of as equally wanton and secular,
'teasing' the senses; lastly, feeling, either in the latter sense,
or in a solemn 'mystical' one, made into the threatening adversary
of an austere rationality which is now considered the exclusive
property that ought to underly all 'legitimate' manifestations of
life and man, from the practical level of the immediate to the
unattainable level of eternality and the 'ideas': These are but
some of the possible meanings with which reason and feeling have
been at times endowed. They represent, nevertheless, basic and
persistent alternatives that can be encountered in numerous in-
stances throughout the history of thought.
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See for instance Popper, K.R., "The Open Society and Its
Enemies", Princeton University Press, 1971, V. II, Ch. 11.
35Venturi, op. cit., pp. 150-151.
36 Ibid., p. 162.
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18-TH-CENTURY CLASSICISM
The eighteenth-century discussions on art and esthetics, partly
because of the retreat to antiquity via Winckelmann and the
beginnings of archaeology, partly because of the persistence
which traditional Greek notions assumed by virtue of Aristotle, 34
and partly because of the seizure 17th-c. science, i.e., Carte-
sian rationalism, exerted upon the learned circles, present such
an instance. It is an instance of open conflict between the parts
of the reason-feeling dichotomy. On the one hand, Mengs, as the
apostle of reason, brings forward advocacies that declare "absolute
beauty" as residing "only in Greek statues", as "justified in the
divine transcendent idea", and as "manifested in circular form and
uniform coloring". 35  Such notions, vindicating a bias for ration-
ally sought abstraction and ideals, are opposed, on the other hand,
by the protesting voices of inchoate Romanticism. Hamann's
metaphors of the garden which "is more ancient than the ploughed
field", and of "painting... (which is older) than writing", serve
as allusions to the conviction that the senses and passions pre-
cede understanding - and thus deserve greater veneration; and are
coupled by Herder who held that "the natural man paints what he
sees as he sees it, live, potent, monstrous, in disorder or in
order". 36 Both proceed on a line analogous to that of Vico who
"freed himself from Cartesian rationalism", protested against a
philosophy preoccupied exclusively with nature, a philosophy
inevitably ensnared in "abstractions that cannot provide a 58
Ibid., p. 162, and Lowith, K., "Meaning in History",
The University of Chicago Press, 1949, ch. VI.
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foundation for a concrete science", and pleaded for "a philosophy
and a history of humanity" based on a concept of human nature
"not fixed by physical properties"; such a theory contains the
seeds of a reaction against the "neo-classic 'idea'" as well as
of a primitivist esthetic "without need for any transcendency",
with the imagination presiding over reason.37
HUME
An analogous need to emancipate beauty and the appraisal of art
from the yokes of either transcendent or conventionalized reason
has also been partly felt by Hume. I say partly because in Hume
one may discern a variety of worthy insights related to esthetics
to some of which we will refer subsequently. His "Of the
Standard of Taste" begins and is more or less based throughout on
the assumption of a clear distinction between sentiment and judg-
ment. As far as matters of taste are concerned, sentiment
(aroused, caused by the object at hand in the subject, the beholder)
is and should naturally be the relevant office in man to refer
them to, since sentiment, hidden deep in man's individuality and
self-sufficient, is unassailable, irreducible to anything beyond
itself. Thus, it is in principle right and real. This immediacy,
and autonomy of feeling is brought into contrast in relation to
the judgement of understanding, which, since by its nature must
depend for its truth upon a standard, i.e. empirical reality, is 60
38Hume "Of the Standard of Taste and Other Essays", Lenz, J.W.,
ed., The Library of Liberal Arts, 1965, "Of the Standard of Taste",
p. 6.
39In "Aesthetics", Osborne, H., ed., Oxford University Press,
1978.
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liable to error and much less certain than sentiment. Furthermore,
the affirmation of this distinction and the establishment of senti-
ment as the reliable legislator of taste is both preceded/underlined,
and followed/enforced by these basic steps: beauty is severed from
any species of knowledge/cognition/truth whatsoever, art is
disqualified as an instrument of cognition guided by the intellect,
and consequently, the beautiful is not anymore thought of as
embedded in objects and constituting one of their properties; for
"no sentiment represents what is really in the object...Beauty is
no quality in things themselves". 38
FEELING VINDICATED
To take an example of the above turn of mind carried to its
extremes, though a much later one, let us hold recourse to Merleau-
Ponty's essay "Eye and Mind".39 Feeling, in this case, is intransi-
gently brought into contrast to reason not only in connection with
esthetics and taste, but also with regard to cognition, comprehen-
sion, conception and perception of things in general. A genuine
validity is claimed for feeling, (in the particular guise of the
imagination), with regard to these tasks, while reason-understanding
is implicitly declared impotent, confounded in conventional appara-
tuses of habitual trains of thought and thereby blind as to the
live reality of things. A "mystical", (so to speak, but neverthe-
less possible of becoming felt), affinity between things is posited, 62
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by virtue of which this live reality can be revealed to the
searching senses coupled by the imagination. This might be under-
stood as man's possibility of coming to a state of sensory union
with the external world; the "manifest visibility (of things) must
be repeated in the body be a secret visibility". The power of
vision, far from being thought of as referring to a sterile,
mechanical process producing "representations", i.e. "copies" of
reality, that are subsequently relegated to the understanding
which conducts the task of "rethink(ing) the constitutive rela-
tions of things", is here conceived as sufficient for a total
discourse with the visible world. This visible world, in turn,
implies something much wider, deeper, potential, fluid, and primeval,
than "a picture or a representation of the world, a world of imma-
nence and ideality...in itself,...matter" which the understanding
cannot help fabricating. This visible world is that which becomes
manifest to a "prehuman way of seeing things", i.e. to a vision not
subject to the convenient but artificial assumptions and classifi-
cations of the understanding concerning, depth, relative position,
color etc., which could further be described as the way in which,
as it were, things "see" each other as in the case of an "empty
interior...'digested' by the 'round eye of the mirror'", or "the
painter's way". The latter, exemplary of the role ascribed to
imagination/feeling in a penetrating perception/conception of
things, is one of minute "interrogation" of things, which starts
anew time and again. Therefore by way of the outcomes of such
"interrogation" the painter's is a continuously "fascinated" 64
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vision which results in "revelations to others (because the others
do not lack what he lacks...)", namely, the distorting lenses of
the understanding. It is in this way that feeling, (vision, along
with movement, touch, a "prehuman" sense of space, the feeling of
one's living organism amidst other living organisms) may be ele-
vated to the position of an all-encompassing faculty, begetting
cognition, through properly attending to the immediate and elusive,
supposedly of a much higher quality than that attained by the
limited "technology" of the intellect.
LOOS AND KRAUS
The threshold of the 20th century will now be adduced as a last
though significant instance of the vicissitudes of the reason-
feeling dichotomy, still welded into a formula of separation,
whereby, however, none of the parts is being deprecated. It is
a demarcation between reason and feeling in which the desire to
give each its proper - but different - due is involved. Further-
more, this is an instance of preoccupation with the proper nature,
meaning, corresponding territories of experience, boundaries of
reason and feeling respectively, shared explicitly by the majority
of intellectual and cultural fields.
"Adolf Loos and I", said Karl Kraus, "have done nothing more than
to show that there is a distinction between an urn and a chamber 66
40Kraus, K., "Werke", ch. III, p. 341, quoted in Janic, A.,
and Toulmin, S., "Wittgenstein's Vienna", 1973, p. 89.
41Janic and Toulmin, op. cit., pp. 97-98.
42Loos, A.,
and Kunstler, G.,
N.Y., Praeger, 19
"Ornament and Crime", reprinted in Munz, L.,
"Adolf Loos: Pioneer of Modern Architecture",
66.
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pot and that it is this distinction above all that provides culture
with elbow room. The others, those who fail to make this distinc-
tion, are divided into those who use the urn as a chamber pot and
those who use the chamber pot as an urn" .40 Three possibilities
appear here. The "urn" standing for the work of art, art in
general; the "chamber pot", for the utilitarian object, practical
necessities and "facts"; and the blurredness of their confusion, a
confusion which had a devastating sweep in fin-de-siecle Viennese
estheticism, in both its bourgeois-taste-aspect, crazed by
fashion based on fake ornament, and its elitist offspring, the
Secession whose self-defeating purpose "to challenge popular and
academic taste... succeeded merely in transforming the contemporary
views about ornamentation" and in curing "the symptoms, not the
disease".41 For Loos, it was chiefly a matter of bold and unequi-
vocal separation between art and craft instead of mingling them
destructively under the auspicies of the presumably pseudo-concept
"applied art". The latter, and its concomitants, in terms of the
cultural habits (fashion etc.) it imposes, the manufacturing pro-
cesses and materials it calls forth, and, which is most important,
the disproportionality between human labor involved (qualitatively
and quantitavely) and corresponding sales value it inevitably en-
tails when contesting the far more efficient mechanical production,
proves disastrous for the economy of the state as well as impinging
upon the cultural advancement of society;42 and for absolutely no
conceivable reason, since "The vegetables (that).. .the 20th-c. man
...likes are simply boiled in water and then served with a little 68
44Janic and Toulmin, op. cit., pp. 99,
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100, 230.
melted butter. The other man" i.e. one who, contaminated by
obscurantism, still lives potentially in the 18th c., in spite of
the actual year being 1908, "doesn't enjoy them until honey and
nuts have been added and someone has been busy cooking them for
hours". Thus, "one man accumulates savings, the other one debts".
Similarly, "the producers of ornament must work twenty hours to
earn the wages a modern worker gets in eight".43 By way of such
consideration, Loos came to determine the artifact as addressing
a pragmatic "use here and now"; on the other hand the work of art
is made "for all men everywhere". The first is "conservative"
because it has to abide by the "present forms of life", and
"serve (men's) comfort". The second is "revolutionary" because
it "aims at edifying men's minds by refocusing their attentions
from the dullness and drudgery of everyday life into the sphere of
fantasy and spiritual values...(and) wants to tear men from their
comfort". 44 The first implies a version of pragmatic rationality
attached to the exigencies of the practical and the "immediate".
The second is properly administered by feeling, here a feeling
solemnly venerated as the exclusive vehicle of the "beyond".
Closely akin to these are Kraus' notions, prime among which stands
a firm and ardent adherence to the "'origin' of all values". In
connection with his opinions about sex and women (both "centers"
of abuse and distortion in the hypocritic late-Habsburg Viennese
milieu) we may trace his account of reason and feeling, an account
which, moreover, bears great relevance and is central to the many 70
451bid., pp. 70, 73-74.
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diverse issues that concerned him.
He.. .maintained,...that 'rationality' is the distin-
guishing characteristic and exclusive property of the
masculine, and 'emotion' that of the feminine...He did
not exalt the rational element, but rather considered
it as having a purely instrumental function in putting
order into our activities... ...The emotional essence
of woman is not wanton or nihilistic, but is rather a
tender fantasy, which serves as the unconscious origin
of all that has any worth in human experience. Herein
lies the source of all inspiration and creativity.
Reason itself is merely a technique, a means by which
men obtain what they desire. In itself it is neither
good nor evil, it is merely effective or ineffective.
Reason must be supplied with proper goals from outside;
it must be given direction of a moral or aesthetic type.
The feminine fantasy fecundates the masculine reason
and gives it this direction. The source of moral and
aesthetic truth is, thus, the unity between feeling and
reason; these two are complementary sides of one and the
same coin. Yet fantasy remains the guiding element
since, without proper feeling, without a sense of the
value of things, reason becomes an instrument which
makes the evil man only more effective in his male-
factions. Kraus' point, then, is that the feminine is
the source of all that is civilizing in society. 45
But even more important than, and as a condition presupposed in
their unity, reason and feeling had to be affirmed/alleged, each
for its own part, as referring to entirely different realms.
"The sphere of values", to which feeling alone can have access,
"is altogether distinct from the sphere of facts", or of reason.
72
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Thus, in order to challenge what they consider the sovereign
evil of their cultural milieu, i.e., mistaking the "urn" for the
"chamber pot" and vice versa, with its many manifestations (on the
level of art we have already hit upon two of them, i.e. popular
taste and the estheticism of the artistic elite; a further one has
been "the feuilleton, in which imagination runs riot with the
facts", crucial for Kraus the journalist) and effect a resuscita-
tion of the "origin of all values", both Kraus and Loos opted for,
and undertook a "'creative separation' between the sphere of
reason (..fact) and that of fantasy(..value)". 46
WITTGENSTEIN AND LOGICAL POSITIVISM
The above cases are but two explicit and articulate statements of
a basic problem that was urgently felt by almost all branches of
science and philosophy of the period. This problem essentially
relates to the question of the extent to which language, or the
many artificial systems of signs with the help of which man can
communicate the proceedings of his mind (thoughts or emotional
states), comprehend and explain the physical phenomena etc., sup-
posedly fabricated on the basis of man's receptivity of messages
from the external world (i.e., senses and sensations) can be
thought of as reliable, as doing justice to the things communicated
or the phenomena explained; in other words, it relates to the ques-
tions of whether language in general, "scientific" or "ordinary", 74
47Ibid., p. 118.
48Ibid., p. 184.
49Ibid., p. 196.
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can be trusted as a never-failing mechanism of transformation of
actual facts into comunicable signs and furthermore, to the
question of whether such a truthful mechanism can effectively
address all possible facts or part of them only, i.e., the question
of its range of potentialities; and it leads to the grim suspicion
that "language cannot express what is most real; this is something
which remains forever private in the depths of the person's sub-
jectivity".4 7 It is in this context that Wittgenstein can be
viewed as a key, who, in his "Tractatus logico-philosophicus"
affirmed that "All philosophy is critique of language" (4.0031),
and who is said to have been much influenced by, and respectful of,
Kraus' personality. Wittgenstein's "Tractatus" is such a critique,
by whose means a "'logical scaffolding'" is constructed, "capable
of modeling the whole world and, so, of furnishing the logical
structure of all description.....By introducing names intc this
general system, we could then apply it to reality. The result
would be ordinary language".48 By using the strict formality of
neo-positivist propositional logic and applying it to language (as
possibility of genuine description of the real world) it became
possible "to show how far ordinary factual or descriptive lan-
guage can legitimately be thought of ... as getting its literal,
straightforward meaning", and consequently, "to underline the
ethical point that all questions about value lie outside the scope
of such ordinary factual or descriptive language". 49 Another ac-
count that has been given of such a formally austere and logically
implacable construction of language so as to make it legitimately 76
50Langer,
Press, 1978, p
S., "Philosophy in a New Key", Harvard University
87.
51Janic and Toulmin, op. cit., p. 197.
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capable of description of the world, according to the postulates of
propositional logic, arrives at the same concession as to its
narrow scope:
At best, human thought is but a tiny, grammar-bound island,
in the midst of a sea of feeling expressed by 'oh-oh' and
sheer babble. The island has a periphery, perhaps of
mud-factual and hypothetical concepts broken down by the
emotional tides into the 'material mode', a mixture of
meaning and nonsense. Most of us live the better part
of our lives on this mud-flat; but in artistic moods we
take to the deep, where we flounder about with symptomatic
cries that sound like propositions about life and death,
good and evil, substance, beauty, and other nonexistent
topics. So long as we regard scientific and 'material'
(semi-scientific), (i.e. that which is brought by means
of what has been referred to as 'ordinary factual language'),
thought as really cognitive of the world, this peculiar
picture must stand. And as long as we admit only dis-
cursive symbolism as a bearer of ideas,...without the
elements at least, of scientific grammar, conception must
be impossible. 50
So, then, Wittgenstein's famous work does nothing other than re-state
in strict terminology and formalism what has already been Kraus'
and Loos' deep convinction: the inevitability of a "radical separa-
tion of facts from values", 51 i.e., of reason from feeling. So it
is, furthermore, that "the Tractatus, is in fact.. .only half a
critique. The ...'second part, that is the important one'" has not
and could not have been written, since it consists in of the
"unspeakable". And, finally, the 78
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Tractatus becomes an expression of a certain type of
language mysticism that assigns a central importance
in human life to art, on the ground that art alone can
express the meaning of life. Only art can express
moral truth, and only the artist can teach the things
that matter most in life...
...The Tractatus is..., by intention a polemic against
the kind of rationalism that.. .shackles the human
spirit. This rationalism had been the result of a
failure to distinguish the legitimate sphere of ra-
tional speculation from that of fantasy.52
So far, we have been dealing with examples which to a greater or
lesser degree demonstrate a will to separate reason from feeling,
regardless of whether this separation is characterized by a per-
missiveness assigning to both a validity as capabilities and as
territories of experience, or, instead, by an exclusiveness more
or less ruling out the one and elevating the other to the status
of monopolist of anything valid. However, the possibility either
at best, of a harmonization-union of reason and feeling, or of a
neutral co-existence, or even, of a promiscuity marking their
relations has already been pointed out. Germs of this possibility
of bringing together and interlocking reason and feeling, no matter
of what kind this bringing-together is, must have been observed
in the discussion, eg. of Kraus' ideal union of the two. It is
with two examples of this possibility that the rest of this
section will be concerned.
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THE ENGLISH "POLITENESS"
It seems to me that the contribution to the discussions on taste,
philosophy of esthetics, and art, by English thinkers chiefly but
not exclusively in the second third of the 18th century, provides
us with a striking instance of this possibility, which I would tend
to designate the "politeness" of English esthetics. I think that
the term "politeness" implies and at the same time reveals the then
apparently dominating mood of not only acknowledging different
values to reason and feeling, but also, of cautioning not to de-
precate either of them, and furthermore of being determined to
allow enough room for both in one and the same domain: that of
esthetics and valid art. Specific, insulated, as it were, cumpart-
ments could be formed by partitioning boldly the general and large
field of applicability of good taste, and some of them would be
readily commended to reason, others to feeling; as is here shown
by William Mason:53
Whilst classic rules were suitable for houses,
shun we here
By those to form our ruins. Much we own
They please, when by Pannini's pencil drawn,
Or darkely graved by Piranesi's hand.
But the builder of classic ruins in England
builds but a splendid lie
And it was not just a matter of houses versus ruins; architecture
in general and gardening; different classes or types of buildings; 82
54Collins, P., "Changing Ideafs in Modern Architecture",
London, 1965, p. 70.
5 5 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
56 Thus Hughe drew "a parallel between the classical writers
and Spenser, and between Roman and Gothic architecture. 'In the
former there is doubtless a more natural grandeus and simplicity;
in the latter we find great mixture of beauty and barbarism, yet
assisted by the invention of inferior ornaments; and though the
former is more majestic in the whole, the latter may be very
surprising and agreeable in its parts.' In 1725 Pope compared
Shakespeare to a Gothic monument 'more strong and more solemn',
even if less elegant and less 'glaring' than modern", i.e.
classical "architecture"; or Walpole, in his "The Anecdotes of
Painting", contrasted the pointed arch to the circular, the
first considered as an improvement upon the latter, and as
importing "a thousand graces and effects, magnificent yet genteel,
vast yet light, venerable and picturesque". In Venturi, op. cit.,
pp. 164, 165
57Hurd, "Letters of Chivalry and Romance", 1762, quoted in
Venturi, op. cit., p. 162.
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different assemblages or ornaments or architectural elements;
differently "spirited" or "disposed" arts; such was the scope of
distinctions and contradistinctions that were assumed so as to
achieve a credible applicability of this specific variation of the
reason-feeling model.
"Lord Kames, for example, who disliked symmetry in gardens con-
tended nevertheless that in'organized bodies comprehended under one
view, nature studies regularity, which for the same reason ought to
.54
be studied in architecture'". Regularity along with "simplicity"
"harmony" and "unity", which may be roughly construed as what at
the time was believed to be the quintessence of Classical, 'ration-
al' architecture, could, and should, in a sense, get along with
"richness", "power", "complexity", and "combination of the greatest
extremes", -the analogous quintessence of the Gothic-, since, after
all, "both", complexes of properties, "are founded in essential and
indestructible principles of human nature". 55  Along similar lines,
numerous comparisons were commonly drawn between species of56
"regular" and "irregular" art, aiming at vindicating both, while
excessive care was taken not to encroach on one of the categories
(eg. feeling), equipped with criteria proper only to the other
(eg. reason): "if you judge Gothic architecture by Grecian rules
you find nothing but deformity, but when you examine it by its own
57
rules the result is quite different".
The entire mood of "politeness" which held reason and feeling 84
58Malton, J. "An Essay on British Cottage Architecture", 1804,
quoted in Kaufmann, E., "Architecture in the Age of Reason", Archon,
1966.
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"Of the Standard of Taste", in loc. cit.
60Ibid., p. 17.
61Such a "true judge" moreover "is observed, even during the
most polished ages, to be rare a character: strong sense, united
to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by compari-
son, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this
valuable character", Ibid., p. 17.
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together in a state of promiscuity, might be thought of as
exemplified in statements such as this, which, spiting the endurance
and unanimously acknowledged validity of the classical, the rational,
the regular "do...admit, that a well chosen irregularity is most
pleasing".58  On a more theoretical level -the "politeness" is
exemplified, in a sense, by Hume, who assisted in restoring feeling
to a foundation oftaste, but, on the other hand, was in great pains
to counterbalance it by a sort of counterpart; a rational "compass",
so to speak. This counterpart, implied by the term "standard", was
not reason throughout, but rather a rationalistic process natural
to, and necessary for taste, by virtue of which feeling could become
cultivated so as to attain a plausible validity and soundness and
avoid arbitrariness when confronted with art. Towards this goal,
feeling was increasingly confined within a narrow space surrounded
by conditions, stipulations and prohibitions. Feeling should not
be contaminated by prejudice as to that upon which it is supposed
to issue a judgement of taste; it should be founded on a sound
state of the mental faculties as well as on perfectly healthy sen-
sory organs; by way of these basic presuppositions, it should pro-
gressively ascend, through practice and exercise and through the 59
help of comparisons, to the attainment of delicacy and good sense.
All these precautions, as well as the confession that by feeling,
or sentiment, as the basis of, and authority on taste, something
far from the feeling or sentiment of anybody is meant, but alone
that of "a true judge in the finer arts",60 leave too little un-
touched of the natural spontaneity and immediacy of feeling.61 86
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It may be thought that they amount to something very akin to
reason and its corresponding rules of falsity and righteousness.
TOWARDS A "GAME THEORY"
What I comprehend as emerging out of this "polite" promiscuity of
reason and feeling, as its message, so to speak, is a profound un-
easiness. A sense of instinctual discomfort caused by a felt
inefficacy of intellectual, analytic "tricks", such as reason vs.
feeling, to render a convincing account of real processes, situa-
tions, feelings, thoughts, phenomena in general, whose internal
complexity, detail, reciprocality, continuity and unlimited reduci-
bility to further and further factors and possible explanations
outweighs by far the simplificatory nature of the intellectual
"tricks". An implicit acknowledgement, that, however well our
categories be elaborated, however scrupulous their formulation so
as to encompass as great a quantity of hues and variations of
reality as possible, there is a certain level beyond which reality
keeps going, and at which the potentialities of our separations
and demarcations stop; that, past that level things develop and
exist in a "real" state of promiscuity, or rather continuity which
does not lend itself to analysis. It is an acknowledgement that
suggests an abandonment of analysis with its bipartite, tripartite,
or multipartite divisions, regardless of what is placed in each
compartment of the schema thus produced, and taking over of 88
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synthesis, of conceptions of unities and continuities instead of
separations and independent domains. It is perhaps an implicit
plea for that union aspired at by Kraus -rea-son and feeling being
two sides of the same coin- although that view was still inextri-
cably subject to the tactics of separation. It is not, however, a
proposal to resume anything of the sort of the Pythagorean fusion,
which, besides being as we have seen not a fusion based on proper
equality of the terms involved, is inestricably rooted in the
analytical habit of conjuring up pictures of the universe and its
domains by way of intellectural abstractions. At any rate, it is
likely to promote a frame of mind, which, with regards to the
understanding and manipulation of reality, would abstain from any
invocation of transcendence whatsoever; which, as to the ground of
its interpretations of experience and man, would, rather than
postulating reason and feeling as a prime, dominant criterion, turn
towards the factual way in which things form themselves and towards
the interactions between them and man: The use of a thing, the
fact of the emergence of this use, the pragmatic criteria that
bring it about or prevent it, the conditions under which it is
made possible, all these factors rooted in actual experience, sub-
stituted for the non-empirical intellectual devices.
This re-orientation is what in fact took place in Wittgenstein's
philosophical course following the Tractatus. In his "Philosophical
Investigations" he had given up any intention at neatly separating
spheres of experience with respect to the formal potentialities of 90
91
language. His deep concern was still with the extent to which some-
thing may be thought of as knowable and expressible; but he sought
"some alternative way of indicating how language does operate",
feeling that questions about how it ought to operate, however
plausibly answered, remained indifferent to reality.
"Rather, some way.. .(had to).. .be found of bringing into the open
the human contingencies.. .presupposed in the adoption of our exist-
ing categories and concepts. In this way, the central philosophi-
cal problem with which Wittgenstein had been concerned throughout
drove him away from all questions about syntax and formal semantics,
and into...(the)...area of 'pragmatics' and 'psychologism'". Being,
then, in this "area", it was inevitable sooner or later, to admit
that the applicability or inapplicability of some...category
or concept depends, in practice, always on previous human
decisions, and that these decisions have become 'second
nature' to us, for one or both of two distinct reasons.
Either, the choices in question were made long ago in the
development of our culture, and (no occasion having arisen
for challenging them) their outcomes have been preserved
within our conceptual traditions ever since; or, alter-
natively, the practice of using an expression in our con-
ventional way, rather than in some conceivable alternative
way, is drilled into us so early in life that, until some
unforeseen contingency compels us to reconsider it, we
cease to think twice about it; or, most commonly, the
conceptual feature under discussion reflects choices taken
at forgotten branch points in conceptual development,
which are both ancient in terms of cultural history and
early in the development of the individual's habits of 92
62Janic and Toulmin, op. cit., pp. 226, 227, 228, 229.
63Wittgenstein, L., "Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics,
Psychology and Religious Belief", University of California Press,
p. 7.
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speech and thought.62
We are in this way driven towards a conception of the world outside
us, and a tentative manipulation of it, which, while not necessarily
dispensing with demarcations such as those discussed above, tends
to observe actuality from a much more immediate standpoint, and
take its sponteneity, naturalness, or even blindness and arbitrari-
ness into due consideration. With respect to the hereby acknowledged
continuity and inseparability, arbitrariness, contingency, or ab-
surdity and inexplicability, instead of being banished to a clearly
bounded "sea of oh-oh and sheer babble", or being thought of as the
offspring of unguided, unfertilized reason, they are considered
necessary elements in our relations to the world. Or, for instance,
with regard to what are the factors of good art, of the beautiful,
or the factors of pleasure resulting from its presence, and related
questions, the possible answers, instead of being monopolized by
either reason, or feeling, or instead of being dissected into parts
in order to receive appropriate treatment by both, are now governed
by a totally different pre-occupation: "it is not only difficult
to describe what appreciation consists in but impossible. To des-
cribe what it consists in we would have to describe the whole
environment".63 Thus emerges the notion of the "game", ("language
game", or "architectural game", "religious game", "esthetic game",
etc.) generally, by which a context of actuality is meant, within
which the play of the perennial interaction between man and man,
and man and nature is performed according to rules that are 94
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ceaselessly produced and abandoned only to be readopted and
modified, in the best possible agreement with immediate needs and
circumstances. In the next section the notion of "esthetic game"
will be touched upon, as an improvement upon the notion of the
reason-feeling dichotomy.
96
64Popper, K.R., "The Poverty of Historicism", Harper Torchbook,
1964.
97
section ii
THE NOTION OF GAME
This heading obviously alludes to Wittgenstein's idea of "Language
games". Nevertheless, a parallel between the sense in which I
understand it and Popper's idea of "piecemeal social engineering"
might be drawn. 64 What is implied by the above phrase is roughly
this: It is impossible either to get to know the causes of, or,
consequently, to foretell, the directions/orientation that a society
as a complex structure will take in the future. It is, in other
words, impossible to acquire such knowledge totally and absolutely.
Any posited, assumed, placated devices such as historical laws, a
priori factors, etc., upon which such knowledge might be made to
depend, are but dangerous simplifications. Societies as wholes
move in a sphere of their proper reality, unattainable by either
our explanatory constructa, or regulatory and directive inventions.
However, as far as the task of improving social life is concerned,
there is still one hope: to face situations and events, trends
and classes, as being individual cases which may be tackled patient-
ly and gradually, their interdependence nevertheless being taken
into consideration, as opposed to any conception of them as being
stably fixed into an irreversible schema granted absolute validity.
So, instead of devising such schemata of social organization and
evolution, and forcing reality and contingency to conform with them,
one is more to the point if he considers that which he is faced 98
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with, selects the more urgent elements out of it, hierarchizes
priorities, and proceeds to tentative solutions liable to re-
adjustment and elaboration. Hence "piecemeal social engineering" is
juxtaposed to "holism".
This parallel should not make one think that in this section I in-
tend to propose anything like a "method" appropriate to either
interpreting or constructing esthetics. Not at all. The comparison
was made solely by virtue of a certain affinity I discern between
the need felt by Popper to abstain from grandiose systems claiming
absolute validity in the field of sociology, and an analogous need
in the field of esthetics. I simply intend to provide samples of
how a way of seeing the phenomenon of taste presents itself, in
accordance to which taste is nothing more or less than a particular
"game" played within the scope of a greater "societal game"; to
show, as far as this is possible, that this game acquires rules
whose validity is unlikely to be found in any sort of transcendental
spheres but rather lies upon the grounds of mere optimum choice in
respect to present problems -biological, psychological, social,
economic; these problems extend, in fact, over a very wide, practi-
cally ungraspable, surface; that as a consquence, the "game" is
and can be played insofar as the rules are made known to the parti-
cipants, i.e. that it is a conventional game. Then, I intend to
bring forth a doubt: Is taste conventional and acquired throughout,
or is there any opening through which claims of autonomy might
creep in? Or, in the last analysis, how is it that claims on its 100
65Xenophanes' verse, quoted in Popper, "Conjectures and
Refutations", op. cit., p. 26.
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autonomy have at times been aroused, in spite of its more or less
apparent foundation, dependence, unpon needs, usages and potent but
imperceptible interactions?
THE CONTINUITY AND HOMOGENEITY OF EXPERIENCE
The gods did not reveal, from the beginning,
All things to us; but in the course of time,
Through seeking, men find that which is better.
But as for certain truth no man has known it,
Nor will he know it; neither of the gods,
Nor yet of all the things of which I speak.
And even if by chance he were to utter
The final truth, he would himself not know it;
For all is but a woven web of guesses.65
This account given as to the possibility, (or, rather impossi-
bility) or knowledge might be readily invoked as a corroboration
for the notion of esthetic game. However, in a sense, it could
not, since it presupposes the existence of absolute knowledge, its
unattainability notwithstanding. (A similar view, at once
corroborating and vitiating taste, or knowledge, or language etc.
as essentially being "games" has been expounded in Berkeley's
epistemology; which assumes the existence of both an "apparent"
and a "real" world, the former being, at best, liable to empiri-
cal explanation and manipulation of its phenomena by way of formal,
convenient, intellectual tools based on hypotheses (and in this 102
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consists the "corroboration" of the "game" notion) but resisting
any attempt at disclosing innate causes, which belong (and this
constitutes the "vitiation") in the latter, inaccessible to any-
thing but (perhaps) piety.66) Nevertheless, to such formulations
which incept the taking of the step towards a concession of the
full reality of the "game" but do not accomplish it for want of
sufficient emancipation from the usual categories of the transcen-
dental, Collingwood's conception of the processes of perception
and expression, might be juxtaposed as a view favoring indivisi-
bility both of human faculties and of experience.67 More specifi-
cally, according to this view, a "ladder", so to speak, is posited,
along the length of which the faculties, from mere sensation to
reason, are arranged as consecutive and interdependent steps. The
starting point being the commonsense distinction between "real"
sensations and "imaginary" ones, "real sensations" or mere sen-
sory impressions constitute the first step. These refer to some-
thing momentary, passing away, being in a state of continuous
flux but are, nevertheless, emotionally charged. It is exactly
this possibility of emotional load of mere sensations that accounts
for the following possibility, that of attention (i.e., conscious-
ness) being addressed to, focusing upon them. By way of this act
of attention/consciousness possibly picking up mere sensations, we
move into the next step: Feeling as imaginative idea, as opposed
to feeling as mere sensation, is in fact the latter (after an act
of attention has been exerted upon it) transformed from something
that is sheerly, automatically felt and lost, to be immediately 104
68Ibid., p. 223
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replaced by something of the same sort, into something stabilized,
solidified, domesticated by consciousness. Thus, we have feeling-
impression, or mere sensation, or "real" sensation, and feeling-
idea, or "imaginary" sensation (the latter seized by consciousness,
the former momentarily existing) as the two first steps of the
'ladder'. From the moment that the second step is effected, it
becomes possible for a third to emerge. It arises out of a very
specific need, namely, one founded upon the fact that "Imagina-
tion", (i.e., the second step), "resembles feeling", (i.e., the
first), "in this, that its object is never a plurality of terms
with relations between them, but a single indivisible unity: a
sheer here and now".68 And this is quite natural, since its mater-
ial is mere sensation unified and blurred, irrespective of the fact
that it has been "stored". The third step, then, is the understand-
ing whose material are the contents of the imagination, i.e.,
imaginative ideas, (or imaginative feelings) and whose function
is to establish relations between them, as well as to refer them
to the past, the future, other possible ideas of the imagination,
or hypothetical ones; in other words to construct elaborate frames,
the nodes of which are, as it were, the ideas of the imagination,
the connecting rods, on the other hand, the relations between them,
and to demolish and to reconstruct them according to criteria of
truth and falsity, or conformity to planned purpose, etc. Finally,
the fourth step is reason, which relates thoughts, i.e., acts of
the understanding, in the same way that the understanding relates
ideas of the imagination. Thus, reason apart, there exist "three 106
69Ibid., pp. 212-213. The above sketchy exposition is a free
rendering of chs. VIII, IX, X.
70Ibid., pp. 109,110,111.
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stages in the life of feeling. First,...bare feeling, below the
level of consciousness. Secondly,...feeling of which we have become
conscious. Thirdly,...feeling which, in addition to becoming con-
scious of, we have placed in its relations to others". 69 There-
fore, as a first consequence of this view, with regard to the
present argument, I would point out the assertion that the material
with which our faculties operate is homogeneous.
In addition, feeling, which is used in a broad sense so as to en-
compass perception and conception, is here considered intrinsically
linked to its expression. For instance, to have an emotion, is,
roughly, to have it in an inchoate, unintelligible form. In this
form, it is disturbing, irrespective of whether it is a pleasant or
unpleasant one, but merely due to its unknowability and incompre-
hensibility. It is in this sense that expressing this emotion by
means of language in general, which might equally mean speech,
gesture, drawing, etc., i.e., finding a comprehensible outlet for
it, is accompanied by relief, a sense that things are being settled,
becoming understood.70 Nonetheless, it is exactly this bringing
about of intelligibility, fundamental to expression, that involves
a presence of consciousness. Thus a second intrinsic link is
implied, this time between expression and the 'upwise' procession
and stabilization of experience from the lower to the higher steps
of the 'ladder'. This, however, does not mean that expression,
as a dynamic movement from incomprehensibility to comprehensibility 108
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72Ibid., p. 229.
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necessarily accompanying feeling, is to be identified with the
overall process of perception. Certainly, this is not the case
since expression is said to go along with feeling, and feeling as
has been stated, may exist on any of three different levels, not
only on all three simultaneously, or exclusively on the third,
i.e., that of intellectual relationships, somehow considered the
'culmination' of the preceding ones. Accordingly, there can be
three levels of expression. I will briefly present them so as to
have the question of this second link clarified. Expression may
and does accompany feeling at a level where it is still crude and
unprocessed, i.e. the first 'step' of the 'ladder'. Collingwood
labels it "psychical expression"71 and is as automatic and pre-
conscious as the organism's function of receiving sensory messages,
because its linkage to the corresponding feelings is equally autom-
atic and preconscious. It is the case of the immediate connection
between pain (feeling) and grimace (expression), which "is in one
way like that between a sensum and its emotional charge...; The
two things connected are not two distinct experiences, but are
elements in one indivisible experience", 72 made manifest in being
expressed.
Every kind and shade of emotion which occurs at the
purely psychical level of expreience has its counter-
part in some change of the muscular or circulatory or
glandular system which...expresses it... Even men,
whose sense of smell is so feeble, can discover that
certain emotions in their fellow men occasion peculiar 110
73 Ibid., p. 230, and n. 1, p. 230; and Gombrich, E.,
"Physiognomic Expression", in Daedalus, Winter 1960.
74Collingwood, op. cit., p. 225.
Ibid., p. 238.
76Ibid., p. 244.
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scents by causing glandular discharges. To an animal
whose sense of smell is so accurate as a dog's, I
suppose there is a 'language' of scent as expressive
as the 'language' of involuntary facial gesture is to
us.
73
Expression and accompanying feeling at the level of the second
'step' of the 'ladder', is termed "imaginative expression" and is
distinct from "psychical expression" in the same sense that an
"idea of the imagination" is distinct from an "impression of the
senses", in that it involves an interference of consciousness, and
is thereby self-conscious, however inarticulate. Language in its
first stage, i.e., before "adapting itself to the requirements of
the intellect",74 is an instance of it. "Imaginative expression"
as a result of its being involved with consciousness, attention and
the concomitant focusings upon the details of the sensory field,
or in other words, as a result of its object occupying a far wider
spectrum of emotions (ideas of the imagination) than sheer momentary
impressions, is, although inarticulate, much more multiple than
"psychical expression". "Thus the imaginative experience creates
for itself, by an infinite work of refraction and reflection and
condensation and dispersal, an infinity of emotions demanding for
their expression an infinite subtlety in the articulations of the
language it creates in expressing them".75 Since "the expression
of emotion is not, as it were, a dress made to fit an emotion
already existing, but is an activity without which the experience
of that emotion cannot exist",76 "what then, do we mean when we say 112
771bid., p. 238
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that the artist finds expression for an emotion hitherto unex-
pressed?"77  What is meant, Collingwood answers, is the follow-
ing: An emotion belonging to the conscious level, i.e., an idea
of the imagination, has two facets, is of a dual nature: on the
one hand there is its "material" aspect, consisting in the "psychic
matter" of the emotion, ie., its constituent impressions, or
transient sensa emotionally tinged; on the other, there is the
"formal" aspect being the new form that has been given to the
above matter by consciousness, (i.e., an act of attention), i.e.,
the stabilization and domestication of the sensory impressions.
The latter facet, as opposed to the former, (which is amendable to
automatic "psychic expression"), is the one which needs to be given
its proper expression and it is this expression which is simul-
taneous to the formation in the consciousness of the emotion.
This, then, is the meaning of the assertion that expression adheres
inextricably to feeling and, at the same time, to the feeling's
bringing into consciousness. That is, the'link between expression
and feeling apart, it is a matter rather of the link of imaginative
expression to consciousness, than of expression, general, to con-
sciousness, since expression may exist pre-consciously ("psychic"
level), but also at a level above mere consciousness, which is its
third level, at which it is adapted to the needs of the understand-
ing, and at which it issues in language proper.
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Therefore, we may infer that this view provides us with two
parallel and inseparable 'ladders'. Along the first experience
is transformed into feeling. Along the second feeling is
expressed. Neither can exist independently of the other. And
here it is that we may extract an element crucial to the 'game'
argument. So far the discussion of Collingwood's views of the
mechanism of perception/expression has centered upon the premise
of continuity of experience, and of the successive stages/strata
of feeling-perceiving-expressing. It is this reducibility of the
one stage to the other, (if one considers the 'ladder' process
'downwise'), and inversely, this building up of each successive
layer-step on the basis of the previous one (if one looks at the
'ladder' upwards) that constitutes a basic characteristic of the
'game' notion. By virtue of this, elaborate Constructa of the
'game', (things, images, concepts, practices, manners, habits,
etc.) brought about by and situated at one of the higher 'steps',
might be found to be ultimately reducible to the 'biological'/
'natural' immediacy of the lower levels. It is in such a sense
that dance has been considered the "mother of all languages"78
and bodily expressions as valid languages i.e., in the sense that
the organism's total receptivity and responsiveness (i.e., roughly
speaking, feeling and expression) to experience may be thought of
as formulating a total bodily language to which vocal language
stands as mere part; after all, vocal language is but movement of
bodily parts, lips, tongue, throat, lungs; all these being considered 116
79Ibid., pp. 230-231.
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"Sight of someone in pain, or the sound of his groans, produces
in us an echo of his pain, whose expression in our own body we can
feel in the tingling or shrinking of skin areas, certain visceral
sensa, and so forth". Ibid., p. 231.
81A somewhat similar view with respect to the social sciences,
especially liable to a 'game' methodological treatment, is ex-
pressed by Popper when he says: "It is...obvious.. .that we cannot
see and observe our objects before we have thought about them."
Popper, "Poverty of Historicism", op. cit., p. 135; also Scruton, R.,
"The Aesthetics of Architecture", Princeton University Press, 1979,
pp. 23 ff, for an attack on what Scruton labels "constructivism".
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as elements of an elaborate system of "expressive gesture" whose
origin undoubtedly lies in the various forms of "psychic expres-
sion". If, furthermore, there exists an attested strange "con-
tagiousness" of feelings at the psychic level, even in the case
where communication of the feeling by speech or individual exper-
ience of it are lacking, as e.g., in the case of spreading panic;79
a contagiousness possible merely on the grounds of the communica-
bility of the feeling by its "psychic", automatic expression, how
much more possible might an analogous contagiousness, or to put it
differently, a communal 'obsession' be at the level of 'naturalized'
feelings, or even thoughts, where communicability is further en-
forced by conscious processes? (Granted that such 'obsession', or
habituation through reciprocal reference from one individual to the
other, has its ancestry in the above "psychic" contagiousness). 80
Thus, this theory, the excursion into which is rewarding, both
avoids any stepping into transcendence, and does justice to the
'naturalness' of the game notion by not postulating a priori con-
ceivability or directability of our mental formations since nothing
is felt until expressed in a manner that involves summoning up and
close interaction, reciprocal reference of all our organic/mental
capacities. 81
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82A hint of this has already been given in the first section;
discussion on Democritus and the Sophists.
83Santayana, G., "The Sense of Beauty, Being the Outline of
Aesthetic Theory", Dover, 1955, p. 22.
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UTILITY
The above considerations make way for the idea of utility:82 utility
conceived in its broadest possible sense including both mere useful-
ness or propriety of an object with respect to its purpose, as well
as a sense in which utility refers to selective adaptation to a
milieu. This might be thought of as referring to an organism's
adaptation to his biological-ecolojical-natural surroundings; or to
a concept, practice, activitiy, habit being formed so as to serve its
claim in the best possible way; or, to man's natural tendency to
attune himself to the circumstances, these circumstances ranging from
apparent ones, as e.g. need for food, to the most subtle and imper-
ceptible, such as a need to employ his faculties of sensing, feeling,
perceiving, conceiving in convenient and rewarding manners, avoiding
superfluities, as far as this is possible. From such a standpoint,
positing utility as an all-pervading natural network underlying as
necessary condition all existence, and thence, experience, even
"obedience to God or reason can originally recommend itself to a
man as the surest and ultimately least painful way of balancing his
83
aims and synthesizing his desires". Utility comes forth as a
consequence of the above discussion in virtue of that possibility
of further and further reducibility until a mere organic level is
reached. Such a level is very akin to biological considerations
about evolution of organic forms according to principles of organiza-
tion based, among other things, on natural selection, adaptation,
"equilibrium with the prevailing forces of the environment... 120
84Ibid., pp. 96 ff.
85Ibid., pp. 100, 132.
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Gravity, for instance, is in itself a chaotic force;... But the
result is not chaos, because matter arranged in some ways is welded
together by the very tendency which disintegrates it when arranged
in other forms". 84  Natural selection is, then, one of the forms
of this generalized utility. Architectural style, for instance,
may be considered as a remote echo, a higher and more sophisticated
reflection of this fundamental function:
Various forms arise by mechanical necessity... These
are perpetuated by a selection in which the needs and
pleasures of man are the environment to which the
structure must be adapted. Determinate forms thus
establish themsevles.. .(and)...the line of use, by habit
of appreciation, becomes the line of beauty.85
This, very schematically illustrates a process fundamental to the
'game' notion from the lower and necessary, to the higher and
conventional.
CONVENTIONALIZATION
It is this process which is in fact essential to the assertion
that the social give-and-take serves as the furnace, as it were,
in which language, as an intrinsic need in man, becomes elaborate,
articulate, conventional, so as to be transformed from its crude
form, in which it is "a vocal actualization of the tendency to see 122
86Langer, op. cit., p. 109.
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reality symbolically" into that "complicated and refined...form
in which it is known today".86 Utility in this generalized sense,
then, and the 'ladder' model, may account for the conventionaliza-
tion of human activities. To pick up religion as an example, the
origins of religious rites have been thought of as possibly lying
in self-releasing, self-expressive, spontaneous movements and
sounds. These acts have probably undergone a gradual process of
schematization, conventionalization, and fixation by way of which
they were elevated to the status of signifying something communi-
cable. From the private world of the individual they are transferred
to the public world of the community: "But soon the outburst be-
comes a habitual reaction and is used to demonstrate, rather than
to relieve, the feelings of individuals". Something self-expres-
sive, becomes logically expressive: a transition from a "sign of
the emotion" to a "symbol of it". The unifiability (in that it
exists solely as a whole) and uniqueness (in that it cannot be re-
sumed, repeated, re-performed) of the first, is contrasted to the
second which involves "an articulation of feelings. The ultimate
product of such articulation is not a simple emotion, but a complex,
permanent attitude" revealed through formalized, conventionalized
gesture. In this context, then, religious rite ends up by being a
"disciplined rehearsal of 'right attitudes'... Yet", the meaning
of the convention, deeply rooted in "the exigencies of current life"
to which "emotional attitudes are always closely linked..., is in
this cryptic form...recognized". This recognizability is brought 124
87Ibid., pp. 151, 152, 153. An analogous account of the
factor of social contagiousness, is rendered for instance in
Freud, S., "Totem and Taboo", N.Y., e.g., "We have interpreted
the power of contagion which inheres in the taboo as the pro-
perty of leading into temptation, and of inciting to imitation",
ibid., p. 46.
88
"Conjecture and Refutations", op. cit., pp. 186 ff.
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about both by the gradually established convention-symbol and by
the factor of contagiousness: "Religious rejoicing is bound en-
tirely to set occasions, when the God-symbol - which probably is
always there, tucked away into its shrine - is brought forth and
officially contemplated. Even this is not enough; someone leads
the shouting and makes a demonstration of joy; gradually the feeling
develops and delight seizes the congregation."87
PREJUDICE
Karl Popper somewhere gives an account88 of the prehistory of
Newton's theory of dynamics which I believe is highly relevant to
our 'game' argument, and specifically, to the related issue of gradual
aloignement of concepts, precepts, ideas etc., from their initial
matrix of immediate interaction with material reality, i.e., the
issue of conventionalization. The basic idea underlying his story
is that "it is historically false to believe that Newton's dynamics
were derived from observation". For Copernicus, who had already pre-
pared the ground for Newton, placed "the sun rather than the earth
in the center of the universe" as a
result of a new interpretation of old and well-known
facts in the light of semi-religious Platonic and Neo-
Platonic ideas. The crucial idea can be traced back to
the sixth book of Plato's Republic, where we can read
that the sun plays the same role in the realm of visible 126
89Ibid., p. 257, and Popper, K.R., "The Logic of Scientific
Discovery", 1959, p. 278.
90
"The Poverty of Historicism", op. cit., p. 134.
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things as does the idea of the good in the realm of
ideas. Now the idea of the good is the highest in
the hierarchy of Platonic ideas. Accordingly the
sun...(since)... it was to be given pride of place...
(since it)...merited a divine status in the hierarchy
of visible things, then it was hardly possible (for
it).. .to revolve about the earth. The only fitted
place for so exalted a star was the center of the
universe.
This is a striking illustration of that dominant element of the
'game' notion, in virtue of which a more or less ineradicable con-
ception, a preconceived idea, a pre-sentiment, situated ideally
in a line of continuity leading back to increasingly elementary
interactions of man's organism and sensitivity with experience,
becomes the sturdy ground of our assumptions and conventions.
"This becomes clear if we remember that most of our scientific
theories originate in myths."89 And it is not only myths or
religious beliefs that play this role: "at no stage of scientific
development do we begin without something in the nature of a
theory, such as ahypothesis, or a prejudice, or a problem - often a
technological one-...".90
'CAPRICE'
Our 'games, then, more or less remotely grounded in the immediacy,
organicity, essential/natural utility and necessity of the inter- 128
91This phenomenon appears to bear a similarity with the
psychoanalytic idea of "autonomization" of an activity in the
life of the individual; by which is meant something of the sort
of a gradual estrangement of an activity initially brought about
as an immediate reaction to a "psychic conflict", as an attempt
to resolve it, and directly connected to it, from the "psychic
conflict" considered the source, the generating ground of the
activity. Thus, the activity, at "increasing distance from
direct reaction to the traumatic experience, distance from
immediacy of discharge", become eventually "detached from the
original conflict which may have turned interest and proclivity
into the specific direction", Kris, op. cit., pp. 29,30.
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action between our sensible selves and experience, move gradually
into conventionality and eventually, vis inertiae, step into a
sphere of seeming autonomy in which any sense of origin is lost
sight of. In that sphere, the phenomenon presents itself of the
emergence of all sorts of strange variations to already esta-
blished motifs, of abrupt shifts, alternations, rise and fall of
successive doctrines, theories, concepts, phrases, all these
occurring with no apparent justification, accompanied by no
explicit awareness of a foundation upon which to be based, and
brought about in the absence of any actual, observable need. In
that sphere there reigns the image of a pageant of strange, un-
invited, more or less absurd and uncontrollable thoughts, acts,
decisions or habits that tend to redirect the 'game' towards un-
foreseeable destinations, almost in defiance of its rules, based
on utility and fundamental necessities. It is as though that part
of the 'game' actuated on the upper levels-steps of the 'ladder'
tends to a certain degree of independence of the remainder; to re-
lease itself, as it were, from the constraints dominating the
whole, and to posit its own rules for itself. And, in fact, this
seems to be roughly the case.9 But thisdoes not constitute a de-
fiance of the rules of the 'game'. It is actually one of its
essential principles, in fact another way of coming to what we have
referred to as lack of any a priori predictablity or directability
of its future course. However, at least as an a posteriori measure,
it has been suggested that an estimation might be possible, of 130
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"The Poverty of Historicism", op. cit., p. 149.
93Ibid., p. 147 and Gombrich, E., "The Logic of Vanity Fair",
in Paul Schilpp, ed. "Karl Popper", 2 vols, The Library of Living
Philosophers, vol. II, p. 926. Gombrich gives a hint with regard
to the question of how this phenomenon insinuating unforeseeability
into the 'game' can, in the last analysis, appear even in "closed"
societies where, presumably, the degree of attachment to principles
purporting natural and organic necessity and utility is greater.
He states that this game of deviation from the norm for the sake
of prestige may commonly be institutionalized and ritualized in
such societies, in defiance of all rationality, i.e. at the ex-
pense of expenditure of goods and resources, possible alteration
of local ecological balance etc.; "yet it is hard to see how the
individual, caught up in the situation, can avoid these unintended
consequences of his bid without foregoing the necessary prestige",
"...Vanity Fair...", in loc. cit., pp. 927, 938. After all may
we not take such elaborate and sophisticated 'irrationalities', as
essentially springing from fundamental and natural traits of the
human character?
94Ibid., pp. 928, 929.
131
"the deviation of the actual behavior of people from the model
behavior", i.e., that which can be determined on the basis of the
element of potential rationality, "using the latter as a kind of
zero co-ordinate".92 An instance of the nature of these, as it
were, self-legislative acts of the 'game', occurring at its conven-
tionalized levels and arising out of no conspicuous need, or utility,
etc. might be discerned in "the way...in which competition" founded
in "intentional human actions", "leads to unintended consequences",
in, say, the field of economy or that of fashion. "All we need..
is the assumption that departure from a norm will arouse attention.
Given the desire of a member of.. .(a)....group to focus attention
on himself, the rational means for that purpose are therefore at
hand".93 Such moves of the game are intrinsic characteristics of
it, though they evince an outer surface or rationally articulated
irrationalities. However "foolish" the fashion "game", for example,
may be "it does not preclude rationality on the part of the players".
Nevertheless, "whatever rationalization we may be able to produce
for our habit of shaving, to bearded nations or periods this fashion
must surely look...unnatural and excessive... In all these matters
some departure from the norm of apparel and appearence must at
first have drawn attention for its rarity"; whereby, "fashion can
94be described in terms of rarity game". So, in such cases, we may
discern two agents: the initiator of a fashion, or the departure,
or the shift, or, generally, the novel move apparently unjustifiable
by the rules of the game, on the one hand; and the public on the 132
95Ibid., pp. 928, 929.
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other, before which two alternatives are placed: Either to discard
the move as "an improfitable eccentricity", which we may term the
'opponent-trend', or to emulate it, adopt it and assimilate it to
the normal behaviour which, on the other hand, may be viewed as
the 'follower-trend'. We might say that these two agents form a
sort of dialectical relationship, in the sense that if the dispo-
sition of the public tends toward following and adopting the move,
induced by a desire similar to that of the initiator, aiming at
attracting attention, then the more this disposition gains impetus,
(i.e., the more the 'follower-trend' is actuated) the more the
"original purpose" of the move "will be defeated", since the move
will thus become assimilated, widespread, established, and no atten-
tion will anymore be aroused in its presence. Consequently, "leaders
of fashion will have to think up a new gimmick", but on the other
hand "the opponents of the" (eventually established) "fashion will
discover to their chagrin that new it is they who are conspicuous
in the rarity game, they attract unwelcome attention by their re-
fusal to fall in".95 This potential changeability and imminent
possibility of re-orientation constitutes, with regard to the fashion
'game', an illustration of that general possibility of deviation
which the above cited "zero co-ordinate" purports to estimate. It
is obvious that such a model cannot be stable and permanent. It
is as contingent and fluid as the game it supposedly provides a
standard for. In fact, any move, which is subject to the 'measure-
ments', so to speak, of the "zero co-ordinate" model as long as it 134
96Ibid., p. 931. Also Goodman, N. "Languages of Art", 1976,
p. 80, "Since metaphor depends upon such transient factors as
novelty and interest, its mortality is understandable. With
repetition, a transferred application to a schema becomes routine,
and no longer requires or makes any allusion to its base applica-
tion. What was novel becomes commonplace, its past is forgotten,
and metaphor fades to mere truth". And figure 2, p. 82.
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is still a mere "intentional human action", upon the condition
that it becomes an "unintended social repercusion", 'eats up' the
model, eliminates it, or rather forces it to shift into a new
position and to assume a new constellation. It is by virtue of
this peculiar characteristic of the model/move, or public/initiator
relationship that I have termed it a dialectical relationship.
Rarity of a move for the sake of resulting attention, i.e., a
propensity towards 'showing-off' is not the sole 'rule', or 'prin-
ciple' engendering such unexpectable shifts chiefly at the higher
levels of the 'game's' hierarchical schema. Another factor is
"inflationary debasement (which) usually takes its departure from
the need for increasing emphasis... Here", i.e., in respect of
language, "the process of inflation.. .has more than a superficial
resemblance to the debasement of currency. Words originally coined
as the rarest tokens of exceptional emphasis rapidly sink down to
the small change of the advertiser and the school boy's slang...
'Large'" (in a corresponding example of a tooth-paste, advertised
in three sizes, 'large', 'jumbo', and 'mammoth') "has come to mean
the smallest".96 This process readily reminds one of the transfor-
mation experience undergoes as it becomes increasingly processed
by the successive steps of the 'ladder' hierarchical schema, i.e.,
as it becomes variously used, so to speak, by the game. It was
conceived by Fritz Mauthner in a manner similar to the previous
one: "The cultural languages of our age are...sick, rotten to the 136
97From "Sprache und Psychologie", quoted in Szasz, T.,
"Karl Kraus and the Soul--Doctors", Louisiana State University
Press, 1976, p. 51.
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"The Logic of Vanity Fair", loc. cit., pp. 931, 932, 933.
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core... The languages of sophistication have all developed through
metaphorization and have all become childish as the meanings of
the metaphors were forgotten".97
In the face of this potential imminence of inflationary metamor-
phosis of a language game two general attitudes emerge which,
driven to their extremes appear as licentiousness, on the one hand,
brought about by and in turn furthering a broad scope of choice
effected by coining new words, and restraint on the other, adhering
to tradition. So on the one hand there is an approval and adoption
of neologism, analogous to the 'follower-trend' discussed above with
regard to competing exhibitionism, and on the other hand there is a
wish for the already existent to persist; an intention to safeguard
it against corrosive neologism; a "purism" which preaches a re-
stricted, "closed", unrenewed language. 9 8  The first attitude tends
to produce a shift of the 'zero model'. The second tends to keep it
where it is.
These possibilities of changing the direction of a game, and its
rules, thus forcing it insidiously to assume a new formation/constel-
lation, being but examples of a great number of possible factors of
change, are crucial to the phenomenon of stylistic evolution.
138
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CONFLICT
When examining the stages which the enterprise of creating form (of
architecture or of the city) has gone through one gradually realizes
and is finally struck by the frequency of reappearance of ideas,
preferences, and formal elements which, at a first glance, have
been thought of as left behind, buried in the past, definitely and
irreversibly obsolete. All the more so, when such recurrences are
attested in periods other than those in which a revival or revali-
dation is generally taken for granted, e.g. the Renaissance; that
is, in periods which, on the contrary, are generally assumed to
cherish the seeds of 'modernism', to effect a digression from the
hitherto maintained continuity, to constitute a bold clash with the
past, thus changing essentially the course and direction of history.
With regard to such periods, and in defiance of any ordered and
neatly 'packed' expectations on the part of the observer, such re-
currences undermine a felicitious state of certainty that would be
most desirable concerning the process of re-tracing the already
accomplished course of events. It is such recurrences that shed the
scene with perplexity and incomprehensibility. And contrariwise to
what might be hoped at first glance, i.e., that recurrences of al-
ready witnessed and known ideas, deeds, situations are likely to
facilitate a relatively smooth systematization of the successive
historical scenes deployed before the observer, this does not appear
to be the case. Several reasons, by virtue of which an overwhelming
complexity is involved in this apparently simple phenomenon are 140
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"The Poverty of Historicism", op. cit., p. 9.
100It might be effected for reasons of propaganda, or as
justification for political or other innovations/alternations.
For instance, Collins' account of the establishing of Greek
Doric forms as the official style in America immediately after
the Revolution, as closely related to the republican fervor of
the period, Collins, op. cit., p. 88. And Gombrich, E.,
"Renaissance and the Golden Age", in "Norm and Form", Phaidon,
1978.
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responsible for this.
Firstly, it has been claimed, and now certainly constitutes for us
an indisputable reality, that "the experience of the repeated event
is not the same as the experience of the original event".99 Repe-
tition cannot escape novelty. Thus (the care with which repetition
is brought about, its precision notwithstanding) it is intrinsically
contaminated by the seeds of novelty. The replica is not anymore
what it causes to re-exist. This essential factor of changeability
necessarily bestowed upon a repetition, a recurrence, demonstrates
how a good deal of perplexity emerges in the observation of seem-
ingly manageable recurrences. Moreover, a recurrence may at a cer-
tain time be the outcome of a more deliberate and conscious decision,
whereas, at another moment it may have been already completely
effected before its presence has been clearly noticed. The relative
degrees of consciousness, in the presence and under the surveillance
of which a recurrence comes about is another powerful diversifying
factor. Both a 'conscious' and an 'unconscious' recurrence are
brought about admidst an entirety of circumstances which are unlikely
to bear any similarity to those having originally circumscribed the
object of the recurrence. Whereas a 'conscious' recurrence is con-
ceivably brought about on the basis and for the sake of issues more
or less extraneous to the object undergoing alteration, i.e., to the
stylistic game,100 on the other hand, a more 'unconscious' recur-
rence, indicates the many levels, interconnections, interactions, 142
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the complex grid of interdependence operating between the many
aspects of a certain society, or more specifically, between the
many fields of its intellectual life, so that if one (or a number)
of these aspects undergoes an alteration, a re-orientation (not at
all necessarily towards the past), a response on the part of another
aspect may be elicited, and this response may in turn 'unconsciously'
(i.e., not proceedingtowards the accomplishment of a prefixed ob-
jective) incorporate an unexpected revalidation of past forms. The
contamination of repetition by change, the purposive distortion of
either the 'original' or its resumption so as to make an inflexion
towards each other (usually for the sake of justifying the latter)
seem plausible, the recurrence brought about surreptitiously by
conditions having no direct connection with it, the continuous alter-
ation of circumstances, in spite of the apparent permanence of cer-
tain forms, an alteration that, at bottom, renders the permanence
insignificant; all these form a body of factors that causes our
initial hope at mastering the endless succession of forms by an act
of simple catalogizing ('Greek' periods, 'Roman' periods, etc.) to
collapse. Neither does some certain comfort come from another direc-
tion, i.e., fixing definitely diverse scenes of formal constellations,
and hierarchizing them according to an unequivocal schema of ad-
vancement, because the recurrences are nevertheless present,
conspicuous, and impelling the observer to attend to them. One is
therefore, so to speak, confronted with a hermaphrodite situation,
including at once persistence and renewal. 144
1 0 1 Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 75-76.
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Commenting upon the same phenomenon of stylistic change and, hence,
upon the possibilities we might have of rendering reliable accounts
of it, Kaufmann 101 asserted the impotence of what he terms the "apex
view" of history, i.e., the simplificatory approach treating the
succession of styles as though they were distinct species, and
accordingly classifying them using as dominant criterion merely
formal similarities or differences. Such a view would tend to pack
together formal or stylistic incidents on the one hand and their
possible recurrences in the subsequent course of history as though
they were more or less identical. But the reliability of the "apex"
method is jeopardized by the fact that
the single forms have a certain persistency. Or, to
put it the other way round: man does not forget completely
the forms his ancestors have devised. There have
always been 'revivals', and there always will be. There
is, however, a great difference between the Gothic and the
Gothic revival. There lis another, deeper-rooted and
deeper-going change besides the periodic appearance and
re-appearance of forms, namely, the change in the inter-
relation of the parts - or, in what I propose to term the
system. It is the system change that makes the difference
between Gothic and Gothic revival, between Roman and
Renaissance architecture, and so forth.
Although here the "system" implies the constellation of a specific
phase of the game, it does not refer to the multitude of circumstances
that surround, and interact with, style but rather to the stylistic
game in isolation, i.e., its forms and the manner in which they are 146
102See above, conscious-unconsciousness recurrences, pp. 142 ff.
103"The Logic of Vanity Fair", loc. cit., pp. 934, 935.
Accordingly, the idea of safeguarding a specific game from the
corrosive effects of the emergence of precedents/potential
overthrowers, has been described as essential to the formation
of taboos. "Totem and Taboo", op. cit., ch. II.
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intermingled. However, he somehow modifies this narrow account
by holding that systems are indicative of the "general mental atti-
tude" of a period, and thus extends it. Although forms are contin-
gent to the prevailing system, "forms and system, however, become
antagonistic when forms of an earlier system recur in a later one
because of some new scholarly interest in them, or for some other
extra-artistic reason". 102  It is thus a matter of warfare, as it
were, between the system and the potentiality of emergence of 'unin-
vited' forms; a state of alertness in which the system has to exist
continuously, so as to safeguard and maintain its existence. But
since the system itself consists of, harbors, all those inconspicuous
factors threatening to undermine its balance, we are again facing
the idea of unpredictibility of the 'game' and the 'follower-trend'
or 'licentious neologism', vs 'opponent-trend' or 'restrictive
purism' picture. The second part of this relation-picture, seems
partly to base its workings and attitudes toward sticking to an immov-
able tradition on a fear of creating precedents that might contin-
gently develop into the grounds for future alterations and substitu-
tions. "'Do not start things, it must not become an institution'.
The 'it' which is to be avoided is...the emergence of a new tradition
which will exact the repetition of an act or a favour which was
intended to be taken in its own right. The link between this problem
and that of inflation is obvious". 103 148
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POLARITIES
Therefore, we come to the issue of polarized camps, the emergence of
polarities as mutually repulsive attitudes towards the same thing,
which is one further characteristic of the game notion. It is dir-
ectly connected to the phenomenon of the changeabiltiy of the 'zero'
constellation of the 'game'. Polarities may emerge when it comes
to decide upon the adoption or not of a 'new' at the expense of an
'old', when both are considered worthwhile and especially when the
'old' is "charged with emotion". 104 In a sense, the entire history
of styles and taste may be viewed in terms of such emergent polari-
105ties, which, for a moment, appear to dissolve into a sort of sta-
bility and unanimity, only for the latter to be re-brought after a
more or less short rest into a relation of militating duality, juxta-
posed to a new adversary. An early instance of acknowledgement of
such a polarity, is provided by Vitruvius who condemned "the license
and illogicality of the decorative style fashionable in his age", 106
which was characterized by an entire mood of indifference towards
the rational possibilities that could be derived from a careful
observation and attentive imitation of Nature and reality.
But those subjects which were copied from actual reali-
ties are scorned in these days of bad taste. We now
have fresco paintings of monstrosities, rather than
truthful representations of definite things. For in-
stance, reeds are put in the place of columns, fluted
appendages with curly leaves and volutes, instead of 150
107Vitruvius, "The Ten Books on Architecture", Dover, 1960,
Book VII, ch. V.
108"The Logic of Vanity Fair", loc. cit., pp. 942 ff.
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pediments, candelabra supporting representations of
shrines, and on top of their pediments numerous tender
stalks and volutes growing up from the roofs and having
human figures senselessly seated upon them; sometimes
stalks having only half-length figures, some with
human heads, others with the heads of animals. Such
things do not exist and cannot exist and never have
existed. Hence, it is the new taste that has caused
bad judges of poor art to prevail over true artistic
excellence. For how it is possible that a reed should
really support a roof...or that roots and stalks should
produce now flowers and now half-length figures? Yet
when people see these frauds, they find no fault with
them, but on the contrary are delighted and do not
care whether any of them can exist or not. 10 7
This is a manifestation of the uneasiness of the system, or esta-
blished norm, when threatened by 'the precedent'. It is significant
to note here that the protesting voice comes from the side of a
norm which had been founded upon the conception of art as imitation,
or craft; a norm whose validity rested upon the practicality and
naturalistic plausibility of the moves it allowed; a norm in the
centre of which lay the pre-occupation with decorum, propriety or
fitness of an object or form, with respect to its own existence or
its probable use. In other words it is significant to relate this
protesting voice advocating adherence to utility, (a fundamental
characteristic of the 'game,', as we have seen), to the fact that
in many cases - though probably not in the specific one just dis-
cussed - the threatening new move is the result of technical pro-
gress108 which too, is based on utility. In this sense it has 152
109 Ibid.
1101t is also interesting to observe in this connection that
the fact of technical innovation, which is directly involved in
the concept of utility, and hence, the rootedness of the 'game'
in practicality and the necessary interactions of man with his
environment, in the form in which it was caught up and applied
to art in the Renaissance, progressively caused art to move
farther and farther away from its medieval dependence upon the
guilds and closely-knit social context. From that point onwards,
"the artist had not only to think of his commission but of his
mission." As a consequence art, made more or less independent
of the material bonds of craftsmanship, came to be thought of
as "a demonstration, an intellectual problem-solution" and
ended up in becoming "a revolution which has its martyrs who
produced art for art's sake in increasing isolation from public
demand." "Norm and Form", op.cit., pp. 3, 8, 10.
de Saisselin, R. "Neo-Classicism: Virtue, Reason,
Nature", in Hawley, H., "Neo-Classicism, Style and Motif", The
Cleveland Museum of Art, 1964, pp. 4, 5.
112Crawford, D. "Kant's Aesthetic Theory", University of
Wisconsin Press, 1974.
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been maintained that technical innovations have in repeated instances
offered the stimuli, formed the grounds for a transition from a
constellation/organization of the game around a propensity towards
the schematic, to one bearing increasingly naturalistic traits.
This picture of a path leading to increasing degrees of naturalism,
formed by virtue of technical innovations, could serve as a possible
interpretation for the shift from archaic to classical Greek art109
or from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance.110
Let us consider some further instances of polarity. It has been
stated that "it can.. .be argued that the Neoclassic style...found
metaphysical justification in Kant's Critique of the Esthetic Judge-
ment, for there are indications enough to show that the philosopher
of Kbnigsberg wrote that work as if the Neoclassic were the ultimate
art". Indeed for Kant,
in painting, sculpture, and in all the formative
arts...the delineation (Zeichnung) is the essential
thing; and here it is not what gratifies in sensation
but what pleases by means of its form...that is fundamental
for taste. The word 'Zeichnung' is used to refer to a
drawing, sketch or design in the sense of presentation
of figures or shapes by means of lines (rather than by
color masses or planes). In other discussions of form,
Kant speaks explicitly of figure and shape...as being
what we are to contemplate or judge in the experience
of the beautiful. 11 2
In connection to this quotation one can hardly fail to recall that 154
ll3de Saisselin, op. cit., p. 1.
114Ibid., p. 4.
115Stendhal, quoted in Holt, E., "From the Classicists to
the Impressionists: Art and Architecture in the 19th Century",
Doubleday, 1966, p. 45.
116Pevsner, N., "Academies of Art, Past and Present",
Cambridge University Press, 1940, pp. 190, 191.
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Neoclassicism, besides being formed on "the belief that history was
governed by eternal rules... (and that it was) a compound of natural
and moral law", 113 ended up by becoming, in the beginnings of the
19th c., an "eminently teachable style",I14 dominated by merely
technical rules, and at its best, expressing a "sort of material
beauty, which excluded the impression of divinity. This fault...
(being)...one of feeling and not of science. ,115 To rectify this
flaw was one of the main concerns of the early Romantics who posited
quests for 'genius' in art, as opposed to strict rules,116 and dis-
puted the primacy of 'design' over 'coloring' by discarding the former
as "mere deftness". This was reflected in the well known ruthless
war waged by the "draughtsmen" against the "colorists" and vice
versa. 118 Now, the fact that Neoclassicism, which was partly incited
by a virile and "heroic" reaction against the academic "flippan-
cies" that dominated early 18th c. official art, became gradually
reconciled with Academic institutions, served "to satisfy the vanity
of princes",119 to be eventually accused "in spite of its divine
descent" as "the mercenary servant of the profligate great", 120 has
been considered a "whim of history". By a similar "whim", so to
speak, was Cezanne 'destined' to play a role analogous to that of
adolescent Neoclassicism, this time attacking 'Neoclassicism acad-
emized' and its doctrines, and laying out the way for a good deal
of 20th c. approaches to art and form, still extant. But it is not
without significance for this argument that Cezanne, in spite of
his pioneering attitudes, "perceived a geometric form underlying 156
121Hol t, op. cit., p. 524.
122Tafuri, M., "Architecture and Utopia", MIT Press, 1976, p.
4; and "The Logic of Vanity Fair", loc. cit., pp. 935, 936.
123See note 105.
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the confusion of nature, found a confirmation for it in Kant's
esthetic theories", 12 1 and insisted that "good studies made after
nature.. .is the best thing". Nevertheless, he sought the "natural
law" by a completely different way than that of Neoclassicism. Early
'chaste' Neoclassicism and late 'perverse' Neoclassicism, 'medie-
valizing' Romanticism and Academicism, all deeply rooted in the
past, while at the same time (either by means of consonances or
dissonances) giving way to Cezanne, who, in turn, was to be super-
seded by later alliances and hostilities; hostilities that, in gen-
eral, similarly separate "Munch from Braque, Raoul Hausmann from
Mondrian, Haring from Mies". 122 All these movements and individu-
als, generally distributed into two opposing camps, fighting for
the 'less' and the 'more absolute' respectively, and asserting the
righteousness of their tenets by monotonously claiming, each for
his part, exclusive and due attendance to truth, genuine progress,
validity, etc.; where less and 'more-absol.ute' might be thought of
as importing the same meaning as the 'non-classical' and 'classical'
distinction referred to above. 1 2 3
DEPENDENCE
In such a way it becomes a most natural phenomenon that taste oper-
ates according to schemata of repulsion and attraction, that it
becomes divided into 'neat packages' opposing each other. Criteria
are readily formed proper to each of the polarized camps and it is 158
124
"The Logic of Vanity Fair", loc. cit., p. 950.
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upon conformity of a work with these that it is declared acceptable;
if, on the other hand, no such conformity appears, the work is
rejected, its value notwithstanding. Bearing in mind, then, the
above discussion, one might say that the separations and mutual
exclusions which we encountered as various manifestations of the
reason-feeling dichotomy may now be considered but offshoots brought
about by the nature and internal workings of the 'game'. Instead
of being absolute categories or criteria of validity, they are
rather contingent possibilities potentially contained among the
many possibilities/directions that the 'game' may at any moment
assume. Moreover, it becomes clear that, by virtue of the polarizing
forces which create the 'packages', appreciation and evaluation of
art, far from being something objective or infallible, tends rather
to acquire the nature of relative "recruitment",124 in the sense
that it praises or disparages a work of art or an object in general
not with respect to any esthetic properties it might supposedly
possess, but on the basis of its mere availability to serve the
cause of either of the "warring camps".
By accepting and flattering 'conformist' cases and making them appear
as corroborations of the standpoint of any of the 'taste packages',
evaluation-"recruitment" effects an increase of their respective
territories. On the other hand, by censuring and excluding 'non-
conformist' cases, it assists in keeping each of the camps pure,
fortified against possible contagion which might threaten to under- 160
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mine their cause and integrity. All these possibilities, however,
removed from the lower levels of the game, which, as we have seen,
are based upon more determinate principles, do not nevertheless
exist in total defiance of, or isolation from them. For example,
how else could this sense of evaluation as recruitment be inter-
preted than as an instance of utility? On this sophisticated level,
apparently independent of the material constraints of practicality,
natural existence and selected use according to the best possible
adaptation to a purpose, these same constraints in fact reappear,
with the sole difference that their matrix, or context, is not man
and his basic needs, or the production of strictly utilitarian ob-
jects, but the establishment and preservation of a particular con-
stellation of the 'upper levels' of the 'game', or of what Kaufmann
refers to as the "system". Consequently, along with this 're-
discovery' of the fundamental role of utility in the apparently
arbitrary or wanton manifestations of the 'game', goes the possibil-
ity that taste is something dependent upon conformism with an al-
ready established set of notions (or, alternatively, with an atti-
tude in the state of becoming), with a group, with a 'camp' gener-
ally. It involves pre-ideation, prejudice, some kind of factor
assumed to be valid as criterion, according to which it is directed.
And this is clearly illustrated by examples of how people pre-
disposed favourably towards a work, on the grounds that they assume
it as fitting into an already established 'package' of taste, are
dissillusioned as soon as they realize or become informed that the 162
125Ibid., pp. 948, 949, 950; and Goodman, op. cit., pp. 99ff.,
ch. III, "Art and Authenticity".
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work is a forgery. Favourable attitude is not based upon the work
itself but upon a pre-existing idea that it is a work by such-and-
such a master; and this pre-existing idea is not formed autonom-
ously but by means of gradual interactions and convergence of a
great number of factors which do not have any direct connection with
the esthetic merit or shortcomings of a work, as such. 125
Utility, prejudice, dependence: These are the basic 'laws' of the
'game', that appear and re-appear in diverse guises throughout the
various levels and manifestations of the phenomenon of taste. At
least, this is what emerges as a plausible hypothesis out of what
has been argued so far. However, it is not accepted unanimously,
and obviously so, because such a thoroughgoing concession on the
part of the 'players', the participants in the 'game', would have
immediately rendered much of its richness barren. If such an aware-
ness existed, an awareness, to put it very simply, that taste is
but a 'game', no fervor, or eagerness or assiduousness, at least in
the sense we encounter such attitudes, would characterize its
pursuance. No polarities would probably exist. A mood of resigna-
tion and utter indifference would most likely prevail. It is in
this connection, therefore, that we have to look at a different. view,
namely that taste is not a 'game', that it is not based upon the
above mentioned factors, and that, far from being centered upon
questions of optimum choices, best possible uses, processes of
conventionalization and transformation, initial theories and predis- 164
126Panofsky, E., "The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline",
in "Meaning in the Visual Arts", Doubleday, 1955, pp. 10 ff.
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positions, showing off tendencies and solicitation; that far from
being situated in a sphere of relativity wherein all possible
contradictions are, by its nature, allowed, and in fact invited,
to emerge, it is properly autonomous. Or, to avoid unyielding ex-
tremes, it will be a question of a view postulating that autonomy
exists (or ought to exist) and reigns (or ought to reign) over taste,
if not in its entirety, as a phenomenon, at least over a specific
aspect of it; that there can be a sense in which, all 'game' con-
siderations apart, one can speak of taste as though it was a totally
independent and autonomous 'universe'. Let us see how such a view
can be reached.
IS THERE AUTONOMY?
According to Panofsky's conception of the function, nature and aim126
of a work of art, the argument may go thus: "a work of art is not
always created for the purpose of...being experienced esthetically".
Whether, however, mere "delectatio" or some usefulness as well be
the ends of art, "a work of art always has esthetic significance".
This, if extended, means that every object, irrespective of its
being a work of art, a tree, or a machine, can be experienced esthe-
tically, on the sole condition that one attends to it "without re-
lating it, intellectually or emotionally, to anything outside itself".
To clarify this, Panofsky uses the example of a tree that, if 166
167
looked at from the point of view of an ornithologist, or that of a
carpenter, certainly won't be experienced esthetically. However,
fortunately, the manifold interpretations, dispositions, and utter
confusion (as to what the right attitude towards a thing should be)
that, most likely, might have originated in such a contemplation of
objects, conditioned at will, is avoided. For "a man-made object"
at least, "either demands or does not demand to be so experienced,
for it has what the scholastics call 'intention'". And it is pre-
cisely this "intention" which foreshadows whether the object should
be experienced "practically" or "esthetically". For example, if "I
choose.. .to experience the redness of a traffic light esthetically,
instead of associating it with the idea of stepping on my breaks, I
should act against the 'intention' of the traffic light".
The phrase "instead of associating it", transfers us smoothly to
the next distinction. The "practical" objects "may be divided into
two classes: Vehicles of conmunication and tools or apparatuses.
A vehicle of communication is 'intended' to transmit a concept",
while "a tool or apparatus.. .to fulfill a function" (which function,
in turn, may be the production and/or transmission of concepts).
But strangely, not only practical objects, but also works of art
"belong in one of these two classes". Therefore, "a historical
painting is, in a sense, a vehicle of communication...the Pantheon
...an apparatus; and Michelangelo's tombs of Lorenzo and Giuliano
de' Medici are, in a sense, both". Obviously, a work of art can 168
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only "in a sense" be either vehicle of communication or apparatus,
since "the interest in the idea (i.e. the concept to be transmitted
or the function to be fulfilled) is balanced, and may be even
eclipsed, by an interest in form". Let alone, with connection to
this duality, Panofsky's ascertainment that since "the element of
'form' is present in every object without exception" no exact lo-
cation can be effected of the point at which objects abandon the
realm of the "practical"/concept to enter that of the "esthetic"/
form; that the identification largely depends on the "intention"
of the creators, and thereby that no guiding principle can be esta-
blished for a clearcut characterization of the objects; what inter-
ests us here is the introduction of another level at which formal
organization may be conceived. A level, within the context of which,
the form of an object and our mode of attending to it appear to be
absolutely free from any dependence, any restriction, or expectation
at fulfilling whatever kind of function, for the reason that no explan-
ation or reduction to some other, more concrete and familiar plane
is provided for the phrase "an interest in form". All the more so,
since this interest - seemingly irreducible to something more 'down-
to-earth' - is virtually uncontrollable and unpredictable, deprived
even of the convenient identification-device of "intention", em-
bedded as a quality inherent in the object (i.e. either concept or
function), which is of no use any more, being operational only on
the preceding level of 'pre-esthetic' experience. Now this "interest
in form" seems to be exposed to the whims of a vague "intention of
the creators", or to the arbitrariness of the viewer (in the case 170
127Both in the sense Panofsky ("Iconography and Iconology", in
ibid.) refers to it and in the 'ordinary' sense.
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the creator's "intention" fails to be communicated to the viewer,
for one reason or another). This abstract level is one where that
which has been mentioned above and might be referred to as 'formal
function' which is presumably closely linked to the subject-matter
or content127 and hence to communicable concepts, of more or less
immediate grasp, is excluded. This puzzling "interest in form" is
not raised because of that which the form, however well or inade-
quately, represents, implies, imparts. It is a 'disinterested'
interest, to use a Kantian term, like the one implied by Panofsky
in the example of the tree. Immediately after this apparently
'hopless' statement, that the "interest in form" is raised of obvi-
ated according to the "intention" of the creators, Panofsky offers
a solution to the problem:
The 'intentions' of those who produce objects are con-
ditioned by the standards of their period and environ-
ment. Classical taste demanded that private letters,
legal speeches, and the shields of heroes should be
'artistic'...while modern taste demands that architecture
and ashtrays should be 'functional'.
Irrespective of the lurking danger that may have caused the former
to result in "fake beauty" and the latter in "fake efficiency", we
are suddenly offered here a vague though plausible solution. By
resorting to the "standards of period and environment", by which,
obviously, something very similar, if not identical to 'taste' is
meant, Panofsky relegates that ultimate, abstract "interest in form" 172
128Kant, "Critique of Judgement", The Hafner Library of Classics,
1951. Unspecified quotations are taken from Crawford, op. cit.
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to the realm of such sociological phenomena as social convention,
the persistence of tradition, the impacts of innovation, the ver-
satile role played by fashion, superstitions, and furthermore,
legislation, economic stratification and hierarchy, systems of pro-
duction, etc., for justification. Thus, what originally appeared to
be an absolutely autonomous "interest in form", now turns out to
be something dependent, attached to the orbit of social vicissitudes.
It might have certainly claimed some kind of universality, never-
theless within the limits - spatial or temporal - of a culture; but
viewed as a whole throughout history it has been as relative as
so many other notions and interests. It may be asserted that Kant's
esthetic theory is pervaded by similar conceptions. At the same
time, however, it departs decisively from what has been stated so
far. Whereas "interest in form", in Panofsky as well as in the
course of this argument up to now, has only been treated as a mere
portion of the multitude of possible 'functions', or relations of
the formal organization to those attending to it, even though a
distinct one since it has been considered, so to speak, more 'ele-
vated' than the others; in Kant, it aquires prime importance.
Throughout his "Critique"128 one repeatedly encounters the distinc-
tion between mere gratification of the senses and pleasure in the
beautiful. It is exactly the latter that forms the cause and the
theme of his work. Thus, in the first place, "an esthetic judgement
is contrasted to a cognitive judgement in which a representation
is related to a concept", as well as being contrasted to sensual 174
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indulgence; "empirical rules or criteria of taste can never serve as a
priori laws by which our judgement of taste must be directed". This makes
quite clear the difference between the preceeding classifications and what
we are going to face in the following lines: This "empirical rules or
criteria of taste" might perfectly be substituted for Panofsky's "standards
of period and environment", or for all that which has been discussed above
as pertaining to the 'game' notion. Obviously, here, we are leaving be-
hind what up to now has seemed to be the farthest extreme, and turning
towards something even more 'pure' and 'intact', implied by the phrases
"a priori laws", and "our judgement of taste must be directed". Indeed,
for Kant, judgement of taste or esthetic judgement, i.e. "this is beautiful"
makes sense only insofar as it is, and must be, universally valid; and it
is exclusively upon this condition that we have what is termed a pure
judgement of taste. "A judgement of taste is pure insofar as it is made
on the basis of contemplation of the form of the object and not on the
basis of pleasure taken in sensation alone", for the latter may be rela-
tive, in the sense that a sensation which for one person is pleasurable,
for another may be repulsive as is e.g. the case with the taste of the
palate, smell or touch. In addition, a pure judgement of taste must be
disinterested, and this is definitely not the case with sensuous pleasures,
which incite a desire for possession of the objects associated with them,
and are thus potentially charged with notions of interest. But it is
not only with the pleasure grounded in sensations that interest emerges.
Pleasure in the presence of the good also presupposes and begets interest.
Thus neither is the judgement "this is a beautiful something" a pure
judgement of taste because it refers not to "free" but "dependent" beauty, 176
129 Kant, op. cit., p. 44.
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by which that it involves
a concept of the purpose which determines what the thing
is to be, and consequently a concept of its perfection.
Therefore the judgement of taste proper is distinguished from any exertion
ofthe faculties of the mind in which concepts - having to do with what an object
is, i.e. cognition, or what it ought to be, i.e. teleology, or with ques-
tions of whether it is good, either in itself or for some purpose -or in-
terest (due to the sensual pleasure an ojbect probably begets, or due to
its goodness or usefulness), are involved. The judgement of taste is not
cognitive, nor teleological; the pleasure felt in the presence of an object
the statement of which is carried out by such a judgement, is not sensuous
pleasure, nor the pleasure of good; "of all these three kinds of satisfac-
tion", i.e. the pleasant, the beautiful, and the good, "that of the taste
in the beautiful is alone a disinterested and free satisfaction".129
The fact that the satisfaction in the beautiful is disinterested, free,
independent,makes for a partial justification for the assumption of its
universal validity; it "implies...a ground of satisfaction for all men." 130
Another reason for assuming universal validity of the judgement of taste
is the fact that men quarrel about matters of taste, do not show indiffer-
ence when their judgement is opposed and have a peculiar inextricable ten-
dency to expect, necessarily, agreement with it. Granted the posited
universality of the judgement of taste
what are we to presume from this except that beauty
is to be regarded as a property of the... (object)... 178
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itself, which does not accomodate to any diversity of
persons or of their sensitive organs, but to which
these must accomodate themselves if they are to pass
any judgment upon it? And yet this is not so
since the slightest interference of any property of the object,
would render the judgment a cognitive one.
For a judgment of taste consists in calling athing
beautiful just because of that characteristic in res-
pect of which it accomodates itself to our mode of
apprehensi on. 131
The implication of this is that the postulated universality of the
judgment of taste is not an objective one. The pleasure in the
beautiful being merely "a feeling in the subject as it is affected
by the representation" of a thing, its "determining ground can be
no other than subjective", and hence, the judgment of the beautiful
is subjectively universal. 1 3 2
Still, however, the above adduced reasons for taste's universality
are anything but adequate. For if the judgment of the beautiful is
to be pushed, with regard to its proper nature, deep into the
subjectivity of man, in reference to what is its communicability,
let alone its universal validity, to be sought? A judgment in general
is conceived by Kant as an act of thinking the particular as con-
tained in the universal. The following two points are crucial here 180
181
for the clarification of the above stated problem: First, that
in such an act of subsumption, the imagination and the under-
standing are closely related and co-operate. The imagination brings
into consciousness the representation, appearance of a thing, which
the understanding is responsible for 'classifying', so to speak,
or for providing with a concept, this process being brought about
in accordance with the understanding's a priori principles. Sec-
ondly, that, precisely, the existence and application of a concept
is necessarily involved in this act. This might otherwise be
referred to as the understanding's bringing unity, by application
of a concept, over the manifold of the intuition (or representation)
brought in by the imagination. Now if knowledge exists about the
universal (i.e., concepts, provided by the a priori principles of
the understanding), then the judgment is "determinant", which is
the case described above. If however, only the particular is known,
no definite law or concept being present for its subsumption under
the universal, the judgment is "reflective". Its function is still
"to establish the possibility of...(the)...systematic subordination
... of... empirical principles under higher ones", but, towards this
goal, since it is unhelped by any determinate concepts or laws of
the understanding, the laws are supplied by the jdugment itself.
In order to obtain some insight as to the nature of these laws, there
must be pre-supposed a priori the possibility of an overall unity
potentially governing the particularities of experience which must
thereby be capable of becoming connected into "a whole of experience". 182
133Ibid., pp. 15-23.
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This a priori unity is the principle of nature's purposiveness for
our faculties. "The ...(reflective).. .judgment has therefore.. .in
itself a principle a priori of the possibility of nature" i.e. of
the possibility of comprehending nature in a unified and organized
way,
but only in a subjective aspect, by which it prescribes
not to nature..., but to itself... a law for its reflec-
tion upon nature... If then, we say that nature specifies
its universal laws according to the principles of pur-
posiveness for our cognitive faculty, i.e., in accordance
with the necessary business of the human understanding for
finding the universal for the particular which perception
offers it, and again of finding connection for the
diverse... in the unity of a principle, we thus neither
prescribe to nature a law, nor do we learn one from its
observation...we only require that, be nature disposed
as it may as regards its universal laws, investigation
into its empirical laws may be carried on in accordance
with that principle. 1 33
With the help of this consideration we may now understand how Kant
means the universality of the judgment of tatse, which is obvi-
ously a reflective judgment, no definite law being provided for it
since any implication of concepts in it is excluded. Therefore
the effecting of unity of the manifold of the intuition (represen-
tation of the imagination) of a thing by the understanding which
is necessarily requisite of judgment in general has to be visual-
ized here unassisted by, free of, any concept whatsoever. The
common locus of judgements, either logical or esthetical, their 184
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common principle, i.e. the conditions under which they are possible,
is "the accordance of... imagination (for the intuition and comprehen-
sion of the manifold) and understanding (for the concept as a represen-
tation of the unity of this comprehension)", in the case of logical
judgements, or lacking a concept as in the case of the judgement of
taste, "the subsumption of the imagaination itself", by which the
representation of an object is given, "under the conditions that
the understanding requires to pass from intuitions to concepts".
In other words, the common locus is "the reciprocal activity of the
imagination in its freedom and the understanding with its conformity
to law",13 which is, in the case of the esthetical judgement, pro-
vided not by any concept, but by the subjective principle of nature's
purposiveness for our faculties. "The purposiveness" of the judg-
ment of taste "has its ground in the object and in its figure, al-
though it does not indicate its reference to other objects in
accordance with concepts (for a cognitive judgment) but merely has
to do in general with the apprehension of this form, so far as it
shows itself conformable to the faculty of concepts", i.e. under-
standing, "and of the presentation.. .of them", i.e. imagination, "in
the mind."135 This purposiveness may be thought of as purposiveness
without purpose, just as the understanding conforms to law, without
136-
any apparent law whatsoever being present. Therefore it can be
labeled a "more formal purposiveness" in respect of both the form
of the object being referred to the subject, and the "formal (element) 186
13 Ibid., p. 63.
138 Ibid., pp. 57, 58, 64, 65.
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in the representation of a thing", which is "the agreement of the
manifold with a unity", and which, if the unity is undertermined
by a concept, "gives to cognition no objective purposiveness what-
ever. For since abstraction is made of this unity as purpose (what
the thing ought to be), nothing remains but the subjective purposive-
ness of the representation in the mind of the intuiting subject". 137
Thus the subjective principle of nature's purposiveness for our
faculties, is, in the case of the judgment of taste, a mere subjec-
tive formal purposiveness. It does not have anything to do with the
object's qualitites but with the liability of their forms to be
thoroughly comprehended and ordered by our faculties; and the
pleasure in the beautiful, accordingly, is the "consciousness of
the mere formal purposiveness in the play of the subject's cognitive
powers", when the subject disinterestedly reflects upon "a repre-
sentation through which an object is given"; it is "the feeling
(...internal sense) of that harmony in the play of the mental powers". 138
Crawford gives the following account of the above:
What Kant terms the 'free play of the imagination' (to
which he ascribes a productive role, i.e. 'the author
of arbitrary forms of possible intuition', and not a
reproductive one as if it were subject to the laws of
association) thus can be viewed as the spatial and
temporal ordering in the imagination of perceptions,
the relating of parts...to each other in a variety of
ways to determine whether a relatedness, a purposiveness
of form, can be apprehended ...(i.e. whether such a 188
relation can result which, by virtue of this very achieve-
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ment of harmony, will incite a feeling of pleasure)...
In cognitive perception this synthesis (i.e. such tenta-
tive successive acts of assembling the parts) is determined
by rules; concepts determine the unification and the
cognitive judgment is thus determinate. In esthetic
perception...this syntehsis is not determined by empir-
ical rules or concepts, and hence it is free to relate
the parts in whatever way it can to obtain a synthetic
unity of the manifold...Thus, the purposiveness of form
in objects considered as to their beauty is merely sub-
jective, in the sense that it is the purposiveness of an
arrangement of the manifold of intuitions (appearances)
by the intuiting subject through the joint efforts of the
imagination and the understanding. 139
Pleasure is achieved when such an ordering is attained that the
cognitive powers are in harmony; i.e. they reach a state beyond
which there is nothing to pursue, and thus they tend to maintain 140
the status of interaction attained. In this stage "it is as if the
object being contemplated were designed for our cognitive facul-
ties", and this capacity of the object to appear thus, essentially
contributes to its formal purposiveness, or else, "designedness",
"rule-governedness". This latter point is expressed by Kant when
he says that "natural beauty (which is independent) brings with it
a purposiveness in its form by which the object seems to be, as it
were, pre-adapted to our judgment, and this constitutes in itself
an object of satisfaction". 141
This conception, then, of the judgment of taste based upon and ful-
filling the conditions for cognition in general, although no 190
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cognition is carried out by it; by referring to a state of mind in
which the imagination and the understanding reach a harmonious
equilibrium with regard to a representation of an object being
'processed', 'administered', reflected upon i.e. with regard to a
form's liability to be comprehended as a unity, (which is nothing
other than this harmonious equanimity attained by the mental powers);
is what justifies the claim for universality of the judgment of
taste. For it is founded upon the conditions of cognition in gener-
al, which are necessarily universal, because otherwise no
communication between people would exist. More specifically, one
aspect of the universality of the autonomous subjective judgment of
taste may be thus explained: namely, its universal communicability.
And it is this that underlies the fact that we seek other people's
agreement with our judgments of taste.
However, there is a second aspect of the judgment's universality
which makes for the fact that, besides expecting agreement, we impute
our judgment of taste to everyone as though it was a duty. It is
a question in other words, of the universal validity of the judgment
of taste apart from its universal communicability. Kant's explana-
tion of this latter kind of universality is crucial to the issue of
the autonomy of taste; because, although none of the factors that
have been discussed so far and which point to that autonomy is dam-
aged by this explanation, yet, in a sense, that independence of taste
(at least within the confines of man's subjectivity) is transformed 192
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into a state of dependence upon, or more specifically, state of
attachment to, or co-existence with, both interest and concept.
For Kant, men's fervor when it comes to matters of taste can only
indicate an interest bound with it, the esthetical judgment's
freedom from interest notwithstanding. However, this is not a
contradiction, because, "A judgment upon an object of satisfaction
may be quite disinterested but yet very interesting, i.e. not
based upon an interest, but bringing an interest with it".142 And
this is doubly true. Firstly, because interest in the beautiful can
be possible only in society as a result of man's sociability, i.e.
inclination to conmunicate, which is a "property belonging to
hunanity'. In this sense "we cannot escape from regarding taste
as a faculty for judging everything in respect of which we can com-
municate our feeling to all other men, and so as a means of further-
ing that which everyone's natural inclination desires". 43Secondly
because "to take an immediate interest in the beauty of nature", as
opposed to that of art, and "(not merely to have taste in judging
it) is always the mark of a good soul". For the man who perceives
the beauties of nature with admiration and love, "it is not merely
the form of the product of nature which pleases him, but", also,
"its very presence", 144 i.e. its existence, in the relation of man
to which interest inevitably enters. Man is interested in the
existence of the beautiful forms of nature. This second interest
in the beautiful is aroused by the fact that in the contemplation
of it, by means of the purposiverness of nature, we come to a concep- 194
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tion of nature which transcends that of a "purposeless mechanism";
we come to a conception of it "as belonging to something analogous
to art",145 which is that which was mentioned before as "designed-
ness" and "rule-goverdness". Hence, "our admiration for nature,
which displays itself in its beautiful products as art, not merely
by chance, but as it were designedly,...as purposiveness without
purpose. This latter, as we never meet it outside ourselves, we
naturally seek in ourselves and, in fact, in that which constitutes
the ultimate purpose of our being, viz. our moral destination." 146
It is thus an interest in what we assume to be nature's lawfulness
without law, or designedness without design, between which and the
a priori laws of reason based on the concept of freedom (the laws of
the morally good, and the corresponding interest in it), an analogy
is drawn. It is this lawfulness without law pervading nature, which
accounts for referring this second, a priori interst (as opposed to
the interest due to sociability, which is an empirical one) to the
beauties of nature exclusively and not to those of art, in which a
design, a definite purpose, viz. aiming at our satisfaction, is
obviously involved. Art is to be elevated from this constraint of
design, i.e. from the limits of either dependent beauty or mere
sensuous pleasantness; in other words, art is to be purely beautiful
only if it becomes "free from all constraint of arbitrary rules as
if it were a product of mere nature... Nature is beautiful because
it looks like art, and art can only be called beautiful if we are
conscious of it as art while yet it looks like nature". 147 This, in 196
148 Ibi d. , pp. 157-158.
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brief, constitutes the introduction of interest in the discussion
of taste which, as it appears, adumbrates a relegation of the
judgment of taste for its explanation to the realm of reason ac-
cording to the concept of freedom i.e. morality.
This move, by which taste will be made subject to an authority, is
made much more explicit if we consider how, in addition, concepts
enter upon the discussion of the beautiful. Genius, as the faculty
of producing beautiful art, (as distinct from merely judging it)
consists in that union of imagination and understanding wherein,
the imagination, unlike its being in a state of subjection under the
concept of the understanding (cognition), is "free to furnish...,
over and above that agreement with a concept, (unsought) abundance
of undeveloped material for the understanding, to which the under-
standing paid no regard in its concept", thus "esthetically enlarging",
so to speak, the concept, by occasioning more thought "(which in-
deed belongs to the concept...)...than can be grasped or made
clear".148 But that which the imagination is here purported to bring
about, is an esthetical idea, i.e. a representation of the imagina-
tion for which no concept can be offered. By bringing such an idea
into the mind, the imagination somehow induces a strife towards "some-
thing which lies beyond the bounds of experience", i.e. unattainable,
in the same way that an adequate presentation for a rational idea,
(which is a concept of reason for which no representation of the
imagination can be offered), is unattainable. The esthetical idea, 198
1491bid. pp. 82 ff.
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then, can be thought of as a presentation of a rational idea.
Therefore we witness here an instance of rapprochement of taste in
the beautiful, to reason. A second one, we observed earlier, via
the analogy between interest in the beautiful in nature and that in
the morally good, which is based upon the rational concept of free-
dom. Parenthetically, I mention here a third such instance offered
by Kant when discussing the sublime which he relates to the inade-
quacy, inability of the imagination to accord with the understanding
when faced with certain representations characterized by "boundless-
ness"; i.e. to its inability to grasp the manifold of the representa-
tion, for which nevertheless unity is required by the understanding:
The sublime then, for Kant, consists in nothing other than the
emergence of an awareness of reason's imperative for absolute unity,
which is transcendent (i.e. impossible in experience) and reveals
the superiority of humanity over nature. Hence the feeling of sublim-
ity involves a transition from an esthetic feeling to the utmost
purpose of man: morality according to the rational concept of free-
dom.149 But we should not forget that this rapprochement has been
implicitly present throughout Kant's argument, with regard to the
fact that the grounds of the judgment of taste are those of cognition
in general; And although it is not based upon concepts of understand-
ing, which are determinable "through predicates of sensible intuition
which can correspond to them", it is nevertheless based upon a con-
cept, which makes for its possibility as well as the possibility of 200
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all mental operation whatsoever. This is "the transcendental rational
concept of the supersensible, which lies at the basis of all sen-
sible intuition", and which "cannot be theoretically determined". 150
This concept of the supersensible is that which, in the form of
purposiveness "underlies the object (and also the subject judging
it) regarded as an object of sense and thus as phenomenal"; 151 in
which sense it is termed "the supersensible substrate of phenomena".152
It is also that which provides us with the possibility of feeling
pleasure as a result/reflection/manifestation of instances of this
purposiveness, i.e. of the harmonization of our faculties before a
representation of nature purposive for them, (i.e. for that very
harmonization).
The judgment of taste is based on a concept (viz. the
concept of the general ground of the subjective purpose-
iveness of nature for the judgment); from which however,
nothing can be known and proved in respect of the
object, because it is in itself undeterminable and use-
less for knowledge. Yet at the same time and on that
very account the judgment has validity for everyone...,
because its determining ground lies perhaps in the con-
cept of that which may be regarded as the supersensible
substrate of humanity". 153
This idea of the supersensible, i.e. as the supersensible substrate
of humanity, bearing the possibility of becoming aware, via the
feeling of pleasure, of that accomplishment, consummation, that
attainment on the part of our mental powers of a state of self- 202
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sufficient harmony, is the same thing as "the principle of the
purposes of freedom and of the agreement of freedom with its pur-
154poses in the moral sphere". It is ultimately on this account
that we intransigently long for agreement in matters of taste,
"because we have a right to expect moral sensitivity in other human
beings".155
In the case of Kant's argument, then, we follow a gradual transfer-
ence of taste from a totally free and autonomous state, to one
in which it is made dependent upon reason, morality and freedom.
Certainly, it is not a case of giving up the claims to autonomy of
taste with respect to any authority outside the individual. It is,
however, a case of giving it up and resigning taste for the beauti-
ful to the guidance of an authority inside the subject. And this
nuance, however well articulated and orderly fitting into Kant's
philosophical schemata, nevertheless escapes them and reaily be-
comes an acknowledgment of taste's dependence in general; an
acknowledgement of the beautiful's inability to exist or betray it-
self to man on its own, absolutely and exclusively.
If the beautiful arts are not brought into more or less
close combination with moral ideas, this.. .fate must
ultimately be theirs.
namely, degenerating into indulgence in, and excluding everything
but 204
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the matter of sensation (charm or emotion), which has only
to do with enjoyment; this...makes the spirit dull...
and the mind, on account of its consciousness of a dis-
position that conflicts with purpose in the judgment of
reason, discontended with itself and peevish... They
then serve as a distraction, or which we are the more
in need the more we avail ourselves of them to dispense
the discontent of the mind with itself.156
One can hardly fail to recall in this connection Plato's indictment
on sensuous gratification as "dragging men away from their sublime
duties",157 as well as to recognize that this statement of Kant's
is but a splendid description and criticism of the phenomenon of
inflation discussed above. In this light the idea of autonomy of
taste can be very plausibly thought of as constituting but a speci-
fic move in the 'game' of taste tending to delineate its own terri-
tory surrounding and fortifying it, in which not all 'taste'
whatsoever, but only a polarized conception of it can reside.
206
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Section iii
THE NOTION OF GAME CONTINUED: SEARCH FOR ORDER IN THE CONCEPTIONS
OF NATURE.
Kant's critique and the preoccupations inherent in it concerning
universality and autonomy are, in a sense, typical of the revolu-
tionary phase which the theory of knowledge went through during the
Enlightenment. The latter's dominant themes had been centered
around questions such as, How is knowledge about the world possible?
What are its extents? How can knowledge be verified? How is truth
to be distinguished from falsity? To what degree can knowledge be
acquired by man autonomously, no authority besides his own capaci-
ties imposing upon him what knowledge is to be? 158 To what degree
is knowledge one and the same for everyone and past which point does
it become (if at all) relative? The character of those enquiries
might be reduced to and expressed by a few key-words: Universality,
relativity, subjective, objective, truth, error.
UNIVERSALITY VS. RELATIVISM
On the one hand, that part of the philosophy of the Enlightenment
which stens from Descartes based its answers to the above questions
upon a sweeping belief in the innate power of human reason. Know-
ledge was derived from "intellectual intuition of clear and distinct 208
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ideas",159 as well as from deduction; accordingly, science could
proceed reliably, upon the condition that it operated in compliance
with the simple laws of the intellect, which were considered
immutable. Truth and universality of knowledge were thus secured
and by the same token final decisions, it was hoped, could be made
upon the puzzling problems of taste and beauty, insofar as the
judgment of the beautiful would be made into a species of intellec-
tual judgment. For final truth ought to exist, it was thought,
concerning esthetic issues, just as it exists with respect to sci-
entific ones, and the only possible means of attaining it could be,
presumably, the simple and immutable laws of reason. Such was the
esthetic program of Rationalism. With the help of Aristotelian
notions it reached the point of conceiving the beautiful as being a
property of the objects of nature from which it only had to be ex-
tracted by imitation. However, that which upon being imitated would
bring forth true beauty was not any part of the natural objects
indistinctly, but their "general and immutable elements", as opposed
to the "accidental accretions of time and the world. The 'nature'
to be represented in art...(meant)...an essence or the ideal of a
kind imperfectly realized in empirical reality". 160  Thus art as-
sumed the responsibilities of the 'Maker', restoring nature to its
'original' (or 'final') rectitude and perfection.161 In addition,
Rationalist esthetic notions, in their eagerness to accord beauty
of natural objects as well as their stable and perfect essences with
simple, immutable, and pure lawas of reason, professed that such 210
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things should be sought after only in such properties of the objects
as could be grasped by reason simply, immutably and purely, and
begetting no equivocality. Such a property was, for example, an
object's figure thought of as residing in the object proper, being
thus one of its essential traits, available to clear intellectual
intuition, and conformable to the laws of reason, viz. geometry;
whereas color was something elusive, unstable, accidental, and more-
over transmittable through vague feelings of the sense.162 Thus
it could not partake of true beauty. The latter was exemplified
empirically in the works of the great masters as well as in certain
objects possessing 'unity in variety', 'proportion', and 'propri-
163
ety'. Nonetheless, whatever its empirical manifestations, the
validity of beauty, it was believed, "must lie rather in the necessary
nature of things". Therefore, a link had to be found between such
formal distributions, or impressions as 'unity in variety', etc.,
on the one hand, which were thought of as making beauty manifest, and
the innate ideas of reason, on the other. For only then could the
former be said to be true and necessary vehicles of beauty. This
link, meant to validate Rational esthetics once and for all, was the
same as that supplied as a proof for the necessary truthfulness of
the intellect with respect to knowledge in general. It was Descartes'
"Veracitas Dei": "What we clearly and distinctly see to be true
must indeed to be true; for otherwise God would be deceiving us". 164
Consequently, in a way similar to that by which, if an idea is gen-
erated so as to be compatible with the laws of reason, not to 212
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contradict them, to accord smoothly with them, and finally become
unreservedly admitted by them, it cannot but be true, (the guar-
antee concerning the reliability of this process being God's truth-
fulness); a form received with approval by our 'introspection' can-
not but be beautiful. "But a 'Cartesian esthetic thus seems neces-
sarily founded upon theology".165 On the other hand, this philoso-
phical trend, seeking absolute universality based upon a theologi-
cally safeguarded homology between innate forms of reason and im-
mutable truths of reality, was somehow challenged by the other part
of the philosophy of the Enlightenment, i.e. that which stemmed from
Bacon. According to this, sensation is substituted for reason as
the exclusive generator of knowledge. We have slightly touched upon
the consequences Empiricism brought to bear upon esthetics when
briefly discussing Hume, in the first section. Beauty, as we saw
there, was transposed from being a quality characteristic of the
object to being a feeling in the subject. It thus appeared to merge
into the relativity of individual, unassailable feeling. "Esthetic
judgement has, to be sure, become subjective, dependent upon indivi-
dual feeling, and yet neither Dubos nor Hume is thrown into sceptical
despair concerning the possibility of making valid esthetic judg-
ments. The stability of the esthetic judgment is in fact seen to
surpass that of the rational judgment";166 and indeed so, for while
it is possible for entire philosophical systems to wane and fall
into oblivion, this is not at all the case of what has always been
honoured as beautiful: 214
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Though many ages have elapsed since the fall of Greece
and Rome, though many changes have arrived in religion,
language, laws, and customs, none of these revolutions
has ever produced any considerable innovation in the
primary sentiments of morals more than in those of ex-
ternal beauty.167
Subjectivism and relativity were obviated by resorting to an ulti-
mate guarantee as to the reliability and consistency of sensation,
similar to the Cartesian 'Veracitas Dei'. Popper has called it
'Veracitas Naturae', and it consisted in the conviction that "Nature
is an open book. He who reads it with a pure eye cannot misread
it. Only if his mind is poisoned by prejudice can he fall into
error".168 This immediately reminds us of Hume's postulation of
corrective conditions so as to render, eventually, the verdicts of
the sentiment universally valid. Therefore, not only nature's truth-
fulness, but also a stipulated "uniformity of the Nature of man"169
is adduced in order to vindicate sensation as the fundamental source
of knowledge. It is this unifornvity which accounts for the assertion
that sentiment "marks a certain conformity or relation between the
object and the...faculties of the mind", or that "some...forms or
qualities, from the original structure of the internal fabric are
calculated to please, and others to displease". 170 If this 'calcula-
tion', pre-existing, as it were, the rise of sensation by the ob-
jects (or the exertion of its power upon them), fails to produce
the expected (known from observation and previous experience) effect,
then this is because the 'organ' of the sensation is defective. 216
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So it is that the two branches of the philosophy of the Enlightenment
by different ways come to very similar conclusions as to the possi-
bility of universally valid knowledge. Be it either reason and its
laws, the conformity of which to nature's essential perfection is
guaranteed by God, or sensation, whose truthfulness is guaranteed
by the necessary adaptation of a uniform human nature (or 'internal
fabric', or 'internal sense') to a veracious nature; "the differ-
ences between classical empiricism and rationalism are much smaller
than their similarities". For,
does not this sense thereby become an a priori sense,
a sense whose existence and uniformity is maintained at
the cost of discounting the differences in the pronounce-
ments it delivers?... Furthermore, (since) the internal
sense is held to be capable of judging not only percep-
tual objects but moral virtue and abstract theorems,...
it... is more akin to classical reason than at first
appears. That which occasions pleasure to the internal
sense upon being perceived is, in fact, discovered by
Hutcheson to be the same uniformty in variety so much
evoked by classical reason". 172
Also, with regard to the question of how such occasional agreements
between 'internal fabric' and certain qualities or arrangements of
objects can be elevated to the status of universally valid standards
concerning a true and impeccable appreciation of the beautiful,
"Hutcheson resorts to a divine guarantee similar to that of Des-
cartes". 173 Thus, both philosophical systems, in spite of a certain 218
174Ibid., p. 80.
As regards the 'specific kind of man' mentioned here, it
appears to be the empiricist correspondent to the 'generalized' and
'typical' object, exclusively 'capable' of beauty, which was advo-
cated by the rationalists. As Hume expresses it: "I must consider
myself as man in general, for although from the universal structure
of man, there are qualities which necessarily occasion pleasure,
this universal nature may become so buried beneath artificial
accretions, beneath such a wealth of customs, prejudices and other
social perversions, that the proper pleasure will not be roused.
Thus it is only when we consider the abstract 'natural' man that the
sought for universality of pleasure, beauty or interest is to be
found", quoted in Ibid., pp. 22, 83.
219
Empiricist basis for beauty as something subjectively sensed and
not objectively embedded in things, converge, in the last analysis,
towards a common, 'quantitative' conception of esthetics, according
to which "the values that go into the work of art" (which is, pre-
sumably, but selection of the proper objects and imitation of them)
are viewed "as pre-existing the work itself". 174
It is obvious that Kant, as we have seen, considerably advances the
conceptions outlined above. Instead of placing beauty, as one of
their intrinsic qualities, in certain objects, or rather, certain
forms those objects might ideally acquire if they were not resisted
by the contingencies of reality, he declared it to be a subjective
feeling of pleasure in toto. Instead, on the other hand, of making
concessions to statistics by succumbing to the contingent validity
of empirical observations concerning the degrees to which men (or
rather a very specific kind of man, i.e. Hume's 'true judge') usually
became attracted by certain kinds of forms, formal arrangements, or
art, he elevated his subjective feeling of beauty to a level of
validity, very akin to that of the intellectual and the moral judg-
ment.175 He avoided confusing the judgment of the beautiful either
with the judgment concerning the perfection of an object, which was
the goal chiefly aimed at by Rationalism, or the feeling of sensuous
pleasure, which was, by and large, the direction followed by Empir-
icism. And while his predecessors could not attain the aspired at
universal validity of the esthetic judgment unless they - implicitly 220
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or explicitly - imposed compulsory selection upon the objects of
nature and art or fabricated a special kind of man, (while, i.e.,
for them true beauty was the 'product' of a sort of private inter-
locution between a very special kind of man and a very special
class of objects), Kant was able to attain universal validity simply
by obviating the trap of necessarily considering it founded upon
objects and making it into a universal validity based on subjective
grounds. Thus he made it possible, avoiding toilsome distillations
of 'essential properties and perfection' of objects, or equally
toilsome and doubtful trainings of 'true judges', for every man to
encounter, feel the pleasure of, the beautiful in the contemplation
of the form of any object whatsoever. His essential contribution,
in other words, lay in the fact that he could gather the fragments
of both Rationalist and Empiricist esthetics, synthesize them and
place them, so to speak, in the single whole of man's individuality.
SUBJECTION TO 'AUTHORITIES'
However much Kant's esthetics differs from those of the 17th and
18th centuries, nevertheless important similarities may be traced.
For instance, he succumbed to the same distinction between figure,
or 'delineation'176 and color, as the rationalists before him, and
favoured the first as exclusively importing beauty whereas he some-
how deprecated the second on the grounds that it is supposedly 222
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addressed to mere sensuous pleasure. 17 In another instance, he
seems to depart decisively from the tenets of Classicism: 178  "Hardly
anyone will say that a man must have taste in order that he should
find more satisfaction in a circle than in a scrawled outline, in
an equilateral and equiangular quadrilateral than in one which is
oblique, irregular, and as it were deformed, for this belongs to
the ordinary understanding and is not taste at all". 179 It follows
from this that 'design', 'symmetry' and 'regularity' are needed only
in cases such as that of a building, in which perception is not
free but essentially enacts a cognition, as qualities facilitating
the comprehension of the whole with respect to its practical purpose.
However, this departure from rationalist esthetics with its adora-
tion of regularity etc. as esthetic panaceas, is complemented by bold
concessions to 'empiricist' taste as it was actually realized:
But where only a free play of the representative powers
(under the condition, however, that the understanding
is to suffer no shock thereby) is to be kept up, in
pleasure gardens, room decorations, all kinds of tasteful
furniture, etc., regularity that shows constraint is
avoided as much as possible. Thus in the English taste
in gardens or in bizarre taste in furniture, the free-
dom of the imagination is pushed almost near to the
grotesque, and in this separation from every constraint
of rule we have the case where taste can display its
greatest perfection... All stiff regularity (such as
approximating to mathematical regularity) has something
in it repugnant to taste; for our entertainment in the
contemplation of it lasts for no length of time, but
rather, in so far as it has not expressly in view cognition 224
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or a definite practical pleasure, produces weariness.
On the other hand, that with which imagination can play
in an unstudied and purposive manner is always new to
us, and one does not get tired of looking at it.180
This much as regards examples of similarities between Kant and Classi-
cal esthetics on a practical level, (i.e., concerning not the phil-
osophy of taste but its applications). A further crucial similarity,
on a purely theoretical level this time, is revealed through the fact
that Kant becomes eventually ensnared, though in a far more subtle
manner, in the same, seemingly unavoidable confines that beset
Classical philosophy. I refer to the confines which are imposed upon
total freedom and autonomy of knowledge, taste, or anything concerned
with the human optentialities, when recourse to any kind of author-
ity whatsoever is held. Just as for the Rationalists and the
Empiricists - in spite of their fundamental hatred of authority in
general - a substitution of new authorities, i.e. the impeccable
powers of the intellect and the senses respectively, for the inveter-
ate ones (e.g. medieval scholasticism, the church, the authority of
tradition) became inevitable, "perhaps because they felt that" other-
wise "subjectivism and arbitrariness"l81 would dominate; so Kant was
irresistibly driven towards establishing authorities responsible for
the exertion of taste and made it, as we have seen, into something
ultimately dependent upon the maxims of reason and morality, or even,
in a sense, upon the general concept of nature. Now whatever the
conception/interpretation/explanation of these maxims by each of the 226
As an example, morality for Kant was intrinsically related
to the self-legislative power of reason, whereas Hume based it
entirely on utility. "It appears that there never was any quality
recommended by anyone, as a virtue of moral excellence, but on
account of its being useful or agreeable to a man himself or to
others". "It is supposed that no greater eulogy can be given to
any man than to display his usefulness to the public and enumerate
the services which he has performed to mankind and society. What
praise, even of an inanimate form, if the regularity and elegance
of its parts destroy not its fitness for any useful purpose.'... For
what other reason can ever be assigned for praise or approbation?"
"A Dialogue", in loc. cit., p. 152, and Ibid., pp. 40, 41.
1 3 Worringer, W., "Abstraction and Empathy", N.Y., 1963,
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philosophical systems concerned,whatever the relative positions they
had separately occupied in each of them, the essential point that
should be borne in mind here is that Kant's esthetics, as composing
into a single unity the incomplete elements of the esthetics of the
Enlightenment, effected and at the same time was based upon a syn-
thesis of the authorities those had disjointly invoked.182
This synthesis of diverse views as well as of the authorities that
are presupposed in them into a coherent system wherein things can
be finally reduced to a limited number of principles, reminds me of
Worringer's analysis of 'abstraction' and 'empathy' (considered the
two fundamental psychic dispositions or essential 'artistic volitions'
which, as explanatory categories are generally capable of rendering
accounts concerning the meaning of all art). I would like to refer
here parenthetically to his argument (not, however to its content
but to its formal deployment, so to speak). Abstraction is generally
considered to be that psychic feeling, or mentality, or 'zeitgeist'
which has at times been characterized by a mood of uneasiness as re-
gards man's relation to the world; i.e., by an instinctive fear
caused by man's feeling of being lost in the universe, the bewildering
world of phenomena. "We might describe this state as an immense
spiritual dread of space...a kind of spiritual agoraphobia in the
face of the motley disorder and caprice of the phenomenal world". 183
Such a mood commonly induces a severe transcendental religion. On
the other hand, empathy is characterized by "a happy pantheistic 228
184I bi d.
185 Ibid.
186 Ibid.
18 7 Ibid.
188 Ibid.
pp. 14-17.
pp. 131 ff.
p. 45.
p. 127.
pp. 23 ff.
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relationship of confidence between man and the phenomena of the
external world". 184  Whereas the former, as artistic principle,
orientates art and esthetics towards forms that look like those of
inorganic matter, unconditional and necessary, towards that which
may be thought of as eternal and unchangeable, towards, that is,
inert, rigid, crystalline forms, so as to 'de-organicize' the organic
and thus liberate it from its finiteness;185 the latter, on the
other hand, involves pleasure taken in the organic forms of nature.
Thus a deep chasm separates abstraction from empathy, the tendency
to the inorganic and the organic respectively, which, however, in
the course of Worringer's argument appears to be bridged in several
instances. For example, it is asserted that empathy and abstraction
"are antitheses which, in principle, are mutually exclusive. In
actual fact, however, the history of art represents an increasing
disputation between "them".186 Or, that "all artistic creation", its
being motivated by abstraction or empathy notwithstanding, "is
nothing else than a continual registration of the great process of
disputation , in which man and the outer world have been engaged,
and will be engaged, from the dawn of creation till the end of
time." 187 At all events, these opposites may be ultimately brought
together, synthesized, so as to constitute but differing manifesta-
tions of one and the same principle, i.e. man's fundamental "impulse
of self-alienation."188 By virtue of this ultimate and irreducible
authority, the urge to abstraction, on the one hand, may be con-
strued as alienating oneself from the reality of the world as a whole 230
189Weiss, P., 'Organic form: Scientific and Esthetic
Aspects', in Daedalus, Winter 1960, pp. 177 ff.
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and transferring oneself to an ideal, absolute, eternalized world.
Empathy, on the other, is but alientating oneself from himself
by means of a resignation to the 'pulse', as it were, of the
natural world.
THE SEARCH FOR ORDER
Thus, it appears to me that what may be deduced from the example of
Worringer's argument as well as from the previous discussion of
Kant with reference to Classical philosophy, is the following point,
namely: That the ultimate reduction of taste into a limited number
of fundamental concepts; its ultimate resignation to the guidance
of a few 'authorities' or supposedly universal maxims, regardless of
whether these are reason, or morality, or sense, or nature, or the
impulse of self-alienation, etc., implies the common anxiety springing
from the need to "break out from the straitjacket of a drab world
of realities", 189 and illustrates, in a sense, the attempt to resolve
this anxiety by discovering, establishing, and justifying a convinc-
ing order. In this manner it is possible for us to resume the 'game'
notion, the 'game' played here being that of seeking conceptions of
both nature as well as human activities and potentialities that are
governed by a plausible order. In the beginning of the second sec-
tion I implied that 'taste' is a 'game' played within the context of
a wider, 'societal' one. At this point we may establish the search 232
"The Philosophy of Modern Art", Faber and Faber,
1977.
191Quoted from Gita May, "Diderot et Baudelaire", in Funt,
op. cit., p. 87.
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for order as the wide context, or general undertaking of which the
'societal game' and its variations are partial manifestations.
Viewed, then, as succumbing to, and dependent upon, the require-
ments of this ultimate mission, taste, or the search for proper form,
i.e. form that is significant, meaningful, beautiful according to
a pervasive order, becomes apt to be explained as the enterprise
whose aim is "to renew one's sensibility towards one's environ-
ment",190 at any time and by any means. Art, it follows, cannot be
explained in any other way than as endlessly striving to create and
propagate "a coherent system in the human scale substituted... for
the inhuman and indifferent order of the universe". 191 Diderot, to
whose theory of esthetics this approach was central, and of whose
thought the previous quotation is a typical example, may, in this
connection be adduced, on the grounds that he offered an over-inclu-
sive system, as a connecting link bringing together that which has
been stated in the beginnings and in the ends of the second section.
Both Collingwood's 'ladder' and Kant's implicit but persistently pre-
sent premise, i.e. the quest for unity, for meaningfulness, for an
understanding of nature not as sheer, blind mechanism but as purposive
art, are in a sense present in Diderot's conception of man and
nature. For him the work of the artist is akin to the hypotheses of
the scientist, in that both aspire at a synthesis through active,
creative steps. They start, in a like manner, from scattered data,
which alone can bear nothing but incomprehensibility as to what nature,
its laws, its causality are, and strive towards relatedness. Their 234
op. cit., pp. 38, 39.
p. 40.
, pp. 61, 62.
192Funt,
193 Ibi d.
194 Ibid.
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common purpose, or rather, mission, is to form a "whole which
illuminates the course of our experience...to gain knowledge and
satisfy human needs". 19 2 This mission may at once involve moral
implications - the illumination of our experience - as well as
notions of utility - human needs. For perception, upon which this
mission is founded, and of which the search for order (and formal
order as a specific branch of it) is the essential responsibility,
"for Diderot, is not the pure and immediate apprehension of simple
ideas, but rather the final stage of a complex process", including
reasoning, understanding, elaboration, modification, attention, and
selection, "by which simple sensation is transformed into conscious
experience". 193 As to those acts, or exertions, of our mental facul-
ties which are involved in perception and contribute to the search
for order, they are undoubtedly rooted in the materiality of nature,
of our organisms and our fundamental needs. Our habits of thought,
understanding, judgment, spring from a close interaction of our
needs with the tentative, experimental, artificial expedients we de-
vise in order to meet them. This close, 'organic' interaction be-
tween man and nature brings about our notions of "order, arrangement,
symmetry, mechanism, proportion, and unity... The understanding
having been defined by tehse notions, it conceives its universe in
terms of them".1 94  By way of such notions an idea of the beautiful
form, in compliance with the search for order in the experience of
nature, is arrived at, according to which "'I call beautiful outside
me everything which contains in itself that which is capable of 236
5Ibid., p. 89.
19 6 Ibid., p. 91.
1971bid. , p. 105.
I98 1bid. p. 92.
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evoking the idea of relationships in my understanding; and beauti-
195
ful by relation to me, everything which evokes this idea".
This distinction between two 'beautifuls' refers in fact to the
distinction between "'. ..the forms which are in the object and the
notion I have of them... '".196 This has its roots in Diderot's
theory of perception which, as we may have probably felt already,
resembles that of Collingwood's in many respects. The basic idea
underlying it is that experience merely sensed, i.e., 'crude',
'unprocessed', is continuous and indivisible. Only through select-
ing distinct 'packages' out of it and isolating them from their
immediate vicinities (and this is the task of perception); only,
that is, by means of breaking "up this continuity and.. .establish-
(ing) relationships of significance between selected selements"
does it become possible for "man, up to a point, though never ulti-
mately...to raise himself above the world stream to a relatively
stable comprehension". 197 But perceptual relationships are somehow
dependent upon the fact that a predisposing, a preparatory ground
exists for them in the objects of experience. "While relating,
Diderot emphasizes, is an operation of the understanding, neverthe-
less relationships have their foundations in things. Thus we can
draw a distinction between the relationship itself and its founda-
tion in the thing, or between relationship and arrangement". 198  On
these grounds, then, Diderot justifies all mental activities, i.e.
perception and conception in general, and the right pursuance of
form, i.e., the creation and appreciation of the 'beautiful', in 238
19 9 Ibid., p. 93.
200Kris, op. cit., pp. 50 ff.
239
particular, as essentially being founded upon the search for order
and intelligibility; and ascribes to them the role of transformers
of experience, since "relating requires that certain elements be
separated from" the continuum of reality "and be referred directly
to one another, while suppressing that which exists between".199
DURATION, ORIENTATION, MORALE
In this search for order, which is intrinsically linked to deeply
rooted and perennial anxieties, formal order, or activities in gen-
eral that are related to form-giving, play a decisive role. One of
the "functions", or missions, to employ the term we have used before,
which "representational techniques fulfill", is "the preservation of
that which vanishes". Representations "persist, control time, and
overcome its passage. In this there is magic". This, for instance,
has been one of the interpretations of prehistoric cave drawings as
far as their purpose is concerned.
The painting in itself, the transposing of what one could
call the passing reality into the eternity of pictorial
representation, may have been meant to produce some magic
effect on the object. The tribe was there to see what
the medicine man had painted. For them, for their eyes,
it was made to commemorate and anticipate the fight with
the prey, to show them what they had in mind as a memory
of the past or as a vision of the future. 200
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201Langer, op. cit., pp. 40 ff. "A tendency to organize the sen-
sory field into groups and patterns of sense-data, to perceive forms
rather than a flux of light-impressions, seems to be inherent in
our receptor apparatus just as much as in the higher nervous
centers with which we do arithmetic and logic. But this unconscious
appreciation of forms is the primitive root of all abstraction,
which in turn is the key-note of rationality". Thus the latter's
roots can be traced down to the "elementary functions of our eyes
and ears and fingers. Mental life begins with our mere physiologi-
cal constitution"; Ibid., p. 89.
202Ibid., pp. 157, 158.
203For instance, metaphor, which may be given rise to by the
need to symbolize, to give conceivable form to a thing for which a
name does not yet exist. On the 'synaesthesia' of the language of
early childhood, and on what is termed the 'vegetative stage of
thought', both as cases in which the 'demand' for symbols, forms,
words, etc., to express things felt and primitively thought out-
weighs the actual 'supply', whence recourse to the device of metaphor
is persistently held, Langer, op. cit., pp. 123 ff and 128 ff;
also Goodman, op. cit., chs. I and II. A bias for metaphor was
expressed by Diderot too: "It is the child and the savage for whom
signs have not yet become conventional labels, whose relations with
the world and whose expressions of those relations are most vivid.
The same is true of the foreigner speaking an unfamiliar language.
He is thereby reduced to something like the condition of a child.
'They are forced to say everything with a very small quantity of
terms, which constrains them to place some of them very happily'".
Funt, op. cit., pp. 164, 165. Also, see below, pp. 266 ff.
204One such fallacy has been minutely described and criticized
by Popper and it consists more or less in hastily adopting ideas and
conceptions that superficially appear useful and adapt to our task
of ordering or to the kind of order we may have already envisaged.
"For if we are uncritical we shall always find what we want; we
shall look for, and find, confirmations, and we shall look away from,241
So, by importing duration, form and the enterprise of form-giving
effects a sense of ordering. This ordering, moreover, is not
something that occasionally occurs by means of contingent acts of
form-giving, or symbolism. It is the outcome of a basic need, as
201it were 'biologically' ingrained inman. Its fulfillment, its
satisfaction, refers continuously to one and the same thing, i.e.
"man's ceaseless quest for conception and orientation", which is in
turn activated by "fear,...the driving force in human minds,...which
begets an impurious demand for security in the world's confusion". 202
The need for orientation and morale, then, may be viewed as the
basic force actuating symbolism, for-giving in general. Whatever
the labels we are to attach to it (duration, eternalization, unifi-
cation, regularization, etc), whatever the tools man may select as
appropriate for the accomplishment of this ineluctable task, whatever
the errors he may commit or the fallacies he may propagate in the
course of pursuing it; and, finally, whatever the results he may beget
at different periods and places ('classical', or 'non-classical',
'autonomous' or 'dependent', 'reasonable' or 'irrational'), that
which matters is exclusively the satisfaction of the need.203,204
It is in this context that Collingwood refers to the magical rites
of primitive societies which precede warfare or woodcutting and to
the nature of the belief in such rites, as follows: "This belief
does not imply that the enemy is defeated or the tree felled by the
power of the magic as distinct from the labour of the 'savage'. It
means that, in warfare or woodcraft, nothing can be done with morale; 242
and not see, whatever might be dangerous to our pet theories. In
this way it is only too easy to obtain what appears to be overwhelm-
ing evidence in favour of a theory which, if approached critically,
would have been refuted", "Poverty of Historicism", op. cit., p. 134.
Also p. 136, on the "permanent ghost of essence"; Langer, op. cit.,
pp. 154 ff, for a discussion on the fallacious transferrence that
may be easily carried out from the expressive power, or virtue of
symbols, into physical power; i.e., the fallacious belief that sym-
bols, or "idols" in particular, are "centers of action", Kris, op.
cit., pp. 48 ff.).
205Collingwood,op. cit., p. 67. In a like manner, Fritz
Mauthner estimates this need for morale and the relevance symbols may
have to its fulfilment, which he terms 'logocracy': "'The Emperor
Marcus Aurelius sent lions into battle along with his soldiers,
against a barbaric tribe. Members of this tribe had never seen
lions so they asked their leader what these animasl were. This leader,
who 'knew the significance of names and words', replied: 'These are
dogs, Roman dogs'. Upon which they proceeded to treat them like
dogs: They beat them to death with their clubs'", in Szasz, op.
cit., p. 49.
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and the function of magic is to develop and conserve morale; or
to damage it".205
NATURE AS FORM-MOULDER
Having indicated that, perhaps, the most principal motive that actuates
virtually all the 'games' that can be conceivedand played by man
(science, production, society, art, religion, magic) is the search
for order; which seemingly permeates everything from the level of
mere physiology to those levels characterized by arbitrariness and
caprice, mentioned in the second section; which, as the fundamental
rule of the 'game', opens up diverse ways by which we may retrieve the
basic notions we have encountered before, e.g. utility, the convention-
alization of symbols, the reciprocality between persistence and re-
newal in the enterprise of form-giving, the volatile relationship be-
tween tradition and innovation, the phenomenon of polarities, etc.;
having, tn other words, reached a point at which we may plausibly
establish a link between section II and the search for order con-
ducted with the help of a few concepts, a prime position among which
is occupied by nature; it now seems tempting, from this standpoint,
to claim an affinity between the task of comprehending the vicissi-
tudes of architectural form and theory and that of seeking 'discur-
sive unities', in the way the latter is conceived by Foucault:
244
206 Foucault, M., "The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse
on Language", Harper, 1976, pp. 35, 36.
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Perhaps one might discover a discursive unity if one
sought it not in the coherence of concepts but in
their simultaneity or successive emergence, in the
distance that separates them and even in their incomp-
atibility";
which directly gives rise to the question: Should the principles
of the individualization of a discourse
not be sought...in the different possibilities that it
opens for reanimating existing themes, of arousing
opposed strategies, of giving way to irreconcilable
interests, of making it possible, with a particular set
of concepts, to play different games? 206
Far from implying that I have the slightest ambition to carry out
a sketch of an 'archaeology of architectural form and theory' in
the rest of this work, I am nevertheless deeply impressed by this
possibility of 'playing different games with a particular set of
concepts', and the intense persistence with which it has probably
constituted a basic trait not only of formal theories, esthetic
preferences and doctrines, but of most of human thought and activity
in all times. It seems to me that this possibility is to be held
largely responsible for the ambiguous phenomenon of 'renewal, yet
recurrence' (mentioned in section II), and on this basis I am going
to discuss an example, borrowed from the esthetic/architectural/
civic 'upheavals' of the period grossly confined between the ends
of the 17th and the middle of the 18th century. More specifically, 246
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I shall consider it against a constant background, namely, its
relations to conceptions of nature. It is nature, as a seemingly
indispensable context of reference that, in the following dis-
cussion, is going to assume the role of the single concept which
gives rise to diverse 'formal games'. It is with regard to this
ever-recurrent reference that the intrinsic validity of the 'formal
games' as such will be questioned; in addition, with regard to the
fact that not a single 'nature', but numerous ones have at times
been adduced as the ultimate legislator of 'formal games'. If it
was possible even for 'natural games', i.e., various, diversified
ideas, notions, and prejudices about what is to be meant by the con-
cept 'nature', to be invented and elaborated, fixed according to
subtly interlocking rules so as to produce the effect of a convinc-
ing consistency, thus making it possible for our hindsight to view
them all as relative utterances, how much more relative the 'formal
games', based upon and legislated by already relative conceptual
systems, must have been' This is the core suspicion-question that
gives rise to these thoughts. To sum up, let us dissect this general
question into two more specific ones:
* How is it that an account may be given of a certain period, or
trend formative of tastes and forms, as 'modern', 'pioneering',
'progressive', 'enlightened', 'redeeming' the sins of the past, when
it appears, in many of its aspects, contaminated by conservatism
and inability to emancipate itself from these very sins?
* How it is that two different periods or trends formative of 248
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tastes and forms, can be inimical towards each other (no matter
whether they are contemporaneous or not) when, at the bottom, we
discern the same, or very kindred preconceptions underlying their
aggressive battlecries?
It must be emphasized that I do not mean to assert that nature is
the only concept in relation to which several 'formal games' have
been and can be played. However, although it shares this role
with a number of other realms, as has already been indicated (e.g.
science, reason, morality, history, the human body), it nevertheless
appears broader than most of them, able to encompass them, though
this fact does not deprive other concepts of the possibility of
enacting independently the wanton setting up of a 'war' waged in
their name. But being broader, more general, and thence, more ab-
stract, the concept of nature is, and must often be defined in rela-
tion to other, more specific, graspable and malleable realms.
Therefore, succumbing to this requirement, arising from the peculiar
character of the concept 'nature', I will have to touch upon themes
such as science and history, since it is with the help of these
that nature is capable of being moulded into many 'natures'. In this
sense, then one could consider the following argument as based on
the hypothesis of this possible hierarchy:
***Diverse-formal systems (justified on the
grounds of)
*Diverse-conceptions of _nature (.issuing from)
*Diverse -ep istemol og ies and hi stori cal (or non- 250
207See, for instance, Plekhanov's account of dialectics in his
foreword to the second Russian edition of Engels' 'Ludwig Feurbach
and the end of Classical German Philosophy', Foreign LainguagesPress,
Peking, 1976. Popper offers an opposition to this in 'What is
Dialectics?', in "Conjectures...", op. cit.
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historical) world-views (trying to scan
and discover the reality of nature, man,
the world).
With the help of such a schema, we may easily discern the extent
to which contradictions threatening the veracity and stability of
an entire theoretical edifice at the first level (formal systems)
can be imminent, provided that a flaw, or inconsistency, or omis-
sion has insidiously crept in at any of the other levels. Or again,
such a schema could facilitate the understanding of how a number
of mutually repulsive formal systems can be nothing more than the
indirect offspring of a single though many-faceted epistemology
or world-view; for, whereas with respect to an explanatory system
even the embodiment of almost mutually exclusive counterparts, made
to harmonize, however arbitrarily, for the sake of a no matter how
far-fetched explanation, may be generally acceptable,207 a formal system
is likely to provoke disquietude and confusion when it accordingly
assumes many facets. Now in the course of this work some inklings
as to the plausibility of this schema may be said to have presented
themselves already. In the first place, we may relate it to the
discussion of Pythagoreanism (section I). The Pythagorean system,
firstly, provides, I believe, a lucid illustration of how, what
can be a posteriori evaluated as an esthetic theory or doctrine,
initially stems from an all-encompassing world-view. Secondly, it
is an example of an epistemology that comprises (in a state of more
or less harmonious unification) the germs of what (in the process 252
208For instance, Alberti's conviction that "since man, nature,
and mathematics are all parts of the same whole, man has only to
use mathematics to understand and control nature"; "On Painting",
tr. J.R. Spencer.
209
"Conjectures...", op. cit., pp. 4, 5, 6.
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of transition from the epistemological level to that of particular
conceptions, and ultimately to that of formal systems) may be even-
tually developed (the original unification thus becoming gradually
lost, the original constellation becoming progressively unrecogniz-
able, in the course of this downward infiltration towards the other
two levels) into two extreme opposites: An insistent attachment to
strict rules, rational canons, on the one hand, and an orgiastic
introspection and unbounded fallacious fantasy on the other. Thirdly,
as regards the search for valid form according to the search for
valid order, it is the remote progenitor of such of what has per-
sisted up to our century via a rehabilitation it underwent during the
Renaissance.208 In the second place, Platos' philosophy presents a
peculiarity which may be readily adduced as a partial justification
for the adoption of the schema. This peculiarity refers, in a way
different to that of Pythagoreanism, to the possibility that the third
level (epistemologies and world-views) might intrinsically bear of
causing incompatibility and dislocation to befall the other levels.
It is the possibility of a metamorphosis, the end points of which
might eventually assume the function of mutually repulsive, opposite
extremes. It is the possibility of the transformation of an 'optim-
istic' epistemology into a 'pessimistic' one, a sort of epistemologi-
cal dictatorship, an authority charged with the duty of "pronouncing
upon, and laying down...what is to be manifest truth". 209 It is in-
deed in Plato that we
254
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find the first transition from an optmistic to a
pessimistic epistemology. Each of them forms the
basis of one of the two diametrically opposed philo-
sophies of the state and of society: on the one hand
an anti-traditionalist, anti-authoritarian, revolutionary
and Utopian rationalism of the Cartesian kind, and on the
other hand an authoritarian traditionalism.210
It is the latter (excluding 'almost all men' from the benediction
of ever encountering the truth) as opposed to the former (granting
literally everyone the inborn right to truly know) that made its
first appearance in the 'Republic', to culminate eventually in the
'Laws'.211  In the third place, we might suppose that this scheme
underlies implicitly some of Kant's discussions on taste with regard
to its practical applications. We have seen how Kant, concerning
different instances equally favoured different formal systems and
'games'. As a result of the broad scope taste was granted by his
epistemology, and furthermore, as a result of the synthesis he ef-
fected (and metamorphosis, to a degree) of apparently divergent trends
of the esthetics and philosophy of the Enlightenment, it became
possible for both 'symmetry', 'regularity', etc., and licentiousness
bordering on the grotesque to co-exist in the vehicle of valid
formal order. Perhaps it is only with the help of such a schema that
one can somehow come to terms with the very strange fact that, Kant,
in praising English gardens and 'bizarre taste', while having already
decisively and irreversibly departed from most of the justifications
and notions of 18th-century taste (i.e., sensuousness, associationism, 256
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picturesqueness based on charm or emotion, in other words, all con-
ceptions of the beautiful or attractive form that involved one or
another sort of concept, purpose, interest, or gratification of
the senses) partly reverted to them.
So far, my purpose has been to provide some hints in favor of the
schema put forward above, and therefore to support the argument
that, basically, formal systems may emerge as more or less immediate
outcomes of epistemologies and world-views, and that epistemologies
and world-views may not only harbor concepts liable to fall under
contradictory categories after having been reflected, 're-incarnated'
as parts of formal systems, but may even oscillate from one general
position to another totally incompatible with the initial one.
Of the latter possibility, the Platonic polarity: 'progressivism'
vs. 'authoritarian traditionalism' has been adduced as an example.
Moreover, both Platonism and Pythagoreanism, apart from hinting at
the relationships of the posited schema, are of great importance
because, by virtue of their ingenuity which secured them a stubborn
persistence, they were often to be plagiarized and usurped, not in
their full scope (which they retained to some degree no later than
the Renaissance), but in the form of scattered and meaningless,
mute fragments. Whereby, they were to be, consciously or not,
brought forward as justifications for the realization of diluted,
'second-hand', and more or less impotent 'rational progressivisms',
'authoriatirian traditionalisms', or 'irrational and divine 258
212Laugier, "An Essay on Architecture", Los Angeles, 1977,
p. 8.
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mysticisms', most of which appear (to a greater or lesser degree)
to be contaminated by what had originally been largely absent,
i.e. relative esthetic preferences.
In brief, my purpose has been to formulate a background juxtaposed
to which, contradictions, ambivalences, and equivocalities that
characterize various moments in the enterprise of creating architec-
tural form (especially since the ends of the 17th century) could be
cooly viewed as more or less deprived of inexplicable myths and
mysteries; a background in relation to which my example will now
be discussed.
PERRAULT AND LAUGIER
Although Claude Perrault, as early as the ends of the 17th century
had contributed a great deal to the demystification of the alleged
validity of proportion with regard to the attainment of beauty;
more especially, to the demystification of the belief that perfect
beauty depended upon a single and uniquely 'catalytic' set of pro-
portions which only had to be discovered; thus anticipating later
developments not only in architecture and aesthetics but also in
epistemology and philosophy; the Abbde Laugier, writing a full 70
years later, in spite of giving his predecessor his due by calling
him "a great man", 212 came up with conclusions and theoretical
solicitations that seemingly ignore those of the later. So that,
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whereas Perrault, demonstrating a fine ability to discern and
evaluate, would claim the existence of
two sorts of beauties in Architecture...those that are
founded on solid convincing reasons, and those that
depend only on prepossession and prejudice; by beauties
founded on convincing reasons I understand such as
cause buildings to please everyone, because their worth
and value are easy to be known, such as are the richness
of the materials, the grandeur and magnificence of the
structure, the exactness and neatness of the performance,
and the symmetry, which denotes that kind of proportion
which produces an evident and remarkable beauty:...that
correspondence the parts have one with another, on
account of the equality, and parity of their number,
their magnitude, their situation, and their order,...a
thing very obvious and the effects thereof such as we can
never fail of discovering;
the second sort of beauties being elicited by
custom, and a connexion which the mind makes of two
things of a different nature, for by this connexion it
comes to pass, that the esteem, wherewith the mind is
prepossessed, for some things whose value it knows,
insinuates an esteem, also, for others, whose worth it
knows not... This principle is the natural foundation
of belief, which is nothing else but an effect of prepos-
session, by which the knowledge and good opinion we have
for him who assures us of anything whose truth we are
ignorant of, disposes us to make no doubt of it;
proceeding to provide as an example of the operation of the 262
213Perrault, C., "Treatise of the five orders of columns of
architecture", London MDCCXXII, pp. vi, vii.
2 14 Ibid., p. iii.
215Laugier, op. cit., pp. 2, 3.
216However, in a 'sociological', so to speak, sense, they
belong to different periods. Laugier may be placed in that general
trend of polemics and protestation, which appears in the middle
of the 18th century, and which pleaded for 'correction' of the
attitudes of the 'petite maniere' that had become dominant in art
and architecture in the period following the ends of the 17th
century; Leith, "The Idea of Art as Propaganda in France 1750-
1799", University of Toronto Press, 1965.
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'connexion' the fact that, as a result of good faith in the "merit
of the court", fashionable tastes for courtly speech and courtly
dresses arise "though these things have nothing in themselves
positively amiable";213 all this being nothing other than the
product of his fundamental belief in the falsity of the "opinion
of those, who imagine that the proportions, which ought to be
observ'd in Architecture, are certain and invariable";214 Laugier's
reply, on the other hand, would be:
It is to be hoped that some great architect will under-
take to save architecture from eccentric opinions by
disclosing its fixed and unchangeable laws... What is
art, if not that mode of expression (maniere) which is
based on clear principles and is carried out with the
help of unchanging precepts? 215
One is struck by the degree of acuity which seems to separate the
'statement' from the 'reply' by an unfathomable gap; he is likely
to wonder whether it can be possible for a later (and hence, presum-
ably more 'modern', 'developed', and 'enlightened') view to topple
over those very obstacles which, naturally, a former, open-minded
one should have, once and for all, abolished; and finally, to ask
how it is that two men roughly belonging to the same 'enlight-
ened',216 'rationalist', 'progressive' epoch and considered as rep-
resenting it could have produced such formidably incompatible
utterances? And yet, though the incompatibility nevertheless remains,
I believe that, according to the schema proposed above, and compared 264
"The Order of Things", Tavistock, 1970,
p. 33.
218Tatarkiewicz, op. cit., pp. 88, 128.
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in relation to the epistemological background of the period as
well as with regard to contemporaneous conceptions of Nature
deriving from the epistemological dicta, one may gradually be-
come less seized by the peculiarity, and that, thence, the in-
comprehensibility may gradually diminish.
PRE-CLASSICAL EPISTEMOLOGY
Towards this goal, one has to bear in mind the basic trait of
thought and reasoning, which, structured as a firm epistemology,
affected almost all spheres of knowledge, from science and religion
to practical medicine, in the Renaissance. The key-instrument upon
which the entire epistemology was based was the rich notion of
'Similitude' .21 It enacted a role strikingly similar to that of
Pythagorean harmony and Platonic proportion, i.e. "reconciling
218things that are hostile", and "binding things together". Indeed,
it was by virtue of similitude, that it was then possible to conceive
of the world as orderable, as a common locus of an endless series
of different yet mutually attractive, collaborating, and potentially
unifiable things.
Four chief types of similitude, that were expressly used as method-
ological instruments in pre-17th'century conceptualization, may be
discerned: 266
219Foucault, "The Order of Things", op. cit., p. 18.
220Ibid., p. 19.
221 Ibid., p. 23.
222 Ibid., p. 23.
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* "Convenientia": operative on the ground of factual proximity.
By virtue of this proximity properties can be transferred from the
one to the other of the contiguous things, their dissimilarity and
unrelatedness notwithstanding.219
* "Aemulatio": a convenientia freed from the constraints of geo-
graphical proximity, able to form an immense system of "questions"
and "answers" on the part of the things. 220
* "Analogy": combining both convenientia and aemulatio and assuming
a power by virtue of which "all the figures in the whole universe
can be drawn together",221 and
* "Sympathy": the sovereign type;
it is an instance of the Same so strong and so insistent
that it will not rest content to be merely one of the
forms of likeness; it has the dangerous power of assim-
ilating, of rendering things identical to one another, of
mingling them, of causing their individuality to disappear
and thus rendering them foreign to what they were before.
Sympathy transforms. 222
Similitude as a tool for creating order usually aims at pairing man,
his members, his basic behavioral traits as well as his products
with aspects of the natural universe that lie beyond himself and
his artificial world. "Man's body is always the possible half of
a universal atlas". The relationship may be reciprocal, i.e. man
questioning nature with respect to the order he and his objects
contingently possess, as well as boasting for 'his' order, in the
manner of which that of nature may be traced. Man, the artificial 268
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objects; those objects deployed within the limits of, so to speak,
'human' or even 'earthy' scale; the 'sublime' natural universe;
all three entireties seen under the light of these reciprocal and
potent similitudes: This is the essence of the man/microcosm/
macrocosm triad.
Nature, the entire universe was then thought of as a 'book' which
only had to be read by man. The truths hidden in the 'book', how-
ever, were not immediately conspicuous ("in order to exercise our
wisdom (God), merely sowed Nature with forms for us to decipher"),
but had to be discovered with the help of signs. Signs were the
devices by means of which a functional, ethical, etc., affinity, a
resemblance, concealed and buried as it were, was to become manifest.
Once the sign was noticed, the raison d' 8tre of things could be
rendered comprehensible. But how was one to know that anything,
this or that, a stone or a fruit, was trying to signify something?
To convey a deep and desirable meaning? How were signs to be discov-
ered and identified as such? By visually resembling what they were
a sign for; to a greater or lesser extent, by being a visual model
of the thing singified. In fact, we can visualize this method (over-
whelmed by the omnipotent and ubiquitous similitude) we are presented
with as follows: Two things are intrinsically attracted to each
other by sympathy or analogy, i.e. by resemblance. This resemblance
is hidden; it has to be discovered. A sign, a mark is purposed to
give a hint; belonging to one of the two things, the sign is nothing 270
22 3 Ibid. , pp. 26, 27.
224Herrmann, W., "Unknown Designs for the 'Temple of Jerusalem',
by Claude Perrault", in "Essays in the History of Architecture",
Fraser, ed. , p. 143.
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other than a resemblance, a likeness of the other. We are dealing
here with two resemblances, one of an 'external' and one of an
'internal' nature. These, in turn are linked together by a third
resemblance, an analogy (in the ordinary sense) which effects the
transference from the visual (or external) affinity/resemblance
to the internal one, or that which constitutes the essential
affinity between the properties or natures of the things involved
in the attraction. This was the system of signification by
which the world could be impeccably communicated to man. 223
It now seems to me worthwhile to turn to an example of how it was
possible for this epistomology to reign over and permeate archi-
tecture: When, in early 17th century, it occured that the ancient
temple, chiefly mentioned in theological writings of ancient Jewish
origin and referred to as the object of prophet Ezekiel's vision
and as subsequently described by him, should be reconstructed, the
Jesuit father Villalpando embarked upon the task; his reasoning was
subject to the following analogies spiting any restrictive evidence:
The temple described by the prophet could not have been other than
that of Solomon; since the latter was a forecast, a model of the
Christian Church to come, the symbolism inherent in this prophecy
might with impunity outweigh its actual appearance: Designed by
God, i.e. having been a perfect building, it could not but have been
fashioned in accordance to the Classical style, the only capable of
perfection, and, whereby, emanating from God. 224 272
225Taylor, R.
p. 90.
"Architecture and Magic", in Fraser, op. cit. ,
273
Not only therefore did he invest his building with a
Classical appearance, but sought to demonstrate that
all its dimensions, as given in the Holy Writ, con-
curred with the doctrine of Vitruvius. He thus con-
verted the Temple into a kind of test-case to prove the
basic compatibility of Christian revelation and the
culture of Classical antiquity, a point very much at
issue at the time... The idea that Classical architec-
ture provided the only acceptable style together with
the blind cult of Vitruvius are manifestations of the
same attitude of mind that led men at this period to
an uncritical acceptance of Hermes Trismegistus,
Zooraster, the Chaldean Oracles, the Orphic hymns, the
sayings of Pythagoras...as being the repositores of an
ancient wisdom going back to the beginnings of time. 225
It is significant that in this context of tracing the 'convenientia'
of things, not only is the scripture distorted so as to fit the
later and totally unrelated, in historical terms, emergence of
Classical architecture, but also, Vitruvius, the source of informa-
tion about the Classical orders, is deformed, twisted, and arbitrar-
ily interpreted in such a way as to be made to approach the sphere
of theology. Thus, the inclination of things towards a common locus,
a single cosmological view capable of offering explanations, is
mutual. Nothing remains Where it is, wiating for the other to
approach it:
Vitruvius himself supplied the ideal example of this
twofold approach...in seeking to combine theory or
innate gift and practice or acquired art, so that he
deals with every facet of architecture from the common- 274
2 2 6 Ibid., p. 89.
22 7Becker, C., "The Heavenly City of the 18th-Century Philosophers",
Yale, 1932, p. 10.
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places of building technics to astrological cosmology.
But if there were some like Alberti and Daniele Barbaro
who felt that it was necessary to discount astrology as
tending to lead into a domain of doubtful validity, it
is equally plain that for other men like Cardanus, Luca
Gauricus and Lomazzo the Roman theorist's chief claim to
immortality was as a Magus.226
These strange effects and notions are dictated by the infinitely
overwhelming potency of the epistemology of similitude, which
can be grossly viewed in this context as the Christian adaptation
of the basic features of Pythagoreanism and Platonism. It is this
epistemology which elsewhere has been charmingly condensed thus:
The letter teaches what we know
Anagogia what we hope is so;
Faith's confirmed by allegories, 227Conduct's shaped by moral stories
It is this that Perrault indicted as precariously founded upon absurd
"connexion", "belief", and "custom". Thus, as far as his plea in
favour of the substitution of a rational theory for an irrational,
refutable one is concerned, he is no doubt justly granted the reputa-
tion of a 'reformer'. As yet, however, the argument in favour of
a possible reconciliation of Perrault's and Laugier's pronouncements
remains incomplete. I will therefore have to discuss some fundamental
characteristics of the "Classical" epistemology which succeeded that
of the Renaissance, so as to assert eventually that, despite their 276
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differences, both opinions merely functioned as 'reflections',
translations at the level of formal systems, of various not so
incompatible aspects of a unified epistemology.
CLASSICAL EPISTEMOLOGY
In contradistinction to the naively, though in a somewhat awesome
manner, unifiable Nature, "Classical" epistemology, partly because
of the numerous phases of development it underwent during the 17th
and 18th centuries, partly because of the many epoch-making contri-
butions made to it by a number of most admirable thinkers, partly
because of the fact that by virtue of the initial impetus given to
it by Bacon and Descartes it was inevitably led to experience re-
peatedly growing disquietudes, with the result that it had to be
continually in a state of fervent search for compensation, verifica-
tion, revaluation, justification, and compromise; presents a highly
diversified and enriched system. A system in which, due to its
character, germs of what would later develop into clashes and radical
disagreements could find an appropriate incubator.
Firstly, "Classical" epistemology was characterized by an irresistible
attraction towards taxonomy and representation. Representation is
what succeeded signature in the search for truth and knowledge about
Nature. Taxonomy is what replaced the tightly packed, intrinsically
organic world of similitudes - organic, in the sense that the 278
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'essential' nature of anything could, however unlikely this might
seem to us nowadays, be referred to and identified with the 'Essen-
tial' nature of practically everything existing outside it, by way
of endless chain-reactions of similitude, so that it could ultim-
ately be viewed as a quasi-indistinguishable part of an extremely
coherent whole; where parts and whole would be subjected to the same
law: Sympathy. So, this organic world of sympathies, (wherein each
element/part/individual possessed its inevitable, impeccable and
essentially relevant sign-mark, so that by way of a cautious 'read-
ing' of it everything concerning the element could be conveyed to
man), was substituted by the colorless, insipid, neutral (in its
assiduousness to exclude every possibility of resuscitation for the
supressed similitude and its concomitants, i.e., prejudice, arbitrar-
iness, fallacy) and artificial world of taxonomy. Taxonomy, as
opposed to the former absolute prevalence of the "Same", was basi-
cally preoccupied with locating and establishing diversities and
with classifying observable objects according to subtle, hardly
discernible gradients of magnitude of differences. These gradients
were not concerned with anything like the essential individuality
of the objects, or with their innate qualities. On the contrary, pre-
cisely because it was through such essences and qualities that
similitude might insidiously reappear, the gradients were obsessed
with fragments of explicit, conspicuous formal appearances reducible
to lines, patterns, shapes and bearing no meaning whatsoever.
Structure, i.e. the sumtotal of a definite number of such fragments 280
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"The Order of Things", op. cit., p. 132.
229This sweeping need for comparing, discovering differences,
relating and classifying according to them is, in a sense, re-
flected in Diderot's thought: "Meaning develops from the context
of relationships established, and the larger the context of rela-
tionships into which we are able to integrate an element the more
complete our understanding becomes. Every being requires others for
its comprehension. Thus ultimately 'there is only a single great
individual: it is the whole'"; in Funt, op. cit., pp. 95, 96. This
gradual reduction to the 'whole must not be thought of as something
similar to the pre-Classical unifiability due to 'magical', or
'mystical', necessary resemblance. It apparently alludes to the
necessity of constructing an order of comprehensibility so as to
compensate for the loss of, and replace the pre-Classical picture,
largely based upon theology and divine providence. Nevertheless,
a thread of continuity between the two might be traced since "the
deeper sense then in which art, for Diderot, imitates nature is in
its use of the inherent affinities of things for the creation of
unified structures, the principle upon which all organic existence
rests"; Funt, op. cit., p. 132. See below, note 238.
2 30
"The Order of Things", op. cit., p. 144.
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which an object, an animal, a plant may possess, as a category,
a device for collecting/nominating/ordering in "a squared and
spatialized development",228 bypasses the nature of things and sets
out to master them by means of their formality and by formalizing
such formalities. Unlike the previous system in which
each species identified itself by itself, expressed its
individuality independently of all the others: it
would have been perfectly possible for all those others
not to exist, since the criteria of definition would not
thereby have been modified for those that remained
visible,
the system of the Classical period, defining things through arbi-
trarily imposing upon them something (geometrical elements) totally
indifferent to their 'interiors', is, as a result, merely compar-
ative, generally untranslatable to something more meaningful, live,
'magical' as it were, than lines and patterns.229 For it, "an
animal or a plant is not what is indicated - or be -
trayed - by the stigma that is to be found imprinted upon it; it is
what the others are not".230 This is a radical transformation
occuring at all levels, of the individual, society, the world. It
seems to be what characterizes a state of things amidst which "diverse
groups... in... a society...can no longer agree on the meaning of God,
life, and Man...unable to decide unanimously what is to be understood
by sin, despair, salvation or loneliness", whereby things, concepts,
notions, tend to become "more bare of content, thinner, and more 282
231Mannheim, K., "Ideology and Utopia", Harvest, p. 17.
232"The Order of Things", p. 43.
233This refers directly to what has been discussed in the be-
ginning of this section, i.e. the ardour exhibited by Classical
philosophers for universality and genuine truth of knowledge, taste,
etc., possible in principle by virtue of simple mental tools rooted
in everyone, as opposed to the universality and order imputed by
tradition and the church.
234This quest is concisely formulated by John Dennis: The
great Design of Arts is to restore the Decays that happened to...
Nature by the Fall, by restoring order. The Design of Logick is
to bring back Order to our conceptions.. .of Moral Philospohy to
cure the Disorder in our Passions". From 'Essay on the Operas
after the Italian Manner', 1706, in Hussey, op. cit., p. 53. Also,
ibid., p. 113: "Nature in her primitive state was chaotic. Only
with the assistance of art and intellect could she be made beautiful,
regular, fruitful".
235
"The Order of Things", p. 148.
236 Becker, op. cit. , p. 55.
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formal ". 231
Secondly, however unjust to the wealth of Nature such superficiality
might seem to us, there was a definite and useful aim, hidden behind
it: To render it possible for things to "be analysed, recognized
23by all" 32 by means of a simple, lucid, 'technical' language, based
on representation. 233 That would only secure a mutual understanding,
and appease the disquietude caused by the apparent disorder in which
Nature presents herself prior to any organizing undertaking called
forth by man.234 Such an initial possibility of Nature, i.e. Nature
untouched by men's ordering enterprises is governed by "an order
which, in relation to the great network of taxonomies, is nothing
more than chance, disorder, or turbulence".235 Thus we are confronted
with a split. On the one hand there is Nature ordered: carefully
displayed on the surface of a table, into which everything can
smoothly slip and fall into its appropriate place, yet a Nature
meaningless and formal. On the other hand, we have Nature as is
immediately perceived: lively, rich, promising, moving, yet turbu-
lent and ungraspable. This opposition was perfectly in line and
keeping with an age-old tradition: "In earlier centuries the ideal
image of nature was, as one may say, too ghostly ever to be mistaken
for nature herself. Nature herself had hitherto seemed to common
sense untractable, even mysterious and dangerous, at best inharmon-
ious to man".236  How was the Classical age to acheive an acceptable
compromise between these extremes now that it was so deeply immersed 284
2 37 Ibid., p. 29.
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in and preoccupied with the problems of Nature?
Towards this reconciliation, the Classical period was seemingly
obliged to recoil to territories it actually disliked. It ap-
peared that it would inevitably have to adopt the notion of
Diety, which at once plans the universe as well as all that is
going to happen thus fixing the entire space and time on an unalter-
able line. This notion, however modified and attenuated, was very
much approaching past periods and their (already condemned) world-
views. The minds of the "Classical age", despite the prevalence
of reason, scepticism, science, were suspects of being
nearer the Middle Ages, less emancipated from the
preconceptions of medieval church thought, than they
quite realized or we have commonly supposed.237
Although they denounced Christian philosophy and the fear of God,
they respected with awe the "Deity"; having stultified the belief
that the universe was created in 6 days, they were enchanted by
the belief that it was a
beautifully articulated machine designed by the Supreme
being according to a rational plan as the abiding place
for mankind... They denied that miracles ever happened,
but believed in the perfectibility of the human race.
Obviously, the disciples of the Newtonian philosophy
had not ceased to worship. They had only given another
form and a new name to the object of worship: having
denatured God, they deified Nature...with eyes uplifted, 286
238Ibid., pp. 49, 63. However, while the manner of the
'Same' was gradually being overriden by that of the 'Other',
"the forces of nature and life (were) refusing to let themselves
be reduced either to algebra or to dynamics, and thus (preserved),
in the depths of Classicism itself, the natural resources of the
non-rationalizable". Foucault, 'The order of Things', op. cit.,
p. 55. The Utopian Socialists may be plausibly adduced as such
instances of the non-rationalizable; especially Owen and Fourier.
Owen's 'parallelograms' might appear to invite an interpretation
as exercises on the microcosm/macrocosm theme. Such as interpre-
tation could be supported, however indirectly, by the very name
'New Harmony' he gave to the abortive attempt to apply his theories,
by his own declaration that in the settlement of New Harmony "the
whole should bear a resemblance to a part", Benevolo, L., "The
Origins of Modern Town Planning", MIT press, 1978, and by the
possibility of a latent inclination toward mystical religion
throughout his life which he nevertheless developed explicitly
in his old age. Manuel, F., and Manuel, F., "Utopian Thought in
the Western World", Cambridge, Mass., 1979. With regard to
Fourier, moreover, it has been stated that "the analogy between
the psychological world and the Newtonian physical universe,
this new version of the ancient comparison of the microcosm with
the macrocosm, could not be driven father". Ibid.
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contemplating and admiring so excellent a system, they
were exicted and animated to correspond with the
general harmony.238
Thus, in order to reconcile the synchronic and formal nature of
the taxonomic table with the implacable evidence presented by
actuality, which resisted any ordering intervention, and pointed
to the fact that, against the artificial Nature of order, ration-
alized, mathematized, and arbitrary, there also exists an histori-
cal Nature involved in constantly transformed constellations of
equilibriums, disequilibriums, the unresolved that becomes resolved
only to fall again into a state in desperate need of resolution;
and that this Nature cannot be ignored; It was claimed that
the entire continuity of nature resides between an
absolutely archaic prototype, buried deeper than any
history, and the extreme complication of this model as
it is now possible to observe it... in the person of
the human being. Between these two extremes there lie
all possible degrees of complexity.. .like an immense
series of experiments. 2 39
This consists, in fact, in taking an abstract table of representa-
tions and, despite its synchronic quality, in turning it into a
kind of history, a simultaneous tabulated history, between the ex-
treme ends of which, one can see not only all that which exists at
the same time as he, but also all that has pre-existed, and in
addition, occasionally, the basic lines along which all is going 288
2 40 1bid. , p. 155.
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to exist thereafter. In such a table, moreover, wherein both syn-
chronic and diachronic categories are being pressed and made to
lose a great deal of their actual meaning, "far from disturbing
the order of things, (bizarre forms).. .contribute to it. It is
only, perhaps, by dint of producing monstrous beings that nature
succeeds in producing beings of greater regularity and with a more
symmetrical structure".240
This contrast brings forth a last essential characteristic of
Classical epistemology, namely the curious unity in which relativism
and the absolute have been interwoven. The absolute and the univer-
sal, the precise and the immutable, i.e. the essence peculiar to
God's ingenuous design, which pertains to all the manifestations of
the universe from the admirable 'suspension' of the stars to the
inescapable line of human perfectibility, can be best revealed and
appreciated in relation to anomalies. Thence, "bizarre forms", often
reaching the limits of the offensive, could be equally valued as
the 'universal', the unchangeable., In this context, apart from the
fact that the monster justifies the normal, remnants from the past
(fossils, for instance) illustrate, justify and legitimize the work-
ing of the Divine plan towards the goal. In them, man recognizes a
remote self, and acquires assurance in terms of the comfort, which
is produced by an attestation of the continuity from the archaic,
the 'origin', to the perfect: "The fossil, with its mixed animal and
mineral nature...like so many plaster statues, fashioned one day and 290
2 4 1 Ibid., p. 156
242As a consequence, neutrality of criticism emerges: "The
historian can ignore the norm and look at the succession of...
styles without bias;.. .approach the varieties of past creations
much as the botanist approaches his material, without caring
whether the flowers he describes are beautiful or ugly, poisonous
or wholesome...", but only with respect to "...certain recognizable
morphological characteristics such as the pointed arch.. .and the
rocaille... These terms could safely be applied stripped of their
normative connotation". Gombrich, "Norm and Form", op. cit., pp.
86, 87. This is in some aspects the approach Kaufmann labels the
'apex view'; see section II, pp. 146 ff.
243Becker, op. cit. , p. 87.
244Ibid., p. 92.
245Ibid., p. 100.
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dropped the next in favour of a more perfected form... is the
privileged locus of a resemblance required by the historian of
the continuum".241 History, roughly speaking, was accordingly
conceived of as a table of relative particulars242 out of which,
after the disagreeing parts have been cancelled out, thus
leaving possession of the table to the common elements, the
immutable nature of man, i.e. that which consists in his continual
ascent towards perfectibility, would come to sight. Lest we reach
a state in which "we have no common model for ourselves" 243
"history must be written by philosophers in order to disengage from
the facts those useful truths that will 'lead us to a knowledge of
244
ourselves'" . Such a program for a History-table demanded,
according to Montesquieu, that
The task of the philosopher-historian (be)... to note
the ideas, customs, and institutions of all peoples and
all times and in all places, to put them side by side,
and to cancel out as it were those that appeared to be
merely local or temporary: What remained would be
those that were common to humanity. From these common
aspects of human experience it would then be possible,
if at all, to discover, as Hume put it, the 'constant
and universal principles of human nature'. 245
If this program bears an extraordinary similarity to what Foucault
describes as the "Method" in Classical Natural History ("instead
of selecting, from the totality described, the elements - whether
few or numerous - that are to be used as characters, the method 292
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"The Order of Things", pp. 141, 142.
24 7Becker, op. cit., p. 104.
"The Order of Things", pp. 139 ff. Also, Funt, op. cit.,
pp. 83, 84 for a discussion of the two alternative ways by which
the 'natural man' could be reached: either by deduction, i.e., as
the 'civilized' man without his 'accidental' accretions, or inver-
sely, by induction, i.e., as the sum of the properties found common
in different societies.
249Stylistic categories, in greater or lesser compliance with
Classical epistemology have been largely treated by post-17th
century esthetics as though they were "'natural classes', as differ-
ent and as fixed as the species of animals were believed to be".
Gombrich, "Norm and Form", op. cit., pp. 81, 82.
250For the gradual establishment of tabulation and classification
in the sphere of man's behavioural traits and especially of his
sexual manners, Foucault, M., "The History of Sexuality", Vintage,
1980, Vol. I. "The Middle Ages had organized around the theme of
the flesh and the practice of penance a discourse that was markedly
unitary. In the course of recent centuries, this relative uniform-
ity was broken apart, scattered and multiplied in an explosion of
distinct discursivities which took form in demography, biology,
medicine, psychiatry,.psychology, ethics, pedagogy, and political
criticism", pp. 33, 34.
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consists in deducing them stage by stage")246 although they have
inverse aims (establishing common loci in the first case, establish-
ing differences in the latter), then what for Diderot ought to be
applied in the making of History, i.e. an abstract,. non-empirical
idea of the just and the unjust, according to which an evaluation
of facts, actions, and persons could be brought about (instead
of trying to extract out of the latter's diversity and multipli-
city, the essential principles of human nature),247 recalls what
Foucault describes as the "System"' of Classical Natural History,
i.e. applying abstract, irreducible, arbitrarily selected formal
categories as criteria for diversification and the classification
of the multiplicity of objects.248 Be that as it may, what seems
plausible is that the attempt at such a History249 was subject to
the same epistemology which governed the examination of Nature
and of man. 250 The "Table", arbitrary and relative representa-
tion, the 'enlightened' goal of an easy communicability, the
relativity of particular entities along with the universality
of the 'Ascent' , the 'origin' and the 'perfect' , history as the
permission granted to apparently unrelated episodes, often incom-
patible with each other, to enter a well-ordered classification
for the sake of the potential unifiability underlying them: How
are all these to be of help in resolving the Perrault-Laugier
tension? I believe that in relation to the above sketched
epistemological traits, both men's attitudes do fall under the
same 'period'/'category'. 294
251This touches upon the conflict, typical of the 18th century,
between "return to the original, the primitive, and dialectical
advance... Two opposite lines of thought are present, often in the
same individual; the one symbolized by the cult of the native savage
and that of antiquity, the other by the Encyclopddie, the spirit of
optimism and progress". Closely interlocking with the above was,
as a consequence, the distinction between "those disciplines which
are dependent upon the accumulation of knowledge, and are hence pro-
gressive, and those which are not: the sciences and the arts", Funt,
op. cit., pp. 58, 59. Kant too made the latter distinction. While
he considered science as based upon definite rules and thence com-
municable; from which it follows that science (the difference between
great inventor and servile imitator notwithstanding, since it is a
mere difference of degree, because they can both know) fosters,
furthers towards perfectibility and propagates the knowledge of man-
kind; "art", he maintained, "stands still at a certain point; a
boundary is set to it beyond which it cannot go, which presumably
has been reached long ago and cannot be extended further". Kant,
op. cit., p. 152. A synthesis of origin and end had been longed for
by Karl Kraus too. In a poem by him titled 'Two Runners':
'Two runners run the track of time,
Reckless the one, the other strides in awe,
The one, from nowhere, wins his goal; the other-
The origin his start- dies on the way.
And he from nowhere, he that won, yields place
To him who ever strides in awe and e'er
Has reached his terminus: the origin.'
Quoted in Szasz, op. cit., p. 55.
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I have previously ascribed 'modernism' to Perrault, on the grounds
of his radical opposition to former trends of thought. Why should
Laugier, eagerly aspiring at universal principles and in spite of
the traditionalism this aspiration seemingly implies, not be
thought of as praising, exemplifying the equally 'modern' notion
of 'origin/perfection' at the level of formal systems? The ori-
gin being his 'primitive hut', perfection, on the other hand, his
infallible Classical architecture.251 Perrault, by ruthlessly
attacking the pursuit of subtle proportions, pleaded for effi-
cacious communicability, for everybody sharing and understanding,
for beauties capable of pleasing everybody. But was Laugier not
actually pursuing the same goal when speaking of "clear princi-
ples" and "unchanging percepts"? If Perrault adopted a relativis-
tic theory of taste and formal validity, thus exemplifying, re-
presenting and potentially implying at that level what Classical
epistemology had brought about at the level of conceptions of
Nature and at the level of History, i.e. tabulation of differ-
ences by gathering them under equal terms within a totally
relative catalogue; Laugier, viewed in this light, is likely
to have done more: He both made his view of architecture fit
the origin/perfection notion thus endowing it with the Classical
absolute, and at the same time far from neglected Classical
relativism, selection of different. particulars, and displaying
them in a spectacular table. With Laugier, the translation of
the "Table of Natural History, or of the Historical "Table", at 296
252The same attitude is present in architecture as well, in the
same period. For instance, this text which accompanied an archi-
tectural drawing of 1767: "On prdsente ici sous les yeux des
personnes studieuses, le Plan, la Coupe, et L' 'Elevation d' une
ROTONDE, ou EGLISE d' une composition nouvelle, afin d' exciter de
plus en plus, et reveiller L' attention des Amateurs pour L'
Architecture. Qu' il seroit souhaiter, qu' une semblable
'Eglise fut executee ' Paris' Il ne manque plus ' cette capitale
qu' un morceau dans ce genre, pour rsunir dans cette grande ville,
toutes les beautss en Architecture des Grecs et des Romains", in
Harris, J., "Le Geay, Piranesi and International Neo-Classicism in
Rome 1740-1750", in Fraser, op. cit., figure 16.
253Laugier, op. cit.
254In this he anticipates Sitte, who, almost one-and-a-half-
century later would justify his strikingly similar indulgence in
civic estheticism by strikingly similar postulates: "...However,
major plazas and thoroughfares should wear their Sunday best in
order to be a pride and joy to the inhabitants, to awake civil
spirit, and forever to nurture great and noble sentiments within
our growing youth...", "City-Planning According to Aristic Principles",
p. 92.
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the level of a formal system may be thought of as having materialized
in his vision of the city.252 By likening the city to a forest, he
proceeds to encourage the application to urban design of all sorts
of diversifying devices, in the same manner that the design for a
garden should by all possible means avoid declining into a boring
uniformity. "I imagine a great avenue, very wide and straight,
lined with two or four rows of trees; it ends at a triumphal arch,
similar to the one I have described; from there one enters a large
place formed by a half-section of a circle, or an oval of of a
polygon; several streets extend fanlike from it... and all with
253
a vista of a beautiful work". On the model of "Nature",
numerous diversified species enter his 'civic Table', a, none-
theless, ordered table. But within the limits of this order,
virtually all sorts of indulgences are enthusiastically admitted.
He speaks of irregularity, variety, bizarre forms yet orderable,
shocking and yet pleasant. In spite of his initial fury to
justify his proposals for urban reform on the grounds of prac-
tical efects in the Paris of his day (traffic problems and the
like), he ends up his spectacular presentation of 'urban fireworks'
by pronouncing the aesthetic value of "sensational composition", by
admitting that his dreams are more or less references to a pleasing
scene, as distinct from utility, and by relegating his "scenes" for
approval to the conception of nothing other than the compelling
command to create a legendary and glorious Capital, and to present
a visual image of this Capital in accordance to the associations of
it awakened in the minds of potential visitors.254 "However, one 298
2 55 Leith, op. cit. , Ch. 3, "The Encyclopddie on the Utility of
Art"; also, Hume, "...Morals...", op. cit.
256Laugier, op. cit.
257Tafuri, op. cit., pp. 3, 4, 5.
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can pursue the useful without neglecting the agreeable255 and must
remember that a project which tends to give strangers a grand idea
of our nation and attract them in great numbers, is a project not
without utility". 256
Thus Laugier is as 'modern' as Perrault if one considers his rela-
tivistic views of the city, his respect for the origin, his belief
in perfectibility (to those that might have his "project" inappli-
cable he would answer that men would only have to start them
optimistically, and that time, in the sense of pre-destined
"perfectionement", would take care of the completion) and also the
fact that with him, aesthetics of the environment, as nothing other
than a remedy against boredom, began to assume the possibility of a
powerful wanton existence, indifferent of any ostentatious justifi-
cation, a possibility suggested in a systematic and concentrated
form. Finally, Laugier is essentially 'modern' because by "reducing
the city itself to a natural phenomenon", as Tafuri claims, he "shows
an understanding of the preeminently antiorganic quality of the
city."257 Although this statement might at a first glance appear
ambiguous and absurd, (how can a natural phenomenon have a preeminent-
ly antiorganic quality?), it can nevertheless be an instance for
recalling what has been said above about how 'arbitrary' Classical
espistemology abolished the 'organic' Reanissance one. According
to the account given of the sense in which 'organic' has been used,
one can see how Laugier's preeminently 'Classical', 'tabulated',
'relativistic' city, its picturesquencess notwithstanding, is a 300
2580r, rather, of the 'organic' pre-Classical conception of
nature. Laugier's resignation to "chaos, disorder, and a wild
variety in the general layout", (Banham, R., "Theory and Design in
The First Machine Age", Praeger, 1978, p. 252) might be compared to
Piranesi's "Carceri" with their tremendous, awesome dimensions and
"great variety ~f non-architectural objects which visualize space
by their contrasting directions and different levels... These ob-
jects produce a 3-dimensional impression but they are far from
forming a unified whole... The elements act against each other; each
is a menace to all. It is a pandemonium of hostile forces; disorder
and uproar are regnant. Thus the objects visualize and, at the
same time, decompose space...the concept of unified and integral
space has gone... The Baroque cycle has come to its end. Its way
has been from bodies to space, from space to chaos". And yet,
Piranesi's "idol is that nebulous 'truth' which he, like so many
others, believed to be attainable by copying nature". Kaufmann,
op. cit., ch. IX, 'Giambattista Piranesi'.
259Such a case, it may be held, is offered by the 'Gothic' formal
'game' which was being persistently played, at least in England,
roughly in the period between the middle of the 18th and the second
half of the 19th century. It had been given rise to by two general
conceptual systems which appeared successively and which may be
viewed as utterly contradictory in many respects. On the one hand,
the Picturesque largely owes its existence to the Classical epistem-
ology, discussed above, as well as to the new socioeconomic condi-
tions that befell England as the concomitants of the advent of the
'machine age'. On the other hand, Romanticism and Revivalism
stemmed, to a considerable extent, in the opposition to both the super-
ficiality/formality of the Classical tabulation and classification
and the increasing de-humanization brought about by the new economy
and productive processes. Whereas the first had been optimistic and
forward-looking ("Burke and the 18th century generally', may be seen
as "newly discovering a park full of terrible woods, precipitous
hills, and bottomless lakes", and turning towards them with pleas-
ant astonishment, (Hussey, op. cit., pp. 55, 56)) the second was
solemnly reverting to the past, seeking reform in art, society,301
model not of the actual, 'organic' Nature herself,258 but of the
fabricated world of an 'artificial' Nature, possessing order
founded in convention. Nature as form-moulder, conceptual sys-
tems emanating from epistemologies, religions, world-views, being
in turn 'manufactures' of ideas about form; Numerous formal or
conceptual games being played by a limited set of concepts;
Inversely a single formal game being called forth as justification
for diverse and contradictory sets of concepts;259 Surreptitious
transformations and 'betrayals'; A Concept, or a form, or a
'taste', or even an epistemological segment, being rendered
meaningless and shallow, deprived of richness and of organic con-
text; Nature ordered v.s. Nature intact; An endless series of
contradictions, fallacies, stubbornly persisting in what might
seem to be merely an endless succession of jargons and stagesets.
It would certainly be fascinating for one to try to grasp the
nature and necessity of all these. Would he not then be most
likely to become, sooner or later, overwhelmed and terrified by the
dreadful possibility that, whereas
"logic (and thence, all of man's consructa) was formerly
visualized as something outside us, something existing
independently, which if we were willing, could take us
by the hand and lead us into the path of truth, we now
suspect that it is something the mind has created to
conceal its timidity and keep its courage, a hocus-
pocus designed to give formal validity to conclusions
we are willing to accept if everyone else in our set
will too"? 260 302
ethics. Yet, both currents, to a greater or lesser extent claimed
Gothic forms to be their repository of validity; and, their differ-
ence notwithstanding, somehow constitute two stages of the same
development towards Romaticism (Hussey, op. cit., p. 17; Collins,
op. cit., p. 39). So that it might be said that, if the Picturesque,
during the 18th century, used the Gothic in a 'romatic' and liter-
ary (rather than thoroughly visual or strictly ethical) sense for
its implementation, in virtue of the suggestions, associations,
ideas, 'stories', or 'sensations' it aroused (stories or sensations
having to do with the 'crusades', 'gloom', 'sublimity', 'desolation',
etc., indistinctly); the second phase of the 'Gothic game', i.e.,
19th-century Romaticism, adopted, swallowed up, and furthered (a
fact which, however, it did not usually acknowledge) picturesque
traits and vestiges (Hussey, op. cit., pp. 150 ff). Also, for in-
stance, Pevsner, N., "The Genesis of the Pictureque", in "Studies
in Art, Architecture and Design", Vol. I, Thames and Hudson,
London, 1968; Harris, E., "Burke and Chambers on the Sublime and
the Beautiful", in Fraser, op. cit., Williams, R., "Culture and
Society", Doubleday, N.Y., 1958; Williams, R., "The Country and the
City", Oxford University Press, 1973; MacLeod, R., "Style and
Society: Architectural Ideology in Britain 1835-1914", London,
1971; Stanton, P., "Principles of Design vs. Revivalism", in
J.S.A.H., October 1954, Vol. XIII, No. 3.
260Becker, op. cit., p. 25.
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QUA EPILOGUE
If taste (as well as the activities related to it, i.e. form-giving
and form-appreciating) is a 'game' (and there are good reasons to
consider it thus, as the aforegoing pages try to show), then any
visualization of 'orthodoxy' whatsoever seems to be futile and
nonsensical. My purpose throughout this text (or bias, to be more
consistent with its essential attitude) has been centered upon the
conviction that there can be no irreversibly valid prescriptions
or doctrines concerning taste. Instead of exclusiveness and
censure, inclusiveness and a mood disposed towards non-fanatical
but active understanding of diverse alternatives presents itself
as much more preferrable and realistically adjusted to the basic
requirements of the 'game'. This does not at all mean that we
ought to, or even could, elevate ourselves above the role of
participants in it to that of its arbiter. In other words,
it does not imply that we might ever emancipate ourselves from
bias and prejudice. What it does imply is that we might possibly
keep on having our preferences and our justifications for them,
while at the same time being aware that, perhaps, other prefer-
ences and other justifications can possess a raison d'etre peculiar
to them.
Making comparisons, staging experimentations, giving way to 304
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unfamiliarity and the unforeseeable, indicate a turn of mind that
would probably exploit actively the basic traits of the 'game',
instead of merely yielding to its dyanmics. Probing diverse
attitudes and approaches, shifting consciously from one to the
other, reverting to old ones only to depart from them after a
while, might beget an over-all picture wherein the dictum 'de
gustibus non est disputandum' would reign, though crucially modi-
fied so as to exclude the unyielding stubborness that is readily
associated with it, and engender, instead, a complex, flexible dis-
cursivity. We may refer to such a picture as a 'de gustibus non
est disputandun' 'tamed' and 'civilized', made to come to terms
with the possibility of its antithesis. Or, as a disposition
epitomized by a 'why not?', though a 'why not?' resulting not
from bigotry, insolence and ignorance, but from a deep awareness
(and a bitter one) of the limits of our capabilities, sensibilities,
justifications, insiqhts, preoccupations, and creations.
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